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ABSTRACT
This thesis starts by reviewing the current literature on autism. The
review focuses on the possibility that autistic children have a specific
cognitive deficit in the development of a "theory of mind", and considers the
potential for computer use with autistic children. It is argued that the
computer is a novel form of presentation and a new channel of
communication that might be used effectively as an investigative tool for
research and as a training device.
In the experimental studies we were able to draw together these two
areas of research by examining understanding of false belief in autistic
children using tasks presented on computer. We were also able to use our
knowledge of autistic cognition in order to design programs best suited to
autistic children.
In the first experiment we tested autistic children, Down's Syndrome
children and young normal children. All three groups performed equally
well, using a mouse to traverse a hypertext type computer training program.
They were then tested using a revised version of the "Sally-Anne" task
(standard presentation) and using a computer version. For both
presentations, the autistic children were found to be impaired in their
understanding of false belief, whereas the Down's Syndrome children and
normal children passed on these tasks. The similar pattern of results for both
forms of presentation suggests that the conceptual nature of these tasks,
rather than their surface form, causes the autistic children to fail. Retesting
showed these results to be reliable. In the third experiment, the autistic
children also failed a different test of false belief (the "Smarties" task) on
both standard and computer presentations.
A minority of the autistic children showed some improvement in their
performance on the computer presentations of these tasks. The possibility
that the computer may be functioning as a training device was discussed.
In the fourth experiment we administered the Vineland Adaptive
Behaviour Scale using autistic children and Down's Syndrome children. We
found evidence to suggest that a cognitive deficit in understanding of false
belief is related to adaptive behaviour, in both autistic and Down's
Syndrome children. In addition, we found that despite being matched for
performance on two false belief tasks the clinical groups still differed in
terms of their overall adaptive behaviour scores. The implications of these
findings with respect to the theory of mind hypothesis were discussed.
The fifth experiment was a small scale training study using autistic,
Down's Syndrome and young normal children. All the subjects failed a
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series of false belief tasks prior to training. Subjects were trained to
understand false belief using a specially designed computer task. Nearly all
the subjects were able to pass the Sally-Anne task by the end of training,
however the autistic children differed from the other two groups on post-test
transfer tasks as they were unable to generalize their knowledge to pass
different false belief tasks using a different scenario. It was concluded that
the autistic subjects had learned an algorithm for the Sally-Anne task, rather
than the concept of false belief, during training. Finally, subjects were tested
on the original false belief tasks three months after the training week. This
follow up revealed that most of the autistic children retained their
knowledge of the algorithm, all of the Down's Syndrome children
maintained their post-test performance and all the normal subjects had either
remained the same or improved.
The thesis concludes with a discussion of the experimental results as a
whole in relation to the experimental hypotheses, and with suggestions for
possible future research.
ix.
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LITERATURE REVIEW
In 1943, Kanner produced a paper describing a group of eleven
children who he claimed shared the same unusual characteristics. The
essential features he described, impairment of social relationships,
stereotyped behaviour and deficits in language development, in
essence remain, although perhaps in a more detailed form, as primary
criteria for the diagnosis of what Kanner chose to call "infantile
autism".
This review will consider some of the recent discussions of the
following topics:
CHAPTER 1. 
a) Diagnosis and Identification
b) Epidemiology
c) Aetiology
CHAPTER 2. 
a) Research on Diagnostic Criteria
b) Research on Cognitive Deficits
Firstly, in order to identify the type of children used in this
research, we need to consider the criteria currently used to diagnose
autism and discuss some of the issues concerning diagnosis which have
been debated over the last forty years.
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CHAPTER 1.
A). DIAGNOSIS AND IDENTIFICATION. 
There has been a great deal of disagreement and confusion over the
definition and diagnosis of autism. Early reports used a variety of
terms; "childhood psychosis", "schizophrenic syndrome", and "infantile
autism", and for many years, autism was thought to be a childhood
version of adult psychosis; in particular, it was speculated to be the
earliest form of schizophrenia, (Fish ,1977; Fish et al ,1968). Lack of
knowledge over the underlying pathology, and the fact that the
condition is so rare, contributed to the difficulty workers had in
attempting to classify autism. It is important that some agreement is
reached over the diagnostic terms used, so that subject selection is kept
uniform across studies, and so that educational planning and
provision for the autistic population can be achieved.
It appears now, however, that there is some consensus in diagnosis
(Schopler, 1983), and the major systems of classification, ICD-9 (World
Health Organization, 1987) and DSM-III (American Psychiatric
Association, 1987), both concentrate on four main diagnostic criteria.
Although we shall return to discuss these in detail (see Chapter 2) we
shall, by way of introduction, briefly note some of the issues here.
Rutter and Schopler (1987) describe the main criteria as the following:
1. Abnormalities in communication;
2. Aspects of deviance in the development of social relationships;
3. Restricted, repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour;
4. Onset before 30 months.
These four features are considered to be the fundamental criteria
for diagnosis, and although "secondary" additional features may be
present, it is these that are considered to be the "core" features of
autism. What makes autism all the more puzzling, as Newson (1987)
explains, is that, "Every kind of impairment links to every other
impairment in the syndrome. They overflow and pervade each other,"
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and what is most characteristic of autism is, "...the interaction between
different parts of the syndrome."
The autistic child's "abnormalities in communication" consist not
only of delayed language development (Rutter 1980), but as more
recent research has shown also includes impairment of other modes of
communication such as gesture (Attwood, 1984; Chapman 1981)), facial
expression and other "body language". The language impairment itself
is distinct from specific language disorders such as dysphasia (Rutter,
1980), and typical features, when speech is present, include delayed
echolalia (Cantwell, Baker and Rutter, 1978), and pragmatic difficulties
(Bates, 1976; Langde11,1980).
It is now clear that "deviance in the development of social
relationships" is an important defining feature of autism, and
descriptions of the specific social disturbance have become more
detailed as knowledge about social development has increased. Rutter
and Schopler (1987) point out that in using this as a diagnostic criterion,
social abnormalities should be measured in relation to the child's
mental age. It seems that from the outset autistic children show a lack
of attachment and social bonding, being apparently content in their
"aloneness," and parents (may) often suspect that their child is deaf.
The social impairment continues on through childhood and usually
into adulthood; the long-term nature of the social impairment
distinguishes autism from other conditions where an early failure in
bonding has occurred. Great difficulty is experienced in forming
friendships, the child never appears to develop cooperative play with
others and seems to lack empathy (Rutter, 1978b). However, it is
important to note that an autistic person may still show a degree of
social relatedness; it is simply the deviant form of these relationships
which is apparent (Volkmar and Cohen, 1985; Wing and Attwood,
1987).
There is a tendency for autistic children to engage in ritualistic
and compulsive behaviour, often becoming obsessed with particular
routines or objects. It is still unclear exactly what motivates this
behaviour, although it has been speculated that it represents an attempt
by the child to impose some order on what must be a confusing world,
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or it may simply reflect a rigidity and lack of creativity in thought
processes (Rutter and Schopler, 1987).
The final criterion of "onset before 30 months" has received much
attention recently. It has been argued that using age of onset as a
diagnostic criterion is problematic since it depends on parental reports
which may be unreliable (Cohen et al, 1987). It also seems likely that
there is a subgroup of children who show normal development in the
first few years with onset at a later stage, possibly as a result of
acquired brain disease (Rutter and Schopler, 1987). It may be that
aetiology is different for this group but in all other respects they share
the same deficits. Furthermore, it is argued that using the term
"childhood autism" to describe the condition is misleading (Cohen et al,
1987), since information on life course (Lotter, 1978) suggests that the
condition continues through to adulthood. However, it is certainly the
case that autism begins in childhood and by virtue of this it is a
"childhood psychosis".
Finally, diagnosis of autism can be made independently of IQ.
Initially, Kanner (1943) thought that all autistic children had normal
cognitive potential, but it is now known that around three-quarters of
these children are also mentally retarded (Rutter, 1979; Wing and
Gould, 1979). One of the problems in expressing intelligence levels
though (for example from the Wechsler Intelligence Scale) is that there
are large discrepancies between different types of cognitive skills.
Autistic children have difficulty with tasks requiring abstraction,
language and use of meaning (Hermelin and O'Connor, 1970; Rutter,
1983), but perform "better than expected" on Block Design tests
(DeMyer, 1976). This profile of test scores is not used as a criterion for
autism but is of interest for research on cognitive disabilities which will
be discussed later (see Chapter 2).
In the next section we shall discuss some of the descriptive studies
which have assessed the prevalence and incidence of autism.
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B) EPIDEMIOLOGY
Epidemiological surveys can supply us with some valuable
information concerning the magnitude of a disorder, who is at greatest
risk and the possible aetiology. There have been five major surveys in
Europe (Brask, 1972; Gillberg, 1984; Lotter, 1966; Steinhausen, Gobel,
Brelinger and Wohleben, 1983; Wing, Yeats, Brierly and Gould, 1976);
six have been carried out in Japan (Hoshino et al, 1982); one was
carried out in Africa (Lotter, 1980); and one in the United States
(Treffert, 1970). Despite the fact that many of these studies have used
different methodologies, for example employing slightly different
diagnostic criteria and screening procedures, the results appear to be
fairly consistent.
i) Prevalence
Most surveys report an incidence of between four and five cases
of autism in every 10,000 children under the age of 15, which would
predict a population of around 5000 autistic children in the UK. In the
study carried out by Lotter in Middlesex during 1963 (Lotter, 1966), a
comprehensive multistage screening process was employed in order to
identify cases. Letters were sent out to schools and institutions for the
handicapped followed by a 22-item questionnaire. The final stages
included a record review and personal examination of the children
considered to be potential cases of autism. Out of a total of 2.25 million
children between the ages of 8 and 10, 35 were diagnosed as autistic
(approx 4.5 in 10,000) and 15 had nuclear features of social aloofness
and resistance to change (approx 2 in 10,000). Prevalence rates for
Camberwell, England (Wing et al, 1976), Fukushima, Japan (Hoshino,
1982), West Berlin, West Germany (Steinhausen, 1983) all showed
similar results, with rates of approximately 2 in 10,000 "classic" cases
using a more conservative definition and between 4 and 5 in 10,000
cases using a broader definition.
Wing and Gould (1979) carried out a comparative study of the
autistic children and the mentally retarded population in the London
Borough of Camberwell. They were interested in the incidence of
children in the region who had the following "triad of impairments":
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1. An absence or impairment of two-way, social interaction.
2. An absence or impairment of the comprehension or use of language
(verbal and non-verbal).
3. A predominance of repetetive and stereotyped pursuits.
They calculated an incidence of 21.2 in 10,000 children showing this
"triad" of impairments; of these children, it was estimated that 4.9 in
10,000 could be diagnosed as autistic, showing such distinguishing
features as elaborate routines and obsessions, early onset, and specific
language difficulties characteristic of autism (pronoun reversal and use
of idiosyncratic phrases). Clearly, the criteria used for diagnosis can
alter estimated incidence rates quite noticeably. Wing and Gould (1979)
have made the suggestion that autism constitutes a distinctive sub-
group of those children who show the "Triad of Impairments"
described above, and that the main characteristics of autism can be
found over a wide range of different mental handicaps. It is possible
then that the incidence of autism is slightly higher than the early
surveys suggested.
ii) Gender
All the epidemiological surveys show a higher rate of autism in
boys than in girls. The male:female ratios found in most studies are
between 1.4:1 and 3.4:1 (eg.lberg,1984; Lotter,1966), although in
Fukushima, Japan, a ratio increases with IQ, in other words , autistic
girls are more seriously impaired in autistic functions than autistic boys
(Lotter,1966; Wing,1981), although this trend was not shown in the
West Berlin study (Steinhausen et al, 1983) or the Goteberg study
(Gillberg,1984).
A variety of explanations have been offered to account for these
gender differences. Wing (1981) hypothesized that the language and
communication impairments of autism forces both the boys and the
girls to use other cognitive skills for IQ tests, and the more limited
compensatory visuo-spatial skills of the girls accounts for the sex
ratio:IQ relationship. Other workers have offered genetic arguments to
explain the gender differences (Tsai, Stewart and August, 1981;
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Wing, 1981). It remains unclear exactly why there should be a predominance
of autistic boys, and why autistic girls have a lower mean IQ, but any
findings in this area may reveal important clues towards aetiology.
iii) Social Class
It was originally thouhgt that the parents of autistic children were more
likely to come from the upper social class and observations from early
epidemiological studies seemed to support this idea (Lotter, 1966; Treffert,
1970). However, at the time of these surveys awareness of autism was not
widespread and upper class parents were more likely to look for help, and
receive it, which created a false impression of the social class distribution.
Several authors have pointed out that recognition of the disorder has
increased amongst the professional and lay persons in the middle and lower
classes, and there appears to be growing financial support for treatment
(Schopler et al, 1979; Tsai et al, 1982). This may explain the more recent
epidemiological data, for example in Camberwell (Wing, 1980) and Goteberg
(Gillberg and Schaumann, 1982), which shows no difference in social
distribution between autistic cases and the rest of the population.
C). AETIOLOGY
Early causation models of autism considered the condition to be of
psychogenic origin. Kanner described a "parent type", characterised as cold,
intellectual and lacking in emotional warmth and it was thought that an
abnormal social and emotional environment was responsible for the
psychological withdrawal which led to the condition of autism (Bettelheim,
1967; and more recently Tinbergen and Tinbergen, 1983). However, there is
no (available) evidence to support this notion (Cox, Rutter, Newman and
Bartak 1975; Wing 1976b; Cantwell, Baker and Rutter, 1979) and it is now
generally thought that autism has an organic basis. A number of
observations indicate that biological factors are at the roots of the condition.
For example, there is a high incidence of epilepsy (Rutter, Bartak and
Newman, 1981), a high ratio of boys to girls (Gillberg, 1984; Lotter, 1966), an
increased incidence of non-right handed children in the autistic population
(Tsai and Stewart, 1982) and a slight increase in perinatal complications
(Deykin and MacMahon, 1980).
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Possible neurological, biochemical and genetic causes have been
investigated, but the precise nature of the organic basis remains unclear. In
their recent review, Rutter and Schopler (1987) conclude that in spite of the
evidence that autism has an organic basis, it is " not usually associated with
gross abnormalities of brain structure or histology " and that "the organic
basis must be of some more subtle, less easy to detect, variety."
Autism probably arises from a variety of aetiologies (Ornitz, 1987) and
there are signs of problems at different levels. A single genetic or
biochemical cause has not been found and results are unreliable in that they
vary across different studies. It is more likely then, that a root cause consists
of a complex interaction of biochemical, genetic and neurological factors. It is
possible however that this interaction may lead to a basic cognitive deficit
which underlies the core symptomology of autism, and, if this is the case, a
cognitive description of the condition might suggest approaches to treatment
as well as furthering our understanding of normal cognition.
In this section then, we will be considering some of the more promising
findings from recent studies and looking at aetiology in the context of what
light it might shed on cognitive deficits.
i) Studies of Biochemical Functioning and Genetics
Biochemical studies have looked at a wide range of neurotransmitters
and neuroendocrine systems related to neurotransmission in the central and
peripheral nervous system. Theories of neurochemical aetiologies may
potentially identify a specific and effective drug for treatment.
Recent reviews of this area conclude that consistent and replicated
differences in biochemical functioning between autistic and normal
populations have not been found (Young et al, 1982; Ornitz, 1987). Those
findings which were mentioned included an increase in whole blood 5-HT
(the most well replicated), abnormalities in peptide excretion and in
neuroendocrine functioning and some evidence to suggest that central
dopamine turn-over may be increased.
It has long been thought that there is some genetic contribution to the
cause of autism. Biochemical studies have failed to identify a particular
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genetic marker responsible for the expression of autism, so that
investigations of familiality have had to concentrate on twin studies and
family studies.
An early family study by Rutter (1968) calculated the incidence of
autism in siblings at two per cent. Although this may appear to be a small
figure Rutter noted that this was fifty times higher than the incidence
expected from the normal population.
The twin studies of Ritvo et al (1985) produced some striking results,
highly suggestive of genetic factors. They reported a concordance rate of
95.7% for MZ twins, compared to 23.5% for DZ twins. However, these
studies have a number of faults associated with them (Rutter and Schopler,
1987). It is not clear what biases were operating in the selectio-n of theii
sample since it relied on voluntary participation. The DZ sample included
opposite-sexed twins which, given that there is a sex difference in the
frequency of autism, skews the results. Finally, DZ twins are approximately
twice as frequent in the general population as MZ twins and yet the sample
used included more MZ twins than DZ twins.
Folstein and Rutter (1977) studied 21 same-sex pairs where at least one
twin was autistic. Their sample included ten DZ twin pairs and 11 MZ pairs.
Four sets of MZ twins were found to be concordant for autism while none of
the DZ twins were concordant. This significant difference suggests that
genetic factors are of importance in the expression of autism. However MZ
twins were not always fully concordant which suggests that other non
genetic factors are involved. Folstein and Rutter developed the hypothesis
that several factors interact to produce the phenotype of autism, but the
underlying genetic liability was for a milder cognitive impairment. On closer
examination of the twin pairs used in their study it was found that in
addition to the four autistic MZ twins, five other MZ twins showed some
cognitive impairment, in other words 9 out of the 11 twins were concordant
for some sort of cognitive impairment. In contrast only 1 out of 10 DZ twins
showed any cognitive impairment. August, Stewart and Tsai (1981) found a
cluster of cognitive disabilities in siblings of autistic children, which also
suggests that a cognitive impairment may be inherited.
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These studies then, suggest that there is no unitary biochemical or
genetic cause of autism; it seems that there may be some cognitive deficit
worth looking for. Let us look in more detail at the studies of neurological
functioning to see if they can tell us anything about possible cognitive
deficits in autism.
ii) Studies of Neurological Functioning
Neurophysiological studies of cortical and subcortical events have been
carried out. Cortical dysfunctions may be relevant to autistic disturbances of
higher cognitive functioning such as language and communication.
Neurophysiological investigations of cortical events have included
electroencephalogram studies (EEG), radiological studies (eg computerised
tomography, CT) and event-related-potential studies. Incidences of epilepsy
in autism have also been examined. In addition associated neurological
disorders have been considered and a number of neuropathological studies
undertaken. Finally, comparisons with adults with known lesions have been
made in an attempt to pinpoint an area of cortical dysfunction.
ii.a) Cortical functioning
Many of the hypotheses concerning the localizing of neuropathology in
autism have focused on left-hemisphere dysfunction.
Workers such as Ricks (1975), Hermelin (1976), Blackstock (1978) and
Prior and Bradshaw (1979) claim that abnormalities of information
processing observed in autistic children are suggestive of a dysfunction of
the left hemisphere. Prior (1979) argues that the language disability shown
by autistic children (Bartak, Rutter and Cox, 1975) is a result of a dysfunction
of the left hemisphere. Similarly, the profile of sub-test results for the
Wechsler intelligence scale demonstrated by DeMyer (1976) was thought to
be a reflection of left hemisphere dysfunction. More recently however, these
studies have been subject to criticism. Arnold and Schwartz (1983) point out
that these results may have been obtained by chance (for example, Prior and
Bradshaw, 1979) or that the measures used may not have been valid (for
example, Blackstock, 1978). Furthermore Fein, Hume, Kaplan, Lucci and
Waterhouse (1984) argue that the division of cognitive tasks into right and
left hemisphere functions is an artificial and arbitrary exercise. They also
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point out that the profile of language deficits in autism (eg, particular
difficulty with pragmatics) does not suggest left hemisphere dysfunction.
Experimental studies of cerebral lateralization have also been
attempted. Electroencephalogram (EEG) studies have produced some
promising results. Small (1975) measured the mean integrated EEG voltage
over each hemisphere and found that the voltage over the left hemisphere
did not show the normal increment over the right hemisphere. During
linguistic tasks it was found that for 7 out of 10 autistic children there was a
lack of left hemisphere EEG activation which normal children show under
such conditions (Dawson, Warrenberg and Fuller, 1982). Abnormal patterns
of cerebral lateralization were also found in EEG studies of autistic children
during sleep (Ogawa et al, 1982). One study of the maturation of ear
advantage suggests unfavourable lateralization (James and Barry, 1983);
using reaction times to monaural presentation of tones they demonstrated a
developmental delay in ear advantage. However, dichotic listening studies,
as reviewed by Ornitz (1987) do not consistently support the cerebral
lateralization hypothesis. Also, experiments using radiological techniques
such as computerised tomography (CT) have not produced consistent
findings to support the hypothesis (Damasio, Maurer, Damasio, and Chui,
1980; Rosenbloom et al, 1984; Tsai, Jacoby and Stewart, 1983).
There is further evidence of cortical dysfunction and structural
abnormalities in autism. A number of experiments have reported that
abnormally small P300 waves are produced in response to target stimuli
requiring an active response (Courchesne et al, 1984; Niwa et al, 1983),
although the total number of children tested has been small and
interpretation of these results is therefore difficult. In a minority of autistic
patients CT scans have shown abnormal structural configurations (Campbell
et al, 1982; Gillberg and Svendson, 1983) which may suggest that there is a
subgroup of autistic children in which the autism is associated with a
structural brain abnormality (Ornitz, 1983). The general increase in incidence
of abnormal EEGs and the greatly increased risk for the development of
seizures (see Golden, 1987) are also suggestive of a primary cortical
dysfunction in autism.
Hypotheses of cortical dysfunction have been derived from
comparisons between autistic behaviour and that of neurologically damaged
11
adults and experimentally lesioned animals. Using this process of reasoning
by analogy, Delong (1978) drew comparisons between autistic children and
adults with Kluver-Bucy syndrome and Korsakoff's amnesic syndrome,
which involve bilateral temporal lobe damage. It is thought that the
temporal lobes are important for integrating visual information with that
from other sensory systems as well as being relevant to the control of
language and memory. In addition the temporal lobes connect to the limbic
system which relates to motivational control and emotion (Walsh, 1978). It is
proposed, then, that bilateral temporal lobe damage is a major causal factor
in autism. This hypothesis was extended further by Damasio and Maurer
(1978) who suggested a dysfunction of the mesolimbic cortex and associated
neostriatal structures. Both of these hypotheses appear quite plausible, but it
should be emphasised that they were derived solely by a process of
reasoning by analogy, which naturally has many_pitfalls, and that there is as
yet no clear cut neuropathological or neurophysiological evidence showing
localization of seizures or damage in these areas.
Postmortem examinations have failed to define consistent (lesion or)
lesions (Rutter and Schopler, 1987), although this may be due to limitations
of histological techniques. Ritvo et al (1985) have made some quite
promising findings however. They identified decreased cerebella Purkinje
cell counts in each of four patients examined and point out that, including
other studies (eg. Bauman and Kemper, 1984), a total of six out of seven
patients examined so far have shown decreased Purkinje cell counts,
although this still represents a small sample.
ii.b). Subcortical functioning
Hypotheses of subcortical functioning consider disturbances of sensory
modulation and motility as primary causal factors in autism. Although these
disturbances are not considered to be major diagnostic criteria for autism,
under-reactivity or over-reactivity to sensory stimuli, preoccupation with
spinning objects and hand flapping are observed in a majority of autistic
children, predominantly between the ages of 2 and 4 years (Ornitz, 1978).
Most of the points of transfer of sensory input are located in the brainstem
and diencephalic structures (Ornitz, 1983) and these areas have received
recent attention with regard to aetiology. Neurophysiological investigations
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have included autonomic studies, brainstem auditory evoked response
(BSER) studies and vestibular studies.
Autonomic response studies discriminate between autistic populations
and controls (Hutt et al, 1975; James and Barry, 1980a; Kootz and Cohen,
1981) and the increased reactivity of autonomic responses is thought to be
related to autistic disturbances of sensory modulation (Ornitz, 1974). It is
proposed that the deficit in autonomic habituation is linked to the autistic
child's inability to "filter" trivial sensory information, which consequently
affects selective attention.
Vestibular response studies have also produced different results for
autistic populations than for controls. In particular, they have demonstrated
abnormal visual-vestibular interactions for autistic subjects, even in the
absence of visual fixation (Ornitz et al, 1974).
Studies of brainstem auditory evoked responses (BAER) have not
produced consistent results to support the hypothesis of brainstem
dysfunction. However, a number of studies have recorded prolonged
brainstem transmission times (BSTTs) in a minority, possibly a subgroup, of
autistics (Fein et al, 1981; Gillberg et al, 1983). Ornitz (1987) reasons that this
may reflect the fact that BAER is the response to a pathological change in
tissue or in a specific group of neurons. In contrast, the autonomic and
vestibular abnormalities are more likely to reflect a common brainstem
system dysfunction that underlies the autistic behavioural syndrome.
In summary, studies of neurological functioning have produced some
promising findings involving both cortical and subcortical pathophysiology
in autism. Cortical functions are thought to be related to higher order
cognitive functioning, whilst subcortical functions are thought to be related
to sensory modulation and motility functions. However, it is difficult to
separate cortical and subcortical influence on cognitive behaviour as they are
so closely associated with one another.
The complex pattern of genetic, biochemical and neurological factors
which appears to be implicated in autism means that a simple physiological
model of the condition is unlikely to be forthcoming. There are indications
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that a cognitive level of explanation may provide a simpler and, perhaps,
more applicable description of the condition.
In this thesis we shall be examining a possible deficit in higher order
cognitive functioning, a basic deficit in "theory of mind" (Premack and
Woodruff, 1978), which may be the province of cortical functions. By
considering cognitive functions it may ultimately be possible to describe a
functional impairment more fully.
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CHAPTER 2. 
A). RESEARCH ON DIAGNOSTIC CRITERIA
This section examines the main criteria used for diagnosing autism,
looking particularly at more recent research.
i). Abnormalities in Communication
Autistic children show an unusual pattern of linguistic skills which
seem to be unique to the group (Rutter, 1978a). It is not surprising then, that
the language deficiency in autism has received a great deal of attention and
was at one time considered to be at the very root of autistic withdrawal
(Rutter, Bartak and Newman, 1971). Early descriptions of autism, including
Kanner's (1943), made note of deviant language characteristics such as
mutism, literalness, echolalia, pronoun reversal, metaphorical substitution
and failure to use speech for communicative purposes. These features are
still recognised as the core properties of the communication deficiency in
autism (Rutter, 1987).
A deficit in communicative functioning can be seen in autistic
children even at the early preverbal stages. Bartak, Rutter and Cox (1975)
report a lack of preverbal pointing, showing, or turn taking. Autistic
children's intentional acts at a 24 month level are limited to requesting and
protesting (Wetherby and Prutting, 1984) whereas in normal development
complex forms of expression are present. The preverbal communication seen
in autism, then, does not involve those acts requiring joint attention and
reference (Paul, 1987).
The communication deficit is not confined to language. Autistic
children are also impaired in their use of gesture, facial expression and other
"body language" and the timing of these (Newson, 1977). Ricks and Wing
(1975) found that autistic children with well developed language capacities
were still impaired in their use and understanding of gestures, facial
expression, head nods and smiles normally used to support conversational
exchange. More recently Attwood (1984) and Ohta (1987) have confirmed the
impairment in the use of gesture and Langdell (1981) has identified an
impairment in face perception.
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Before discussing the speech impairment suffered by autistic children
it is important to stress that between 28% (Wolff and Chess, 1965) and 61%
(Fish, Shapero and Campbell, 1966) of these children are mute. Furthermore,
mute autistic children do not spontaneously develop gestural or other means
of conveying complex messages. Attempts to teach language using operant
conditioning have been ineffective (Howlin, 1981). A number of other
language teaching programs have met with limited success; plastic symbol
systems (Premack and Premack, 1974), written word communication systems
(La Vigna, 1977) and a computerised written system (Colby, 1973). Perhaps
the most successful and widely used systems at present, though, are manual
signing systems (Bonvillian and Nelson, 1976; Salvin, Ralph, Foster and
Lovejoy, 1977; Barrera, Loboto-Barrera and Sulzer-Azaroff, 1980). Although
some communicative gains are reported using manual sign language, as
Schuler and Baldwin (1981) point out, it is signed vocabulary items that are
learned rather than any grammatical combination of signs and the learning
of these signs is unlikely to lead to the acquisition of speech. Single words
for expressing wants and needs may be learned, but these alternative modes
of teaching language do not seem to lead to an increase in spontaneous
communicative behaviour outside the training session.
One of the most striking features of the deviant speech in autism is the
occurrence of echolalia. This consists of the repetition of a word or sentence
which may be immediate (occurring straight after another's utterance) or
delayed (when stored utterances are repeated in new, usually inappropriate
contexts). Despite the frequent occurrence of echolalia in autism, it is not
synonymous nor unique to the syndrome, being found in a wide variety of
other conditions such as dementia, congenital blindness, acquired aphasia
and also in the early language development of some normal children (Fay
and Schuler, 1980).
Although some echolalia may appear non-functional it is now thought
that immediate and delayed echolalia can serve communicative functions.
Prizant and Dunchan (1981) proposed six communicative functions that may
be served by immediate echolalia. These functions were turn-taking,
assertions, affirmative answers, requests, rehearsal to aid processing and
self-regulation. Hurtig, Ensurd and Tomblin (1982) suggested that echolalia
may be used by autistic children as a crude but effective means of
maintaining conversational flow. There are also instances when delayed
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echolalia may be considered functional, for example, it may be used to
request recreations of scenes (Prizant and Rydell, 1984). Shapiro (1977) and
Carr, Schriebman and Lovaas (1975) noted that autistic children were more
likely to echo questions they did not understand or did not know how to
respond to.
Echolalia may have a constructive role in language acquisition.
Studies in the language development of normal children have shown that
echolalia plays an important role in the development of vocabulary and in
the development of conversational skills (Paul, 1987). It may function as an
important stage between the comprehension and production of language
(Dyer and Hadden, 1982). Baltaxe and Simmons (1977) proposed that the
bedtime soliloquize of an eight year old autistic child (delayed echolalia)
may be functional, the stored utterances being used as a base for analytic
linguistic operations which the child was in the process of acquiring. Similar
behaviour can be observed in the bedtime soliloquies of some normal two
year olds (Weir 1962). Examples of echolalia in normal young children are of
particular importance since they demonstrate its role in normal development
and suggest that it is not necessarily deviant. Bloom (1970) observed echoing
in some normal children and noted that the utterances were selective,
containing advanced forms not used in spontaneous speech, again
suggesting that echolalia may be important for early language learning. One
hypothesis as to the function of echolalia is that it represents a form of
"gestalt" processing in early language development, unanalysed language
chunks being produced, as part of the learning process, with little
appreciation of their internal structure. Young normal children vary along a
continuum from those who use a mixture of analytic and "gestalt" to those
who use entirely "gestalt" processing (Peters,1980). Normal children
gradually rely more on an analytic strategy for language acquisition whilst
autistic children rely on "gestalt" processing to an extreme degree (Paul,
1987).
The language disorder in autism can be distinguished from that in
developmental receptive dysphasia (Bartak, Rutter and Cox 1975; 1977). In a
systematic comparison between autistic and dysphasic children these
authors showed that the two groups differed significantly in their linguistic
and cognitive handicaps. Autistic children had :
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1. Greater comprehension deficits;
2. Deviant characteristics such as inappropriate, immediate echoes,
delayed echolalia, metaphorical language and paucity of
spontaneous remarks;
3. Impaired social usage.
It was concluded that autistic children had unique language
difficulties, being particularly impaired in the area of pragmatics in contrast
to dysphasics whose main problems were with syntax and semantics. Before
considering the difficulties autistic children have with language use, let us
first examine other areas of language development.
Phonological development in autistic children remains unimpaired
(Bartolucci, Pierce, Streiner and Eppel, 1976) and articulation is also often
reported as either normal or precocious with a slight distortion of rhythm
and sometimes overprecision of pronunciation (Pierce and Bartolucci, 1977;
Bartak and . Rutter, 1975). Indirect evidence of a deficit in semantic
development can be found in the studies of liermelin and O'Connor "19137,
1970) which suggest that autistic children make little use of meaning in
recalling verbal material. Simmons and Baltaxe (1975) also present evidence
of impaired semantic skills although their study lacked data on controls. The
experiments of Tager-Flusberg (1985), however, suggest that the
representation of semantic knowledge in autistic children does not differ
from subjects matched for mental age. It should be noted also, that autistic
children often develop large vocabularies and in some cases take an
obsessive interest in words and word meaning.
Studies of syntactic development in autistic children suggest that it
follows the same pattern as that observed in normal children but proceeds at
a slower pace, lagging behind normal development (Tager-Flusberg, 1981;
Bartak et al, 1975, 1977; Pierce and Bartolucci, 1977). More recently Paul and
Cohen (1984b) have looked at the syntactic skills of adult autistics and
suggested that syntactic development may reach a plateau of performance
below that of retarded controls matched for non verbal IQ.
Difficulty with pronominal reversal is also a typical feature of speech
in autism. Particularly a failure to reverse pronouns, for example shifting
"you" to "I". This is considered to be a problem of tracking shifting reference
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in deictic terms, which may be related to deficits in understanding another's
point of view (Fay, 1971).
The vocal quality, intonation, and stress patterns in autistic speech are
often deviant (Ricks 1975). Intonational peculiarities in speech vary from
monotony (Fay and Schuler, 1980), to unusually high frequency speech,
harshness and poor control of volume (Provnost, Wakstein and Wakstein,
1966) all of which hamper communication. It has also been observed that
autistic children fail to take advantage of stress cues in their speech (Frith,
1966; Baltaxe, 1984) which is of importance to communication.
There have been few studies of language comprehension, but the
work that has been done suggests that this is also an area of impairment for
autistic children. Autistic children perform poorly on standardized tests of
language comprehension (Bartak et al, 1975, 1977; Paul and Cohen, 1984b)
and show poor sentence comprehension (Tager-Flusberg, 1981b) in
comparison to retarded and aphasic controls matched for non verbal mental
age.
Although some difficulties are found in these aspects of autistic
language development, syntax, semantics and phonology remain largely
unimpaired in comparison to pragmatic aspects of their language (Bartak,
Rutter and Cox, 1975; 1977; Cromer, 1981; Tager-Flusberg, 1981; 1985). Let us
examine the area of pragmatics in more detail then, since it appears to be a
specific problem for autistic children and, as we shall discuss later, may
reflect some underlying basis to the syndrome.
Pragmatics can be defined as the communicative use of speech and
gesture in a way appropriate to social context (Bates, 1976). Indirect reports
of a deficit in this area appeared early in the literature. Kanner (1943) noted a
failure to use speech for communicating meaning to others, but studies
looking specifically at pragmatic skills in autism have been more recent.
Baltaxe (1977) reported that autistic subjects often failed to shift out of the
hearer role to become a speaker and also failed to follow "conversational
postulates" of acceptability and politeness (Bates, 1976). In addition, Baltaxe
noted that autistic adolescents tended not to "foreground and background"
their utterance, for example by the use of definite and indefinite articles,
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making it difficult for listeners to differentiate between old and new
information.
Langdell (1980) examined the speech of autistic children and noted a
tendency to ask embarrassing questions; inappropriate use of a pedantic and
formal style of speech in an informal context, particularly by higher level
autistic children, was also identified. Langdell described other examples of
pragmatic deficits in autistic speech. When autistic children start talking to
someone, they fail to use appropriate boundary markers, for example
"Hello", which, it was argued, was due to difficulties in taking another
person's point of view. This may also explain the difficulty autistic children
had modifying their accounts, when reporting events, according to whether
the listener had been present or not.
Another pragmatic skill which autistic children have difficulty with is
turn taking in conversation (Fay and Schuler, 1980). For example autistic
children tend to interrupt the speaker inappropriately (Pacci-Cooper, Curcio
and Sacharko, 1980) and fail to signal turn taking using eye contact (Mirenda
et al, 1983). There is also a tendency to remain in the speaker's role (Bernard-
Opitz, 1982; Paul and Feldman, 1984) or in the respondent's role (McCaleb
and Prizant, 1985) for too long, violating Grice's (1975) "maxim of quantity".
Wetherby and Prutting (1984) examined the range of speech acts
(Austin, 1962) displayed by autistic children. They noted an absence of
requests for information, acknowledgements of others, showing off and
commenting. Some speech acts were used however, although these were
limited to requests for objects and actions or, were in the form of a protest.
They concluded that autistic children were able to regulate an adult's
behaviour to obtain objects, or to obtain an environmental end, but they
were unable to draw attention to themselves, or to an object, as an end in
itself.
There is some evidence, however, that autistic children do attempt to
use language in a communicative way. In a case study by Bernard-Opitz
(1982), communicative performance was found to vary across different
settings with different interlocutors, which indicated some social awareness
in the use of language. Hurtig, Ensurd and Tomblin (1980) examined
persistent and perseverative questioning behaviour in autistic subjects and
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concluded that although this did not serve the purpose of requesting
information, it was communicative in that it functioned as a means of
initiating interactions. Ball (1978) and Caparulo and Cohen (1977) also argue
that autistic children seem to recognize the function of language which
serves to inform others. In addition it is argued that echolalia is used to
request, protest and affirm (Prizant and Duchan (1981), which may also be
thought of as examples of using language communicatively. If our definition
of pragmatics, used earlier, hinges on "..the communicative use of speech
and gesture.." then we must consider whether these are in fact examples of
communicative behaviour.
Clearly some definition of "communicative" behaviour is required.
Baron-Cohen (1988) points out that in Speech Act Theory (Austin, 1962;
Searle, 1965) communicative behaviour consists of "complex intentions", in
other words it involves a speaker's intentions to affect a listener's intentions
or beliefs. The examples above (Hurtig et al, 1980; Prizant and Duchan, 1981)
focus on the speaker's intentions alone. It would seem more accurate,
perhaps, to describe autistic children's language as instrumental rather than
communicative (Baron-Cohen, 1988).
In contrast to the difficulties autistic children have with pragmatic
skills, young normal children display pragmatic competence from a very
early age (Wellman and Lempers, 1977; Furrow, 1984) and a normal range of
speech acts are displayed by language delayed children (Rom and Bliss,
1981; Ball, 1981), Down's syndrome children (Coggins, Carpenter and
Owings, 1983) and mentally handicapped adolescents (Price, Williams and
Sabsay, 1979; Bedrosian and Prutting, 1978).
Autistic children, then, are especially deviant in the area of pragmatic
functioning (Tager-Flusberg, 1981; Baron-Cohen, 1988). Furthermore,
pragmatic deficits can be seen in gesture (Bartak et al, 1975; Attwood, 1984;
Wetherby and Prutting, 1984; Ohta, 1987) which suggests that its basis is
more than a surface linguistic problem.
To summarize, we have seen that the language profile of autistic
children is unlike that of any other language delayed or developmentally
delayed clinical group. For those autistic children who can speak, a common
feature is echolalia, which is now thought to be functional, perhaps playing a
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role in the language acquisition process. Some autistic children may develop
competence in phonology, syntax and semantics, but the main area of
deviance is with pragmatics. Later (see Chapter 3) we shall discuss the
possibility that this language profile may reflect a basic cognitive deficit in
autism.
ii). Impairment in Social Relations
The social impairment observed in autistic children is one of the most
striking features of the syndrome. In Kanner's (1943) early descriptions of
autism, difficulty with social relationships are emphasised as a cardinal
feature. Deviance in the development of social relationships is now used as
an important diagnostic criterion in the major classification systems
(WH0,1978; APA,1980). However, despite the importance of this area of
development, it is only in the last ten years that detailed attention has been
paid to it, as it has been considered a "secondary symptom" and research on
cognitive deficits and communication deficits have taken precedence. As
Volkmar (1987) points out though, even if the social factors are not
"primary", they may still be of importance in defining the syndrome and
they may provide insights to help us understand the role of social factors in
relation to other aspects of development.
Studies of early development in autistic children (Ornitz, 1977, 1978;
Volkmar et al, 1986) show severe early social deficits and follow up studies
(Rutter, Greenfield and Lockyer, 1967; Rumsey, Rapoport and Sceery, 1985)
testify to a lifelong and persisting social impairment in autism. Wing and
Gould (1979), in their epidemiological survey, categorised this social
impairment into three types: social aloofness, passive interaction, and active-
but-odd interaction. In other words, not all autistic children are aloof and
withdrawn since those in the active-but-odd group do approach and attempt
to interact with others. What makes this category unusual is that the
interactions are inappropriate, as Baron-Cohen (1988) describes, being
"undertaken to indulge some repetitive, idiosyncractic preoccupation,
showing no interest in the other person's needs." Aloofness and detachment
appear to be more marked in younger childhood (Wing, 1981) and indeed it
may be that there is a developmental progression through these categories,
from "aloof" to "passive" in "social responsiveness" and from "aloof" to
"passive" to "odd" in "rate of initiation" (Lord, 1984).
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Despite the severity of the impairment in social relations then, autistic
children are not all totally detached and withdrawn. For example, autistic
children do appear to be capable of taking account of other people's
behaviour. Hopkins and Lord (1981) observed the number of initiations and
responses to interactions in autistic subjects in an attempt to measure which
of the three social impairment categories (Wing and Gould, 1979) each child
fell into. They found that this could be determined by the age, sex,
familiarity and diagnosis of who the child was interacting with. Similarly,
when Clark and Rutter (1981) measured social behaviour in terms of "degree
of compliance" they found differential social responsiveness to varied tone of
voice and varied interpersonal demands. Autistic children also do show
some attachment behaviour, for example, proximity-seeking after reunion
with a caregiver (Sigman and Ungerer, 1984), eye contact and reaching after
tickling in 3 to 6 year olds (Sigman et al, 1986) and gestural requests for
social routines (Wetherby and Prutting, 1984).
One of the problems in this area of research is the differential
definition of "social behaviour" across various studies. In the examples
above, Hopkins and Lord (1981) used "number of initiations and responses
to interactions" whilst Clark and Rutter (1981) used "degree of compliance".
A full discussion of definition here would be beyond the scope of this thesis,
but it is perhaps worth noting the work of Damon (1979) and Frye (1981)
who describe social behaviour more thoroughly in terms of "mutually
intentional relations" in their detailed discussion of normal child
development. Using this approach, it has been found that autistic children
show significantly less "joint attention" than matched controls, and "show" or
point to toys less often (Mundy et al, 1986; Sigman et al, 1986; Loveland and
Landry, 1986).
Let us now consider the experimental studies of social understanding
that reveal a particular profile of impairment for autistic children.
There is some evidence of "eye-gaze avoidance" in autistic children.
Hutt and Ounsted (1966) and Richer (1976) found that autistic children
looked at people's faces less than controls. However, this quantitative
measure may be misleading as Hermelin and O'Connor (1967) demonstrated
that autistic children simply have shorter, more frequent fixations for all
types of stimuli, not just faces. Perhaps a more important aspect of eye gaze,
23
which appears to be impaired, is its social use. Mirenda, Donnellan and
Yonder (1983) found qualitative differences between eye gaze use in autistic
and normal children. They found that during monologues, autistic children
tended to look for longer and more frequently.
In tests of face-recognition autistic children were unimpaired in their
ability to recognise their peers in photographs (Langdell, 1980). Langdell
also found that when only the lower half of a face was shown autistic
children made fewer errors than controls in face-recognition; in other words
they were less dependent on the upper part of the face (the eye region) for
recognition, suggesting that they may use a different strategy for face
recognition.
Hobson (1986a, 1986b) tested autistic children's understanding of
emotions. He looked at the ability to match emotional expressions from
different modalities and found that autistic children made more errors than
controls in choosing schematic faces to match videotapes showing emotions
expressed in gesture, vocalization or context. However, recognizing
emotions in one modality appears to be less difficult. Autistic children were
able to sort photographs of faces with different emotional expressions
significantly above chance (Langdell, 1981). Jennings (1973) and Weeks and
Hobson (1987) found that autistic children preferred to sort photographs
according to non affective stimuli (such as different hats) than by emotional
indices; this was in contrast to normal controls who preferred to sort by
emotional expression. Recognition of age and sex was also found to be
impaired (Hobson, 1983, 1987) although sex recognition alone was not found
to be impaired (Weeks and Hobson, 1987; Ableson, 1981).
Autistic children seem to be unimpaired in visual self-recognition,
being able to understand their own reflection in mirrors (Ferrari and
Matthews, 1983; Dawson and McKissick, 1984; Baron-Cohen, 1985). This has
been interpreted as showing that they have some concept of self as a separate
physical object of their own perception. It should be noted though that
autistic children do not show the shyness and embarrassment in front of a
mirror (Baron-Cohen, 1985; Spiker and Ricks, 1984) usually observed in
normal children (Amsterdam and Greenberg, 1977) and in Down's children
(Mans, Cichetti and Sroufe, 1978).
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In tests of perceptual role-taking, autistic children were found to be
unimpaired (Hobson, 1984; Baron-Cohen, 1985). However, autistic children
performed significantly worse than matched controls in tests of conceptual
role-taking (Baron-Cohen Leslie and Frith, 1985), being impaired in their
ability to predict where a person would look for an object they had left in
one location, but which had been moved to another location in that person's
absence. This was interpreted as a failure to attribute beliefs to others, which
involves using a "theory of mind" (Premack and Woodruff, 1978). Further
evidence of a failure to attribute mental states was demonstrated with a
picture-sequencing task (Baron-Cohen et al, 1986) and using a gift-choosing
paradigm (Dawson and Fernald, 1987). We shall examine these ideas in
more detail later (see Chapter 3) as this thesis is particularly concerned with
the "theory of mind" hypothesis.
Imitation ability has also been tested in autistic children. DeMyer et al
(1972) found that imitation of body movements was at a lower level than
imitation of object use. However, imitation ability appears to be related to
mental age (Van Smeerdjick, 1981) and seems to be unimpaired at lower
levels but impaired at higher levels (Jones and Prior, 1985). Curcio (1978)
and Hammes and Langdell (1981) concluded that although imitation of
abstract gesture is difficult for autistic children, on the whole imitation is not
an autism-specific impairment.
It seems that the social deficit persists throughout the lifetime of an
autistic person with an inability to take part in two-way reciprocal
interaction. Despite this bleak picture however, it should be emphasised that
it is the quality and nature of the social relationships, rather than their
complete absence, that is aberrant. The experimental studies of autistic
children's social understanding reveal a specific profile of impairment unlike
any other clinical group. Face recognition, mirror self-recognition and
perceptual role-taking appear to be unimpaired, whilst there is severe
impairment in the intermodal matching of emotional expressions, conceptual
role taking and imitation of symbolic gestures. If children's cognitions are
the primary determinants of their behaviour (Cairns, 1979) then this profile
of impairment may offer some clues as to a basic cognitive deficit underlying
autism.
1
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iii). Ritualistic and Compulsive Phenomena
In young autistic children there is a tendency to engage in restricted,
repetitive and stereotyped patterns of behaviour (Rutter and Schopler, 1987).
There is a tendency to impose a rigid routine on a wide range of day-to-day
activities. The stereotyped behaviour applies to autistic children across a
whole range of IQs (Bartak and Rutter, 1976). In their review, Rutter and
Schopler (1987) list a variety of ways in which stereotyped behaviour may be
shown. It may include:
a) an encompassing preoccupation with stereotyped and restricted
patterns of interest
b) attachments to unusual objects
c) compulsive rituals
d) stereotyped and repetitive motor mannerisms
e) preoccupation with part-objects or non-functional elements of
play materials
f) distress over changes in small details of the environment
The meaning of these ritualistic and compulsive phenomena remains
obscure. Stereotypical behaviour is not exclusive to autism and can be found
in other mentally retarded and hyperactive children (Berkson and Mason,
1963; Hutt and Hutt, 1970; Thelan, 1979). Some authors have speculated that
stereotypies may be symptoms of a neurological or biochemical abnormality
(Robbins and Sahakian, 1979; Robbins, 1982), whilst others have argued that
they reflect a rigidity in thought processes (Newson, 1987) or an attempt to
impose some order on an otherwise confusing world (Rutter and Schopler,
1987).
The stereotyped behaviour tends to diminish as the child grows
(Gillberg and Schaumann, 1981) or more complex routines may develop. The
autistic child is highly resistant to any attempts to interfere with or change a
routine or ritual, often responding with temper tantrums which may be quite
violent. Obsessions may develop for unusual objects or subjects (in this
author's experience this may range from cassette players to cranes) which the
child will draw constant attention to and talk about incessantly.
Attempts to eliminate or discourage these behaviours, including
physical punishment (Risley, 1968; Koegel and Covert, 1972), sensory
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extinction (Ricover, 1978), jogging (Kern et al, 1982) and behaviour
modification (Marchant et al, 1974), have met with some success. An
adequate explanation for these behaviours however, has not yet been put
forward and it remains unclear how these compulsions and rituals may be
related to cognitive deficits or to other aspects of development in autism.
In this section we have seen that autism is characterised by a
particular profile of social impairment and language impairment. It should
also be emphasised that these impairments overflow and pervade one
another, the social use of language being a specific impairment and
problems with two-way reciprocal interaction being a particular aspect of
the social deficit.
In the next section we shall discuss the research on cognitive
development in autism and later examine proposals for a basic cognitive
deficit that might underlie the behavioural impairments.
B). COGNITIVE DEFICITS
In recent years, the significance of cognitive functioning in autism has
become clear (Rutter, 1983). Autism is often associated with mental
retardation, with approximately two thirds of autistic children achieving IQ
scores on standardised tests in the mentally retarded range (see section 2). It
is not surprising, then, that some cognitive deficits will be present. However,
using appropriate controls (chronological-age matched and mental-age
matched), it has been possible to examine cognitive deficits that are
specifically associated with autism.
One popular early hypothesis of cognitive dysfunction was the
"stimulus overselectivity hypothesis" (Lovaas et al, 1971). Research
suggested that autistic children may selectively attend to one restricted
source of information, to the exclusion of others, perhaps attending to a
minor feature of the environment whilst ignoring relevant features.
However, this type of responding does not appear to be specific to autism
since it can be observed in non-autistic retarded children (Anderson and
Rincover, 1982; Gerstan, 1983). Although this is still of importance, for
example Fein, Tinder and Waterhouse (1979) have suggested that selective
attention may be guided by higher-level perceptual processes so that
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different features of attention may be relevant, this thesis is more concerned
with those processes which are unique to autism and so it is those features
that we will concern ourselves with here.
i). Perception
In a review of their early experiments on perceptual functioning,
Hermelin and O'Connor (1970) concluded that autistic children do not show
any abnormalities in lower processing levels of perception, performing
according to their level of cognitive development. Nevertheless, it does seem
that autistic children perceive the environment in a different way from
normal individuals, as can be seen from their abnormal responses to sensory
stimuli (see Frith and Baron-Cohen, 1987 for a review), and what appear to
be signs of lower level dysfunction may be explained more powerfully in
terms of higher-level cognitive dysfunctions (eg selective attention, relating
general knowledge to perceptual input, interpreting input as meaningful).
Hermelin and O'Connor carried out a series of experiments to
investigate possible higher level cognitive dysfunctions. They compared
autistic children with deaf and blind subjects as well as normal and retarded
controls, in order to examine whether cognitive problems might be related to
more specific coding problems. In particular they hypothesized that spatial
and temporal mental codes might each be associated with more immediate
sensory codes for visual and auditory information. In a task requiring
subjects to recall visually presented letters, in which spatial and temporal
orders of presentation varied independently, the order of recall revealed that
deaf and autistic children were more likely to use visual coding, whilst
normal children used temporal coding (Hermelin and O'Connor, 1975;
O'Connor and Hermelin, 1975). Strategies of recall were also examined in a
task which allowed subjects to use either touch or fixed spatial location to
encode words; blindfolded normal children were more likely to use spatial
location, whilst blind and blindfolded autistics used touch (Hermelin and
O'Connor, 1971). It was concluded that autistic children use their low level
processing functions, which are specific to the sensory modality, rather than
their higher level functions, which use abstract codes. It seems that autistic
children do have mental images and representational systems, but do not
tend to recode visual and auditory stimuli into higher level temporal or
spatial codes (ie moving from sensory to abstract codes), as normal children
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do. In other words it is this higher level of cognitive functioning that is
deficient (Hermelin, 1978).
Various patterns of perceptual ability have been examined. On tests of
object permanence autistic children have been found to perform in
accordance with their mental age (Sigman and Ungerer, 1981). Hobson
(1984) also found that this was true for the number conservation task and the
three mountains task (Piaget and Inhelder, 1956). Psychometric data has
been gathered from standard tests such as the WISC, Leiter, and Merrill-
Palmer tests. Peak performance was observed on the subtests of Block
Design and Object Assembly, in contrast to poor performance on verbal tests
(Dawson, 1983; Lockyer and Rutter, 1970; Tymchuk et al, 1977).
The observation of peak performance and sometimes exceptional
"islets of ability" is an unusual and baffling one. There have been reports of
extraordinary drawing ability (Selfe, 1977; 1983), musical talent (Rimland,
1978) and powerful calendar memory, calculation and rote memory
(Rimland, 1978). Various authors have attempted to explain these abilities by
proposing that autistic don't recode sensory stimuli into abstract codes so
that they are able to echo and reproduce relatively unprocessed stimuli,
which may enhance performance on certain tasks (Selfe, 1983; Frith and
Baron-Cohen, 1987). Also, with regard to musical ability, it is interesting to
note that given a free choice between musical and verbal information autistic
children prefer music, in contrast to normal children who like both
(Blackstock, 1978). It is also interesting that autistic children perform
particularly well on the embedded figures task, this may be due to basic
level processes being allowed to function without the selective control of
higher order functions (Shah and Frith, 1983). It seems, then, that autistic
children show deficits in tasks which require a recoding of stimuli.
The perception and recoding of meaningful stimuli has been
investigated. Hermelin and O'Connor (1976b) looked at recall of words
when presented in meaningful sentences compared to recall of words
presented in random strings. For normal children, presentation of words in
meaningful sentences enhances recall. Although autistic children did show
this effect in reduced form, compared to retarded and normal children,
matched for mental age, autistic children showed superior recall for random
strings and inferior recall for sentences. This has also been confirmed by
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other authors (Aurnhammer-Frith, 1969; Fyffe and Prior, 1978; Ramondo and
Milech, 1984). Perception of meaningful information then seems impaired in
comparison to perception of non-meaningful information. This also applies
to non-linguistic, abstract material, as Frith (1970a, 1970b) showed, using
coloured chips; autistic children's performance was unimpaired relative to
controls when recalling unstructured random material.
Patterns of salience, then, do not seem to work in the same way for
autistic children as for non-autistic children. Those aspects of the
environment which are relevant and meaningful in normal perception, do
not seem to be so for autistic children. Whatever determines this relevance
would seem to be an important cognitive deficit in autism.
There appear to be no deficits in discrimination learning (Hermelin
and O'Connor, 1970; Prior, 1979) or in short term memory (Hermelin and
O'Connor, 1970; Fyffe and Prior, 1978). It has been observed that autistic
children are less likely than mental-age-matched controls to imitate
spontaneously (Bartak, Rutter and Cox, 1975; Sigman and Ungerer, 1984a,
1984b), although some imitation of body movement and speech, for example
echolalia, does occur.
Rutter (1983) summarized the cognitive skills of autistic children and
noted special difficulties in sequencing, abstraction and coding functions,
with few deficits in spatial performance, perceptual organization, and
attentional short term memory skills.
ii). Symbolic Play
Autistic children show a striking lack of pretend play (Baron-Cohen,
1987; Rutter, 1978; Sigman, Ungerer, Munder and Sherman, 1987; Ungerer
and Sigman, 1981; Wing et al, 1977). Pretend play is also sometimes referred
to as "symbolic" play, which we shall discuss the definition of later, and is
contrasted with "functional" play which involves using objects in ways
appropriate to their conventional function. Symbolic play is thought to
develop at 20 months of age (Piaget, 1954) in normal children. Wing, Gould,
Yeates and Brierly (1977) found that symbolic play could be observed in
mentally handicapped children with mental ages above 20 months, but that
autistic children were the only group that showed a poverty in symbolic
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play in children with a mental age of over 20 months. In a review by Wulff
(1985), it was concluded that "the autistic child's play is striking in its lack of
fantasy and all other aspects of symbolic play".
Leslie (1987) points out that primary representational abilities such as
object concept and causality are not impaired in autism relative to mental
age (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1986; Curcio, 1978; Ungerer and Sigman,
1981), furthermore, the ability to pretend is not impaired in other forms of
retardation, such as Down's syndrome (Hill and McCune-Nicolich, 1981). It
would seem then that lack of pretend play is a deficit specific to autism. This
was also confirmed by Baron-Cohen (1987). In his experiment he outlines a
clear definition of pretend play, which is worth noting; pretend play occurs
when:
1. The subject is using an object as if it were another object and/or
2. The subject is attributing properties to an object which it does
not have, and/or
3. The subject is referring to absent objects as if they were
present.
Using this definition of pretend play Baron-Cohen (1987) confirmed that
autistic children are severely impaired in their ability to produce pretend
play, in contrast to non-autistic retarded and normal controls.
Although the absence of pretend play in autism remains an area of
dispute (see Lewis and Bowcher, 1988), the overwhelming evidence points to
an absence of pretend play as a specific impairment in autism.
The dysfunction in pretend play is often interpreted as being due to
an inability to abstract concepts and to store these abstraction symbolically
(Sigman et al, 1987). It would seem likely that some higher order cognitive
dysfunction is responsible. In the next chapter we shall look more closely at
a theory of the mechanisms of pretending, proposed by Leslie (1985). He
argues that the ability to engage in pretend play may require that the child
have some "metarepresentational" capacity which allows the cognitive
system to register that it is in the pretend mode. It is argued by Leslie (1985)
and others (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985, 1986) that this "metarepresentational"
capacity is also important for the development of a "theory of mind"
(Premack and Woodruff, 1978). In the next chapter we shall examine the
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proposal that an impairment in "theory of mind" is a basic cognitive deficit
in autism.
In summary, it would seem that the cognitive dysfunctions in autism
occur at the higher rather that the lower level of processing. Those processes
used for deriving abstract information, for sequencing material and for
transforming information into symbolic representations appear to be most
affected. However, although a great deal of progress has been made and we
now know more about the cognitive deficits specifically associated with
autism, it is still unclear how these deficits may be related to the
abnormalities in social functioning (see section 4b).
The "theory of mind" hypothesis (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985,
1986) attempts to draw together various psychological processes relevant to
socialization which may be impaired and proposes a basic cognitive deficit
which begins with impaired "metarepresentational" capacity and affects
specific social skills, pragmatics of language, and pretend play. It is this basic
cognitive deficit that will be discussed in the next chapter and examined
further in this thesis.
/
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CHAPTER 3.
A COGNITIVE DEFICIT.
Introduction
In this chapter we will describe a new theory, proposed by Uta Frith
and her colleagues, which attempts to explain the specific impairments of
autism. We will go on to examine some of the precise predictions that this
theory makes and describe recent studies which support the theory. Finally,
we will deal with some of the criticisms and queries concerning this theory
before describing how the research in this thesis fits in with the current
picture.
A triad of impairments and a single cognitive deficit
As we have seen in chapter 1 a confusing feature of autism is that it
may occur together with other impairments, in other words, what we might
consider to be "pure" autism may or may not have other handicaps imposed
upon it. Possibly this combination with other handicaps results from
widespread brain damage. However, an important epidemiological study of
Wing and Gould (1979) has enabled us to identify a constellation of three
features that are always present, regardless of additional handicaps. The
triad of impairments proposed by Wing (1988) consists of social impairment,
communicative impairment and an impairment of imaginative activity with
substitution of repetitive behaviour. These three impairments are thought to
be the core features of autism.
There is also a consensus of opinion that autism has a biological origin
(see Chapter 2). In addition we have described how autism can be found in
the normal population but is more commonly found in the mentally
handicapped population. However, autism only affects a proportion of the
mentally handicapped population. We have also discussed (see Chapter 2)
how autistic children of normal intelligence suffer from specific
neuropsychological deficits and that autism can be linked to a variety of
medical conditions. It would seem reasonable to conclude, then, that there is
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some brain abnormality which is linked specifically to Wing's triad of
impairments.
Frith (1989) argues that although the nature of this abnormality is
unknown, we can assume that there is a "final common pathway" leading to
that abnormality, and when this particular pathway or brain system is
damaged it will always lead to autism. This possibility seems even more
likely when we take into account the fact that autism is such a clearly
defined syndrome involving such a strong common denominator as is
implied by the triad.
It would be extremely useful then if a single cognitive deficit could be
identified which might eventually be mapped onto the brain system which
forms the final common pathway. We shall be examining a cognitive theory
which attempts to explain the co-occurence of the triad of symptoms which
are specific to autism (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985, 1986; Frith, 1987;
Leslie, 1987; Baron-Cohen, 1988). The theory proposes that autistic children
have a specific deficit in their ability to form and use metarepresentations. In
order to explain what is meant by this we need to make the distinction
between primary representations and metarepresentations in normal
cognitive development.
Metarepresentations
The beliefs and concepts which a child is able to form about the
physical world are called "primary representations". For example,
representations of categories such as bananas or telephones, with
information about appearance, functions and properties are "primary
representations". However, as Leslie (1987) illustrates, young children are
also able to form representations of other representations, which he calls
metarepresentations (also described as second-order representations by
Dennett,1978, and Johnson-Laird, 1983). For example, in pretend play a
young child can form the metarepresentation that <a banana is a telephone>
which must be kept separate from the primary representation <a banana is
good to eat>. In other words the metarepresentation is not directly related to
reality. In pretend play, the cognitive system must simultaneously represent
an object as real and unreal.
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Leslie (1987) argues that the ability to form and use
metarepresentations is normally in place by the second year of life when it is
manifested in the ability to pretend. From then on more sophisticated
developments take place until metarepresentational capacity will enable the
child to think and reason about the content of his/her own and other
people's mental states. This ability to conceive of ones own mental states and
to attribute mental states (such as belief and desires) to others is achieved by
using what is called a "theory of mind" (Premack and Woodruff, 1978) and
requires the use of metarepresentations.
Being able to use a "theory of mind" is important for understanding
the social world and for communication in general. It enables us to predict
the relationship between external states of affairs and other people's mental
states. We use it to make sense of the social world (eg. "He won't talk to me
because he believes I don't like him"), to distinguish between "really meaning
something" and "just pretending", to understand when somebody is joking
and when s/he is are lying. It also allows us to represent someone else's false
belief and to predict that s/he will behave according to that false belief.
Understanding of false belief has been shown to be present in normal
children at the age of four (Wimmer and Perner, 1983).
Uta Frith and her colleagues proposed that autistic children have a
cognitive dysfunction in the formation and use of metarepresentations. This
results in an inability to "pretend play" and also impairs the development of
a "theory of mind". Before we discuss the direct evidence for this we will
consider how these deficits can explain the triad impairments seen in autism.
Explaining the triad of impairments. 
i) Social Impairment
The metarepresentation hypothesis makes precise predictions
concerning the social impairments observed in autism. Only those social
skills requiring the use of metarepresentations should be impaired whilst
skills involving only "primary representations" remain intact. This would
account for lack of embarrassment in autism (Baron-Cohen, 1985) since
embarrassment involves conceiving of oneself as an object of others thoughts .
(which requires using a theory of mind). Not being able to use a theory of
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mind can also account for deficits in joint attention observed in autism
(Mundy et al, 1986) and deficits in conceptual role-taking that we will
describe later (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985,1986). Low level imitation as well as
recognising people and forming emotional attachments however, may only
require the use of primary representations and so remain intact. Perceptual
role-taking also remains unimpaired (Hobson, 1984) as it only requires
rotation of a primary representation. It is the capacity to form and maintain
the sophisticated aspects of social interaction, for which the "theory of mind"
is used, which is impaired in autism (Frith, 1989).
ii) Communicative Impairments
Frith (1989) presents a detailed account of how the specific
communication deficits observed in autism can be accounted for by an
impaired "theory of mind". The most distinctive communicative deficit in
autism is in pragmatic skills (see Chapter 2) which are predicted to be
impaired due to an inability to attribute mental states to others. Baron-Cohen
(1989) lists a number of reasons why a speaker must be aware of a listener's
mental state (italicized below) in order to communicate in a socially
appropriate way:
a) The listener holds certain beliefs about what particular words refer to when
the speaker uses them.
b) The listener is trying to represent the message in just the way the speaker
intended it to be represented (Shatz, 1978).
c) The listener and speaker share some information but do not share other
information. This involves the speaker making "psychological
presuppositions".
d) The listener holds certain beliefs about how the speaker will act, such that
the speaker will be informative, truthful, relevant, sincere, etc (Grice, 1957,
1975).
The importance of the speaker and the listener being able to take
account of each other's mental states, in order for meaningful communication
to take place, is a tenet of Speech Act Theory (Austin, 1962; Grice,1957,1967;
Searle,1965,1979; Srawson,1964,1979). The theory notes that it is in the
speaker's intention to refer to something that the meaning of an utterance
resides. Therefore for the listener to understand the meaning of the speech
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he or she must make inferances about the speaker's intention and likewise, to
make the speech meaningful the speaker must monitor whether that
intention has been recognized. More recently Sperber and Wilson (1986)
have extended this theory and also point out the importance of inference in
meaningful communication, the object of that inference being the speaker's
intention.
According to these theories then, using language meaningfully and
communicatively depends on being able to take account of thought content.
Without a theory of mind this cannot be done. The communicative
impairment observed in autism may occur due to an inability to use a
theory of mind, which in turn is explained by impaired metarepresentational
capacity.
iii). Impairment in imaginative activity
As Leslie (1987) has shown, the ability to pretend only emerges as a
result of the capacity to form and use metarepresentations. Since pretend
play has been shown to be absent (WuIlf, 1985; Baron-Cohen, 1987) or at
least delayed (Lewis and Boucher, 1988), then it seems reasonable to suggest
that this is also due to an impairment in metarepresentational capacity.
The cognitive theory was summarized diagramatically by Baron-
Cohen (1989) as shown in Figure 1 below.
Table 1. Metarepresentational deficit theory
meta-representational capacity
Impaired	 Impaired
theory of mind
	 symbolic skill
Specific social 	 1
skills impaired,	 Pragmatic	 Pretend Play
others spared	 deficits	 deficits
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Experimental Studies
One complex ability which requires the use of a theory of mind is
being able to represent someone else's false belief. Baron-Cohen, Leslie and
Frith (1985) set out to demonstrate that autistic children lack the ability to
understand false belief in others, while intellectually more retarded Down's
syndrome children and normal four year olds do not. They used a task
originally devised by Wimmer and Perner (1983), in which the child is
shown a scenario involving two dolls, Sally and Anne. The first doll, Sally,
hides her ball in a box and then goes outside to play. While she is away,
Anne transfers Sally's ball to a basket after having played with it herself. The
child is then asked,"Where will Sally look for the ball?" If the child is able to
understand that Sally will believe the ball is still in the box and will act
according to that belief, then the child will point to the box and not to where
the ball really is. Eighty percent of the autistic children, despite being able to
answer the control questions correctly, indicated the basket where the ball
really was, ie. they predict Sally's behaviour in terms of the actual situation
and not where Sally should think the ball is. In contrast, 85% of the Down's
syndrome children and the normal children indicated the box where Sally
had originally put the ball, thus taking account of her false belief. This
supported Baron-Cohen et al's hypothesis.
The theory of mind was then tested using a picture sequencing task
(Baron-Cohen et al, 1986). The performance of the autistic children on
physical-mechanical and on social-behavioural events was far better than
their performance on events which involved the protagonist's beliefs,
whereas Down's syndrome and normal controls did not show this pattern. In
addition the children were also asked to describe what was happening in
each sequence. The autistic children used significantly fewer mental state
terms than the controls.
These studies provided promising evidence that autistic children are
impaired in their theory of mind and it was at this point that the work
reported in this thesis was started. However, for a more complete picture we
need to describe the more recent research in the area which ran concurrently
with the thesis research.
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Baron-Cohen (1989) went on to test the 20% of autistic children who
had passed the false belief task using tests which required the use of third
order representations (eg. John thinks that Mary thinks that..) and found that
they failed this task where matched controls passed. This supported the
hypothesis that the autistic children who have developed a theory of mind at
a lower level remain "specifically delayed" in the acquisition of a more
complex theory of mind.
Leslie and Frith (1988) replicated earlier findings and also used real
people rather than dolls, further testing the child's understanding of false
belief and also showing autistic children to be impaired in their
understanding of "limited knowledge" which is another aspect of theory of
mind. They also used an additional control group of children with specific
language impairment.
Finally, Perner et al (1989) used a "deceptive-appearance" paradigm
(which was also carried out in this thesis) to provide further evidence of
difficulty understanding false belief. This was important in that it answered
criticisms that results on previous false belief tasks simply reflected a
difference in the common-sense assumptions about what people normally
expected to happen. We shall describe this paradigm in more detail in
Chapter 8.
In the next section we will attempt to deal with some of the criticisms
of these studies and of the metarepresentational hypothesis itself.
Criticisms
A variety of methodological criticisms of the early studies (described
above) have been made. De Gelder (1987) questioned the use of dolls in a
"play" situation of the Sally-Anne task which, she argued, would be a
disadvantage to the autistic children. In addition it was claimed that the test
question "Where will Sally look for the ball?" would be easily
misunderstood. These criticisms will be addressed in this thesis (see Chapter
5) by using a different test question, using a different medium of
presentation and also testing false-belief understanding with a different task.
However, recently the Sally-Anne task has been carried out using real
people instead of dolls with the same result (Leslie and Frith, 1988) and also
39
using different tests and different children (Baron-Cohen et al, 1986; Leslie
and Frith, 1988; Perner et al, 1989).
Another important query is that the children in these studies were not
language matched with regard to grammatical competence. Boucher (1989)
points out that the grammatical competence of autistic children may develop
more slowly than their vocabulary and that the vocabulary comprehension
tests used for matching the children in these studies are therefore
inappropriate. This issue will also be considered in the research of this
thesis. However, this fails to explain why the autistic children should be able
to answer grammatically complex control questions. It is also worth noting
that specific language impaired children have been included as controls in
some of the experiments and that these children showed the same results as
the other controls, differing from the autistic children. (Leslie and Frith,
1988).
In Boucher's (1989) assessment of the theory of mind hypothesis she
points out the importance of being able to show evidence that autistic
children lack other abilities which are dependent on metarepresentation, the
most obvious of these being pretend play. Without such evidence the
hypothesis will be based on a circular argument explaining "impaired ability
to attribute mental states to others in terms of specific impairment of
metarepresentational capacity" whilst the only evidence for impaired
metarepresentational ability would be "impaired ability to attribute mental
states." She makes this point in the light of her own experiment (Lewis and
Boucher, 1988) which found evidence of pretend play under eliciting
conditions which clearly contradicts Baron-Cohen's (1987) findings.
However, as Baron-Cohen points out, Lewis and Boucher used autistic
children with much higher Mental Ages and Chronological Ages who may
have developed to the point of a normal 18 month old and are able to
pretend but are delayed in that ability. This would be in line with the
specific developmental delay hypothesis (Baron-Cohen, 1989a).
Another interesting suggestion which Boucher makes is that the
autistic children fail to use a theory of mind because they are not motivated
to do so rather than because they are incapable of doing so. In other words
she argues that we cannot interpret "failure to use the skill as evidence that
skill is lacking." In making this claim she refers to Light's (1987) comments
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that to pass a conceptual perspective taking task children need to have
knowledge concerning other people's states of mind but also must be able to
appreciate the need to use this knowledge in different situations. Boucher
claims that the discourse difficulties shown by autistic children may be such
that they don't see the relevance of this task and hence don't use a theory of
mind. However a theory that attempts to explain why they don't use a
theory of mind in terms of motivational factors would be extremely
complicated and a far simpler account for their not using a theory of mind is
that they have a cognitive deficit. Also, such a theory would predict other
deficits (ie in any "difficult" task) which are not observed in autism.
Nevertheless it will be interesting to consider this motivational factor in the
research of this thesis. An interesting proposal of Morton's (1989) is an
"optimistic" view that "the necessary structures are there but have not yet
been hooked up within the brain." This is also an interesting possibility.
Finally, without going into too much detail, we must mention an
alternative theory which also attempts to account for the theory of mind
data. Hobson (1986 a,b) and Hobson, Ouston and Lee (1988 a,b) present
evidence that autistic children, relative to mental age, are impaired in their
emotion recognition and argue that this is the basis of autism. Hobson
argues that autistic children are impaired in the innate (preprogrammed)
capacity for understanding mental states in others. In other words he
assumes the philosophical stance of Butterworth (1986) that the "mind is
transparent" and that the mental states of other people are naturally
available. This contrasts with assumptions of the metarepresentational
hypothesis which is that "mental states are not directly observable but have
to be inferred" and the child must develop a theory of their existence that can
be used to make sense of people's actions. Baron-Cohen presents various
criticisms of Hobson's "Affective Theory". The model does not explain why
there should be a link between understanding of emotions and
understanding of beliefs nor does it explain unimpaired functioning in
perceptual role taking, or why attachment is, to some extent, unaffected in
autism (Sigman and Ungerer, 1984). The affective theory is also unclear in its
explanation of pretend play, and finally Baron-Cohen (1989) also notes that
impairment in emotion recognition can also be found in other mentally
handicapped children who do not have autism. Hobson's findings remain
interesting though and one would imagine that ultimately the role of the
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affective system would need to be incorporated in some way into the
cognitive theory.
Clearly, then, the metarepresentational theory seems promising
although surrounded by controversy. In Chapter 5 we will discuss how we
have approached what would appear to be a worthwhile investigation of the
theory in this thesis. Firstly though, let us look at another interesting issue
concerning autism, that of computer use.
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CHAPTER 4
COMPUTER USE WITH AUTISTIC CHILDREN
The introduction of computer use with special needs children has
been hailed as a major step forward. However, before we can be satisfied
with this new technology, we must first consider whether it is being used to
optimal effect. We must think about which groups of children are most likely
to benefit from computer use, how computers can be employed most
effectively in education and whether the computer can be used as a research
tool with special needs children.
Despite the fact that the majority of schools for autistic children now
have a computer of some sort (Jordan, 1984), there have been relatively few
studies concerning the use of computers with autistic children.
In this chapter we will be examining the evidence and the arguments
concerning the use of computers with autistic children, looking at previous
studies and also considering how the computer might capitalise on aspects
of autistic cognition.
Early Studies
The first investigations of computer use with autistic children
produced encouraging results. Colby (1973) reported that 13 out of 17
nonspeaking autistic children began voluntarily to use speech for social
communication after playing and interacting with symbols on the computer.
Each treatment session involved a single child, with an adult (sitter) present.
Adult interference was kept to a minimum and the principle underlying the
treatment was that the exploratory and self initiated nature of the play
would promote learning. The child used a keyboard controlled audio-visual
display on which he or she could produce symbols accompanied by a human
voice and other sounds. It was not made clear exactly what the linguistic
improvement consisted of ( ie. whether it was confined to the computer
sessions or extended to other situations). However, it was emphasised that
the aim was simply to rekindle the child's interest in attempting speech.
43
Weir and Emanuel (1976) also used the computer as a catalyst to
stimulate language. They worked with a seven year old autistic child, over a
six-week period, using the graphics-oriented computer language LOGO. It
was reported that the child's explorations in controlling the LOGO turtle had
led to the development of both verbal and non-verbal language for
communication. The child began to use spontaneous language, based on his
descriptions of the turtle and also actively sought social interaction for the
first time. It was argued that because of the nature of the computer
environment the child had been given the opportunity to understand and be
understood, in other words share a sense of relevance, and that the self-
validating effect of this had led to increased communication. Again, the
extent of the communication improvement beyond the computer sessions
was not made clear.
LOGO computer language was also used by Goldenberg (1979) with a
number of autistic children working individually. His anecdotal accounts
were also promising. He describes the experience of one of the children as
follows; "She became more active and more in control, both of herself and of
the turtle, than she had been earlier. She also said several times ' I'm so
happy at that turtle. That turtle listens to me. Aren't you happy at me ?'."
Frost (1981) also reported that autistic children were able to control the
movements and characteristics of a "screen turtle". Geoffrion and
Goldenberg (1981) report further evidence of increased responsivity in
autistic children after using computer-based exploratory learning systems.
These results are clearly promising, however, as Panyan (1984) points
out in her review of computer technology for autistic children, the lack of
experimental design and "sketchy" procedural details of these early
experiments make it difficult to draw any firm conclusions.
More Recent Studies
In more recent years a number of studies have attempted a more
systematic evaluation of computer use with autistic subjects. Plienis and
Romanczyk (1985) compared computer instruction with other forms of
instruction. Their data indicated that the use of computers has a positive
effect on the attention and performance of autistic subjects.
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Panyan et al (1984) used a peer tutoring approach during a computer-
based instruction period to promote verbal interactions between autistic
subjects. This was particularly interesting since it took the novel approach of
having more than one user, in this case a pair of users, and sought to
facilitate communication between the children through the use of the
computer. One student provided answers in response to requests for
assistance from his peer during a spelling program. Verbalizations were
reported to have increased from less than 5% to around 80% during the task.
It was also reported that the improved social skills were extended to other
social situations.
The emphasis in most of the studies then, has been on the child
learning independently, capitalising on the autonomy the computer offers
and perhaps even using the computer to support something that resembles
an interpersonal exchange. However, the computer can also be used in quite
a different way, as with the peer tutoring approach (Panyan, 1984), if the
medium is used to support joint activity. In other words, it is possible to
place the emphasis more on the interactions around the computer,
establishing and developing partnerships between the child and either the
teacher or a peer. Both of these approaches would appear to be promising. In
the next section we shall look more closely at the relationship between
autism and the computer environment.
Characteristics of Autistic Cognition and the Computer
There are a number of theoretical arguments to support the idea that
the computer environment is particularly well suited to autistic children.
Some of these arguments have been derived from the studies described
above, but the general hypothesis is that the computer may be a useful tool
for education and research since it capitalises on specific characteristics of
autistic cognition.
The attributes that a computer can offer and what those attributes
capitalise on in terms of autistic cognition are summarised in Table 2 below.
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Table 2. Computer Attributes and Autistic Cognition. 
Computer Attribute
	
Aspects of Autistic Cognition
Capitalised on. 
Restricted field of vision	 Stimulus overselectivity
Stimuli in close proximity
Reduction of irrelevant cues
Consistency	 Ritualistic and compulsive
Predictable cues	 phenomena
Predictable reinforcement
schedules
Nature of HCI
	
Impoverished communication
Provides consistent
communication and meaning
Provides own mini-world
Involves no social dangers
No Adult-Child opponent
relationship
Opportunity to succeed
Bridge to social world
Withdrawn - Difficulty with
social world
There is evidence to suggest that autistic children have difficulty
attending to one aspect of a learning situation, sometimes ignoring salient
cues while focusing on more subtle cues. This has been termed "stimulus
overselectivity" (Lovaas et al, 1971; see chapter 2). However, Anderson and
Rincover (1982) have shown that autistic children are capable of responding
to more than one cue at a time if those cues are relatively close in physical
proximity. They suggested that stimuli only become functional for the
autistic child when they occur within a restricted field of vision. One
advantage that computers may have for autistic children is that stimuli can
be presented in close proximity on computer monitors. In contrast, stimulus
items in non-computer instructional situations may well be spread over a
large physical distance. The computer can also offer a limited and observable
number of stimuli, where as adult presentation is accompanied by many
idiosyncratic and often irrelevant cues which the autistic child may attend to
unnecessarily.
46
The ritualistic and compulsive phenomena reported in autistic
children (see chapter 2) may also link their behaviour with the computer.
Rimland (1964) argues that the preoccupation with mechanical objects shown
by many autistic children may be due to the "sameness" and the consistent
effect the object has on the environment. The computer may be attractive to
the autistic child then, because of its consistent effect on the environment.
The computer can provide predictable cues and reinforcement schedules
which may be varied gradually in an instructional situation. It would be
difficult for a teacher to provide this type of consistency and control.
The impoverished nature of human-computer interaction itself seems
comparable to the type of communication autistic children already display.
Attwood (1984) points out that conversing with an autistic child is very like
talking to a computer, "the objects of conversation are strictly limited and the
same questions evoke the same responses with monotonous regularity." The
routine and well-defined nature of the computer seems well suited to the
routine and ritualistic aspects of autistic behaviour.
Goldenberg (1979) has presented some of the most convincing
arguments in favour of computer use with autistic children. He notes the
difficulty autistic children have with human communication, that they are
better at initiating behaviour than copying and that they need consistent
meaning assigned to their behaviour. Given these observations, Goldenberg
(1979) proposes that, "..it might be a good route to communication for the
autistic child to have the orderly computer world first, teaching the child
that consistent communication is possible." The computer can give the
children active control of their environment and establish a sense of causality
as the children attach meaning to their own behaviour and to the what they
teach the computer to perform.
The child can explore his or her own mini-world and be given the
motivation and the opportunity to succeed. Furthermore, this mini-world is
one that the child can share and communicate about.
Interacting with the computer involves none of the social dangers that
interacting with other people presents. The child is not confronted with the
adult-child opponent relationship that teaching situations and research
entails.
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One criticism of the computer is that it gives the child an opportunity
to "opt out" of social interaction. In order to avoid this it is important to be
positive about the role of the computer and look upon it as a bridge to
communication rather than a barrier. If this is done it may prove to be an
ideal common factor that we can make the most of for educational purposes
and as a research tool, in order to break down the barriers.
There are also attributes of the computer that suggest its usefulness as
a research tool. Reinforcers can be immediate and consistent and the
computer can produce a response and provide feedback at great speed
(Eisele, 1980). In addition, an accurate record of the type and frequency of
response can be kept.
Conclusion
The evidence from the experimental work completed so far and the
theoretical arguments presented here suggests that the prospects for
computer use with autistic children are favourable. Given that the computer
seems to be particularly attractive to autistic children and given that the
computer generally seems to be a useful research tool, it would seem
worthwhile attempting a research project with autistic children using a
computer as a research device. In this thesis we have attempted to
investigate a particular cognitive impairment whilst at the same time
evaluating the computer in its role as a research tool and training device.
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CHAPTER 5
INTRODUCTION TO EXPERIMENTAL WORK
A). OVERVIEW 
It would seem from the work carried out so far concerning "theory of
mind" in autism, that there is a good case for a specific cognitive deficit in
this area. The rest of the thesis attempts to examine these findings with
further research.
Another area of interest which seems particularly promising is the use
of computers with autistic children. Further research in this area may
demonstrate important practical benefits of computer use. It is possible that
the computer may offer a rich new channel of communication that might be
used effectively, as a training device or as an investigative tool for the
research worker.
The thesis attempts to combine research in these two areas by
examining false belief using tasks presented in a novel way on computer.
False belief tasks are also presented with conventional apparatus so that
some comparison with the results from the computer can be made. By
presenting these tasks in different forms it will be possible to examine
whether performance can be explained by the surface form of the tasks or by
the conceptual nature of the tasks. In addition, the Vineland Adaptive
Behaviour Scale is also administered using a group of autistic children and a
group of Down's Syndrome children, in order to find out more about how
the cognitive deficit might be linked to the child's behaviour. Finally, the
computer is used in a training study using autistic, Down's Syndrome and
young normal children who fail false belief tasks.
This, then, allows us to examine a number of questions concerning both
the nature of the cognitive impairment in autism and the nature of the
relationship between the autistic child and the computer. We can also
consider whether the computer mode of presentation produces any results
that differ from the conventional mode of presentation. If there are any
differences, then we can look at whether this tells us anything more about
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the child's understanding of false belief, or about the qualities of computer
presentation that yield different results.
Outline of Experiments. 
There are two main aims for the first experiment:-
1. The first aim is to examine false belief in autistic children, Down's
Syndrome children and normal children, using a revised version of the
Sally-Anne task (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Alterations are made to the text
of the story and to the test questions in an attempt to eliminate some of the
ambiguities of the Sally-Anne task used by Baron-Cohen et al (1985). Also,
computer versions of the Sally-Anne task are presented. This will provide us
with further information about the child's understanding of false belief and,
by using the same task via a very different medium, we will be able to test
whether it is the conceptual nature of the task that matters rather than its
surface form.
2. A secondary aim is to gather information about the child's handling of the
computer interface during the training program and the computer tasks. We
will be able to analyze time spent on each screen (logged by the computer),
as well as considering our own informal observations.
In this experiment, then, we shall be interested in the hypothesis that
failure on the false belief task can be predicted by clinical type. According to
Baron-Cohen et al (1985), autistic children fail the false belief task whilst
Down's Syndrome children and young normal children pass. We will also
be able to consider alternative hypotheses as to why failure on the Sally-
Anne test might occur (Baron-Cohen, 1985), for example:-
a). It may be due to a deficit in the child's understanding of false belief
(Baron-Cohen et al, 1985).
b). The child may have difficulty with some other aspect of the task, not
involving "theory of mind". For example, memory for the events that
have taken place. It would be the job of the control
questions to identify what this might be.
c). It may be due to the mode of presentation of the task.
d). It may be due to other factors, such as IQ or Chronological Age.
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We will be able to differentiate between these possibilities more clearly
by using a variety of computer tasks.
The second experiment will involve retesting the children
approximately six months later. Here we will be interested in the Test-Retest
reliability of the tasks, in other words whether the results are stable over
time. One hypothesis might be that training (ie. previous experience of the
program) improves initial performance.
In the third experiment, understanding of false belief will be examined
using a different task, called the "Smarties" task which was used by Perner et
al (1987) with normal young children. Again, this task will be presented
using conventional materials and also on computer. This will allow
comparisons to be made between modes of presentation and also across
different types of tasks, since the same subjects are used in all three
experiments. If the Sally-Anne task and the Smarties task are both testing
false belief, then we would expect there to be a strong correlation between
performance on the two different tasks. If children fail to understand false
belief on one task but not on another, then we might conclude that it is the
task itself, rather than the understanding of false belief, that has lead to the
failure. Although, of course, success on both types of task is not a guarantee
that it is false belief that is being tested. In addition, the assessment of
performance on a second computer-based task will allow us to draw more
general and confident conclusions about autistic children's communication
with computers.
By looking across a range of tasks and presentation modes, we hope to
demonstrate the robust and conceptual nature of the "false-belief"
phenomenon in autistic children
In the fourth study we will examine the "ecological validity" of the
theory of mind hypothesis by considering whether the cognitive deficit is
linked to deficits in real behaviour. The Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale
will be administered using autistic children and Down's Syndrome children,
with each diagnostic group divided into a subgroup of children who pass
false belief tasks and a subgroup who fail false belief tasks. Information will
be collected for each of the following domains:-
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a). Communication
b). Daily Living Skills
c). Socialization
If the hypothesis is correct that a cognitive deficit in the theory of mind
as reflected in poor understanding of false belief, is causally linked to
autistic behaviour (Leslie, 1987; Baron-Cohen et al, 1985, 1986), then we
would expect to find a correlation between performance on the false belief
tasks and scores on the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale. We will be able
to look at how false belief is situated within the overall pattern of behaviour
and consider whether false belief is a specific deficit.
In the fifth experiment a specially designed computer training program
will be used to train children to understand false belief. Autistic, Down's
Syndrome and young normal children who initially fail a series of false
belief tasks will be tested before and after training, and information will be
gathered on the training task performance, pre-test and post-test transfer
task performance and follow-up results. We will then be able to consider
whether the computer can be used effectively as a training device, whether
the diagnostic groups differ in terms of performance and learning and
whether factors such as Chronological Age and Mental Age are predictors of
performance. We will also be interested in whether subjects learn the concept
of false belief or an algorithm for the false belief task used in training. These
results may allow us further insight regarding the cognition of the three
diagnostic groups used.
B). SUBJECTS
Since approximately two thirds of autistic children score in the
mentally retarded range for IQ, it is necessary to establish whether test
performance on the experimental tasks is a reflection of IQ or of clinical type.
This is done by using a comparison group of subjects of similar
Chronological Age and IQ who are not autistic. For this thesis Down's
Syndrome children were chosen as a comparison group. A specific
diagnostic category is used to ensure that the comparison group is
homogeneous. We also need to consider the possibility that performance
may simply be normal for the child's stage of development (ie Mental Age).
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This thesis, then, also uses a comparison group of young normal children
whose Mental Ages are equal to or below those of the autistic children.
i). Autistic Children
a). Diagnosis 
A total of 40 children who had been diagnosed as autistic were used in
the thesis experiments. These children attended either Storm House School,
West Yorkshire, Thornhill Park School, Tyne and Wear, Radlett School,
Heartfordshire or Brondyffryn School, North Wales. The children are
referred to the schools by their local Education Authority after having been
independently diagnosed as autistic by a School Medical Officer and
Educational Psychologist. All the children used in the study had been at the
Autistic School for at least three years. Diagnosis was made on the basis of
the established criteria set out by Rutter, Bartak and Newman (1971), which
are:-
1. Delay in speech and language development
2. Failure to develop inter-personal relationships
3. Ritualistic and compulsive phenomena
4. Onset before 30 months.
b). The Schools
All four of the autistic schools are run by the National Autistic Society.
The schools have a philosophy of providing a structured environment and
education for the children concentrating on the teaching of specific skills to
each child. There is a high teacher:pupil ratio of approximately seven
children to one teacher, with four assistant care staff. Storm House School,
Radlett School and Brondyffryn School all have residential facilities and
approximately half the children used in the study stayed overnight at the
school during the week. Thornhill Park School is full-time residential.
A visit to each school was made prior to experimentation, in an effort to
get to know the children and help them feel more relaxed in the company of
the experimenter.
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ii). Down's Syndrome Children
a). Diagnosis
A total of 45 Down's Syndrome children, all with trisomy 21, were used
in the thesis. Diagnosis is made by a doctor in cases of Down's Syndrome on
the basis of standard criteria. Prevalence is high for a specific syndrome
associated with mental handicap, occurring in approximately 14 children per
10,000 (Smith and Berg, 1976).
b). Schools
The Down's Syndrome children used in the study attended either Galtres
School or Lidgett Grove School in the York area, or Foxfield School or Dee
Bank School in the Chester area. These schools are for children with mental
handicap and learning difficulties and so do not cater, exclusively, for
Down's Syndrome children. Unlike the schools for autistic children, these
schools are not residential. However, teacher:pupil ratios were similar to
those of the autistic schools, as was the philosophy of providing a structured
environment and education for the children.
iii). Normal Children
There were 33 normal children used in the thesis. They attended
Hobmore Primary School, York, and or Boughton Nursery School in
Chester. All were in the normal educational stream.
Q. JO STUDIES
All of the children were tested for Verbal IQ and Non-Verbal IQ. As we
described earlier in this chapter, we are interested in a specific cognitive
deficit which occurs independently of general retardation. It is necessary,
then, is to establish the IQ's and hence the Mental Ages of the three groups.
The British Picture Vocabulary Test was used to test Verbal IQ. This is a
well established IQ test, widely used to test mentally handicapped and
normal children. This test was also used by Baron-Cohen et al (1985,1986) in
their series of experiments examining false belief. The Leiter International
Performance Scale was used to measure Non-Verbal IQ. This is also a well
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established IQ test which can be used for mentally handicapped children
and young normal children and was used by Baron-Cohen et al (1985,1986).
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CHAPTER 6. 
DESIGN AND DEVELOPMENT OF COMPUTER TASKS 
a) Materials
The programs used in this study were written using an authoring
system called PED (for Picture Editor) on a computer assisted learning
(CAL) system developed in the Department of Psychology at York
(Hammond and Allinson, 1988). The system is an example of a hypermedia
system (Conklin, 1987) consisting of a network of screens of information
(incorporating text, graphics, bit-mapped images and sounds) traversed by
a computer mouse to point and click on active areas in the currently viewed
screen.
The user interface is entirely mouse-driven with each display frame
containing a variable number of mouse-selectable links (active areas). The
active areas provide hypertext links from the displayed frame to a related
frame. When the mouse cursor is moved over the active area it will change
colour, highlighting its significance, at which point clicking the mouse will
change the screen to the related screen.
b) Composing the Programs
Using the authoring system PED it was possible to compose each
screen and define the links to related screens. The facilities used in creating
the screen are shown in Table 5 below.
As the authoring and user systems are separate, only the screen
information and the relatively small program to allow full interactive
"playback" are required in order to use the system. This meant that the
generated sequences used in the study could be stored on a single floppy
disc and a single machine could be taken to the various testing locations.
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Table 3. PED Facilities 
1) Colour and texture selection
2) Text input, editing and positioning
(four sizes and orientation of text available)
3) Object-oriented paint package
(graphics elements used included lines, boxes, circles,
ellipses, arcs, fills and deletions)
4) Animated sequence production
(selected objects or areas of the screen can be moved at
specified rates, with or without leaving a trail)
5) Bit-mapped pictures run-length encoded
(obtained via a video frame grabbing system)
6) Monotonic sound sequences
(Music was created by selecting intensity, pitch, attack
and decay times for each note)
7) Conditional branching depending on user actions
8) Bottom line facilities
(restart and end session)
The software was used to construct a number of games. The children
saw a screen display, sometimes with objects moving on the display.
Clicking a mouse over an active area caused the next screen to be chosen,
often with accompanying music.
Table 4 below shows the music written for the computer. A tune is
played with each screen. Table 4 also shows a key (code) to each of these
tunes which will be used later to show which tune goes with which screen.
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Another feature of the interface that was altered was that the mouse
was surrounded by a red cardboard arrow to match a red arrow cursor used
on the screens. It was thought that this would help the children make the
relation between the mouse and the cursor and understand that moving their
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red arrow (the mouse) caused the red arrow on the screen to move. A white
button was built on to the mouse so that clicking was easy to perform.
c) Design Principles
We needed to design computer tasks that would be attractive and
motivating for the autistic children and which would also be easy to use. We
needed to consider general principles that would apply to the autistic group
as a whole (ideally, these principles might be adapted to suit the individual
needs of each autistic child).
The following factors were taken into account for the design:-
1. Attentional Processes
2. Communication Skills
3. Responsivity to Sensory Stimuli
4. Coping with Change
5. Learning History
6. Difficulty Level
1. Attentional Processes
In Chapter 2 we discussed the phenomenon of overselectivity (Lovaas
et al, 1976). Autistic children cannot attend well to simultaneously presented
information and therefore tend to select a narrow aspect of information,
often fixating on minor features of the environment whilst ignoring
important features. Although this was found IiQL to be specific to autism,
these attentional problems have important implications for the design of the
computer tasks.
Given the deficit in attentional processes we hypothesized that it
would be most appropriate to focus on a minimalist design, keeping the
program as simple as possible, cutting down on irrelevant features. The
tasks are therefore designed using simple, easily distinguishable shapes and
colours.
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2. Communication Skills
Considering the same principles of overselectivity and given the
difficulties autistic children have with language (see Chapter 2), it was
necessary to design programs that make the minimum of linguistic
demands. Programs were therefore made as self-explanatory as possible
(particularly the training program which required no linguistic skills).
Clearly, certain text was necessary for the false belief tasks (for example the
test question), however we tried to design the tasks so that the scenarios
could be followed with a minimum use of language.
3. Responsivity to Sensory Stimuli 
Evidence suggests that autistic children are attracted to and motivated
by music (Blackstock, 1978; Nelson et al, 1984). For this reason, using music
as a motivating aspect is an important feature of the programs. Again, a
minimalist design prevails, using single tone synthesized music with simple,
easily recognisable tunes.
We also needed to consider the effects of visual stimuli. The literature
suggests that this will present no problems for the subjects, however, we
decided not to use any subjects with a history of epilepsy as a precautionary
measure to the flicker affects of the computer screen.
4. Coping with Change. 
Although the novelty value of the computer might be one of its
advantages, for autistic children this change in their environment might be
disturbing. Previous work (see Chapter 4), however, suggests that this
should not be a problem for autistic children. In terms of the programs
themselves, the predictability and repetitive nature of the tasks need not be
problematic, and indeed may be a motivating factor for the autistic children.
5. Learning History
The individual learning history and previous experience with the
computer could be taken into consideration in designing programs for
specific children. However, for these experiments we are designing tasks
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suitable for a number of children, most of whom have no prior experience of
using computers, and all of whom have never used a mouse before. We need
to consider the difficulty level accordingly.
6. Difficulty Level 
Designing the task to the correct difficulty level is particularly
important for the training program. One of the functions of the training
program is to ensure that all the subjects are capable of performing with ease
on the later programs. If the subjects can master the training program, then
they should have no difficulty with the false belief task games.
The early screens of the training program were designed to accept
input that the child could make easily, producing an engaging and easily
perceivable response or output. In other words, a large effect could be
obtained with a very small effort. As the child becomes more interested in
the output, then the program is designed so that input becomes more and
more difficult to make, by reducing the size of the active areas. The child can
then no longer rely on random movements, but instead is required to make
more deliberate movements, requiring skill and mastery of the mouse.
d) Program descriptions
A selection of colour photographs of the screens used in the training
program and the various false-belief games are shown at the end of this
chapter. These are intended to illustrate the various features of the interface.
Figure 6.1 shows the first screen of the training program. A white
arrow indicates where the active area is. This is a convention used
throughout the programs. In this case the active area is the large red square.
When the cursor (the red arrow) is moved over the red square (see fig 6.2.),
the square changes colour to green. Clicking the mouse then changes the
screen to that shown in figure 6.3 with the accompanying music. Simple,
easily distinguishable colours have been used (Red, Green, Blue, Purple,
White) throughout the programs.
Figures 6.4 to 6.7 show another sequence of screens from later in the
training program. A character appears in figure 6.4. Clicking the cursor over
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the character (see figure 6.5) results in a new screen with an animated
sequence (see figure 6.6) where the character moves across the screen with
accompanying music, ending up on the opposite side of the screen and
becoming a new active area (see figure 6.7). The double image in fig 6.6, and
later figures, is due to movement of the characters during camera exposure.
Figures 6.8 to 6.13 show the sequence of screens that make up Game
type B (see Chapter 7.) in the false-belief program. The other false-belief
program games have the same features as those displayed in this sequence of
photographs. Figure 6.8 shows the two characters "Sally" and "Anne". These
two characters are more easily distinguishable on the actual screen, although
it is clear from this photograph. The character "Sally" wears white with a
large "S" on her clothing and "Anne" wears purple with a large "A". Before
testing the experimenter checks that the child can tell these two characters
apart. This screen also includes text, a ball in "Anne's" hand and two
containers (red and blue). When the cursor is moved over "Anne" and
clicked the new screen appears in which the character moves with the ball to
the red container with accompanying music (see figure 6.9). "Anne" then
puts the ball into the container (see figure 6.10) and at the end of the screen
a door appears in the top right-hand corner of the screen (see figure 6.11).
The door opens by the child putting the cursor over it and clicking the
mouse and "Anne" moves out through the door which closes behind her (see
figure 6.12).
At the end of this sequence the text "Where does Sally think the ball
is?" appears (see figure 6.13). The experimenter asks the child this question
and the child can then click the cursor over one of the large white arrows
above the containers. The containers themselves are not used as active areas
since they would change colour when the cursor is moved over them.
Although this is a drawback the children soon learn that the arrow is
associated with the container below it and, since the arrow changes colour,
that it is an active area. If the child clicks over the correct container (in this
case the red container) "Sally" goes to the container and retrieves the ball and
the text "YES, WELL DONE" flashes on the screen. If the child chooses
incorrectly the text "NO I WON'T" and then "TRY AGAIN" appears on the
screen. It is not assumed that the child can read this text, so the experimenter
repeats it out load. However if the child repeats the text aloud himself or
herself then the experimenter keeps quiet.
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Figure 6.4
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Figure 6.10
Figure 6.11 
open the door
for Anne
it's pies tise
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Figure 6.13
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the ball is ?
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The key to the music used throughout this program is shown
alongside the photographs. There is some consistency to the choice of music
used which holds throughout the false-belief games. "Sally's" movements are
accompanied by the "Bod theme", "Anne's" movements by the "Pink Panther
theme" and the music to "Girls and boys go out to play" accompanies a
character leaving.
This small selection of photographs illustrates the colour and
movement that it has been possible to include in the computer games. They
also show how simple, easily distinguishable shapes and characters have
been used for the games. The main emphasis in writing the programs was to
create an interface that was easy to understand and also easy to use.
In order to display as many of these screens as possible when
describing the computer games we will illustrate using small black and
white photocopies of the screens for the remainder of the thesis.
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CHAPTER 7
EXPERIMENT 1.
INTRODUCTION
In Chapter 5 we described the aims of the first experiment. Briefly,
these can be listed as follows:-
a) To examine understanding of false-belief in autistic, Down's Syndrome
and normal children using a revised version of the false-belief task, with
alterations made to the task used by Baron-Cohen et al (1985).
b) To examine false belief in the same groups of children using computer
versions of the task.
c) To gather information about the child's handling of the computer
interface during the training program and the computer tasks.
We are interested in the hypothesis that failure on the false-belief task
can be predicted by clinical type. Baron-Cohen et al (1985) found that autistic
children failed the false-belief task whilst Down's Syndrome children and
young normal children passed. We will be able to consider alternative
hypotheses as to why failure on the false-belief task (Baron-Cohen, 1985)
might occur, for example:-
a) It may be due to a deficit in the child's understanding of false-belief
(Baron-Cohen et al, 1985).
b) The child may have difficulty with some other aspect of the task, not
involving "theory of mind". For example, memory for the events that have
taken place. It would be the job of the control questions may identify this.
c) It may be due to the mode of presentation of the task, (ie. the surface
form rather than the conceptual nature of the task).
d) It may be due to other factors, such as IQ or Chronological Age.
Using a variety of computer tasks we will be able to differentiate
between these possibilities more clearly.
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We shall also test the hypothesis that autistic children are well suited to
the computer environment (Goldenberg, 1979) and will not experience
difficulties with the technology.
Let us consider how the doll presentation of the false-belief task might
be revised from its original form (Wimmer and Perner, 1983; Baron-Cohen et
al, 1985). Table 5 shows the text for the presentation of the dolls used in this
experiment. The alterations made to the text used by Baron-Cohen et al
(1985) are underlined.
Table 5. False-belief task - Text
Julie is playing with her ball
Julie decides she wants to go out to play
So she puts her ball away under the basket and she carefully
remembers where she puts it, as she might want it later. 
(PROMPT)-Where did Julie put the ball? 
Julie goes out through the door and out to the playground.
While she is away, Bruce takes the ball from the basket and plays
with it.
But, Bruce forgets to put the ball back in the basket and puts it in
the box instead. 
Then Julie comes back to collect her ball.
Test Question 
"Where does Julie think the ball is?"
Control Questions
Reality	 - "Where is the ball really?"
Memory 1- "Where did Julie put the ball in the beginning?"
Memory 2- "Where did Bruce put the ball?" 
Memory 3- "Where was Julie when Bruce put it there?" 
Memory 4- "So did Julie see Bruce put it there?" 
The false-belief procedure used by Baron-Cohen et al (1985) was
originally designed by Wimmer and Perner (1983). The alterations that have
been made to that task in this experiment are based on changes made by
Perner, Leekam and Wimmer (1987), which were used in testing young
normal children. These changes focus on three main criticisms of the original
design; that failure on the false-belief task could be due to:-
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a) Failure to retain essential facts.
b) Failure to understand normal expectations that give rise to false-belief.
c) Pragmatic misinterpretation of the test question.
Let us consider how the "new" text attempts to deal with these factors.
a) Failure to retain essential facts
In order to predict correctly that Julie would mistakenly look in the
original location, children must have understood and remembered the
relevant facts in the story. In order to examine this, additional memory
questions, underlined in the text above, were included as control questions.
Memory 2 examines whether the child remembers where Bruce put the ball.
Memory 3 examines whether the child remembers that Julie was not present
when Bruce moved the ball. Finally, memory 4 examines whether the child
realises that since Julie was not present she will not have seen Bruce move
the ball to a different location. In other words, this final question assesses the
child's "visual perspective taking" ability and hence the child's
understanding of the fact that Julie did not see the object being transferred.
If any of these facts are not understood then Julie's false belief cannot be
correctly inferred and failure on the test question could be due to memory
failure for relevant story facts. We need to ensure that none of these factors
leads to failure on the test question before we can claim that a failure was
due to a deficit in the child's understanding of false belief.
b) Understanding normal expectations that give rise to false-belief
In order to make the correct belief attribution the child must appreciate
the fact that Julie expected the object to stay in its original location. This
expectation was made clear in the text with the line "..she carefully
remembers where she puts it as she might want it later." The commonsense
assumption that once an object has been placed in a particular location it can
be expected to remain there, is also made explicit in the text. This is done by
explaining that the other character (Bruce) transferred the ball to the new
location by mistake ("Bruce forgets to put the ball back in the basket and
puts it in the box by mistake"). Finally, it is made explicit, in the text, that the
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protagonist (Julie) did not witness the transfer of the ball ("Julie is still in the
playground and couldn't see where Bruce put the ball.").
We would expect that if the autistic children in the previous
experiments (Baron-Cohen et al 1985) failed belief attribution because they
did not make the correct assumption about the protagonist's common sense
expectation, then an explicit description of this expectation should elicit
more correct attributions from the autistic children in this experiment.
c) Pragmatic misinterpretation of the test question. 
The test question from the original design of this task (Wimmer and
Perner, 1983) used by Baron-Cohen et al (1985) was "Where will Sally look
for her marble?". This question may be open to pragmatic misinterpretation.
The question may have been taken as a request to help the protagonist to
find the object, so the actual question may have been glossed over as
meaning "Where should she look....?". It is possible then that the child may
see it as his/her role to help the protagonist find the ball. This would lead
them to answer the test question incorrectly. In the text used in this
experiment, however, the test question has been changed from "Where will
Julie look for the ball?" to "Where does Julie think the ball is?" in an attempt
to limit the possibilities of misinterpretation.
In comparison to the doll presentation the computer presentation does
not have such direct control questions. Instead, the child plays control
"games". Each type of game involves different actions for the characters Sally
and Anne and requires varying levels of understanding of the component
rules of false-belief. A description of the screen components of each game
and the rules required to understand each scenario is shown in Table 6.
There are five types of game, but only game E involves an
understanding of all the component rules of false-belief; games A, B, C and
D act as "control" games. If the child fails on game E we can only say that
this is due to a deficit in their understanding of false-belief if he or she has
been able to pass similar games, which did not involve false-belief but did
involve some of the component rules. In other words, if the child fails false-
belief game E for any reason other than a deficit in false-belief
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understanding, then he or she should also fail one or more of the control
games.
Table 6. False-belief program Games - Screen components and rules. 
Screen Components
Games 1 and 2 (Type A) 
Sally hides the ball.
Sally leaves
then returns.
Sally looks for ball
Games 3 and 4 (Type B) 
Anne hides the ball,
Sally watches.
Anne leaves.
Sally looks for the ball.
Games 5 and 6 (Type C) 
Anne hides the ball,
Sally watches.
Sally leaves.
Sally returns.
Sally looks for ball.
Games 7 and 8 (Type D) 
Sally hides the ball,
Anne watches.
Anne moves the ball,
Sally watches.
Sally looks for the ball.
Rules
Person is exposed to a
situation Sl-where person=actor
Person will contract belief B1,
will remember this and will act
upon it.
Person observes situation S1
where person=actor
and contracts belief BI.
Person will act on this belief.
Person observes situation SI
where person=actor
and contracts belief B1
Person remembers Sl,
and,returning,
will act on belief BI.
Person observes situation SI
where person=actor
and contracts belief B1
Person then observes situation
S2 and contracts belief B2
and acts on this belief.
Games 9 and 10 (Type E) 
Sally hides the ball,
Anne watches.
Sally leaves.
Anne moves the ball,
Sally not present,
Sally returns.
Sally looks for the ball.
will act on this.
Person observes situation SI
where person=actor
and contracts belief Bl.
Situation S2 occurs.
Person does not observe S2
and so does not contract belief
B2, but retains belief B1 and
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In addition to their function as control games, games A to D can also
tell us about the child's understanding of the component rules of false belief.
It would be interesting, for example, if the children consistently failed one of
those games.
METHOD
Subjects
Subjects were 23 autistic children, 17 Down's Syndrome children and 25
clinically normal children.
i). Autistic Subjects
The autistic subjects were attending Storm House School or Thornhill
Park School (see Chapter 5 for details). The groups consisted of 16 males and
7 females. This reflects the male:female ratios found in epidemiological
studies (Rutter and Schopler, 1987). The Chronological Ages of the autistic
children ranged from six years and three months to sixteen years and nine
months. All these children had a primary diagnosis of autism according to
DSM-III criteria.
ii). Down's Syndrome Subjects
A total of 17 Down's Syndrome children were used in the study, 10
males and 8 females. These subjects were attending either Galtres School or
Lidgett Grove School (see Chapter 5 for details). The Chronological Ages of
the Down's Syndrome subjects ranged from nine years and four months to
eighteen years and three months.
iii). Normal Subjects
There were 25 normal children used in the study, all of whom attended
Hobmore Primary School. Chronological Ages ranged from fours years and
one month to four years and ten months.
JO Testing Procedure. 
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Each child was tested individually in a quite room in the school. Verbal
IQ was tested using the British Picture Vocabulary Test and Non-Verbal IQ
was tested using the Leiter International Performance Scale (see Chapter 5
for details). Each IQ test took between 30 and 40 minutes to complete , so
that two sessions with each child were required.
General Procedure
Each child was tested in one session which lasted for approximately 45
minutes. In that session the child was tested on the false-belief task using
two different forms of presentation:-
1. Using dolls in a similar procedure to that used by Baron-Cohen et al
(1985), but with added control questions and a more explicit story.
2. Using computer versions of the task.
The order of presentation was counterbalanced, so that, by random
selection, half of the children worked with the computer first and then with
the dolls and vice-versa.
In addition, computer presentation of the false-belief task was preceded
by an introduction to the computer using the training program.
i). Presentation with the dolls
a). Materials
The two dolls used in this presentation were both approximately 15 cm
high and had distinctive appearances (eg. different clothing and hair) so that
the children had no difficulty distinguishing between them. The basket
(brown, measuring 20 cm in diameter and 7 cm in height) and the box
(white, length 30 cm, width 16 cm and height 9 cm) were also easily
distinguishable. The ball measured 2 cm in diameter and was multi-
coloured. Finally, a white partition (length 70 cm and height 45 cm) was
used to separate what was referred to in the story as "outside" or
"playground" from the area "inside" where the movement of the ball takes
place.
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b). Procedure. 
The experimenter sat next to the child and introduced the two dolls,
Julie and Bruce. Before continuing the task, the experimenter checked that
the child knew which doll was which and could also distinguish between
the basket and the box. The experimenter also explained that beyond the
partition Julie would be outside on the playground and could not see inside
where the basket and box were. The experimenter then told a set story (see
Table 5 for the text), moving the dolls and the ball appropriately. At a crucial
point in the story a prompt question was given to ensure that the child was
following the events. If the child's response was incorrect at this point then a
clue was given and the story retold until the correct answer to the prompt
question was given.
At the end of the story when Julie returns to look for her ball, the child
is asked a series of questions; the test question followed by five control
questions. The experimenter then marked down whether the child's response
was correct or incorrect. The responses may be verbal or, in the case of the
first three questions, the response may be given by simply pointing to the
correct location.
The standard scenario was performed three times, using a different
location for the ball on each occasion (the basket, the box and a third location
which was the experimenter's pocket). This was done to ensure that the
correct responses at the end of each trial were a different location.
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ii). Presentation with the computer
Introduction to Procedure
The computer presentation began with a training program which
served as an introduction to the interface, teaching the child how to use the
mouse and how to work through "games" similar to those used in the false-
belief program. None of the children in the study had used a mouse before.
This was followed by the group of "games" which formed the main false-
belief program.
a) Training program,
Procedure
The child sat next to the experimenter at a table and was told that there
were several games to play on the computer. The computer was situated
directly opposite the child at the back of the table. Immediately in front of
the child was the mouse, surrounded by a red cardboard arrow (see
Materials), which could be moved around the table in front of the computer.
The experimenter first moved the arrow and pointed out to the child
that there was a similar red arrow on the screen which moved in the same
way. The child was then asked to place his or her hand on the arrow and
move it around on the table. The movements of the arrow on the screen were
pointed out again. The child is then asked to move the arrow over the
coloured shapes. From this point onward the child moves the arrow without
the aid of the experimenter. As we described in Chapter 6 the training
program is designed to be easy to begin with, gradually becoming harder as
the child works through the screens, until eventually the child has mastered
all the skills necessary to use the main false belief programs.
A flow diagram of the training program screens is shown in figure 7.1
at the end of this section. The photocopies used do not show the colours.
However, the photographs used earlier (see Chapter 6) give an indication of
the colours used. Figures 6.1 to 6.3 are photographs of screens 1 and 2 and
figures 6.4 to 6.7 are photographs of screen 8 and 9. The first four screens of
the training program are coloured squares. A character is introduced on
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screen five. On screen eight clicking the cursor over the character produces
an animated sequence where the character moves across the screen. There
are several photographs of this animation as we move from screen 8 to
screen 9. Only one mouse click is required at the start of the sequence and
this is represented in the flow diagram by the arrows between the
photocopies. The music which plays following the mouse click is also
represented in the flow diagram. Clicking on screen ten produces another
animated sequence to screen eleven.
Once the child reaches screen 11 the experimenter asks whether he or
she would like to continue this game or play another game. If the child elects
to play another game then the cursor is clicked over the square with "restart"
written in it and the child will have completed 10 screen clicks in all.
However, if the child elects to continue then he or she can work through to
screen 13 where again there is an opportunity to stop, or continues further to
screen 14 which, as can be seen from the flow diagram "loops" back to screen
10 again. This loop continues until the child indicates that he or she would
like to play another game. In this way it was emphasised that the children
were free to play what they wanted and stop whenever they wished. It was
considered important to stress to the child that this was not an adult-guided
activity and, although the experimenter was there to help (or join in the
games) if required, the child was in control.
By the end of the training program it was hoped that the child had
sufficient understanding of the interface to enable him or her to use the false-
belief program, which required mouse control and contained similar
components of music and animation of characters. The screens visited and
the time spent on each screen were also logged by the computer during the
training program. These data should give us an indication of the child's
ability to handle the interface.
b) False-belief program
Procedure 
In the main program there were five different types of game. Each had
a counterpart which differed only in that the ball was originally hidden in
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the other container, making ten games in all. Each type of game involved
different actions for the characters Sally and Anne, and required varying
levels of understanding of the component rules of false-belief. A description
of the screen components of each game, and the rules required to understand
each scenario, is shown in Table 6 (see introduction).
The games were worked through in the following order:-
1. Type E
2. Type A
3. Type B
4. Type C
5. Type D
6. Type E
Flow diagrams of these games are shown in figures 7.2 to 7.6 at the end
of this section. Figure 7.2 shows a flow diagram of game type A. The
standard text on the screens may be read out by the child or by the
experimenter. These text serve as both instructions and indications of what is
going on. As with the training program, a white arrow indicates where the
active area is. For screen 1 "clicking" the mouse over the character "Sally"
causes the character to move across the screen and put the ball into the blue
container (see animated sequences). Screen 2 invites the child to "open the
door for Sally." and explains that "..it's play time". The child opens the door
by "clicking" the mouse over the door, causing the door to open and the
character to leave the screen through the door. After a pause of four seconds
there is an audible knock on the door and the child is told "Sally wants to
come in, open the door for her" (see screen 3). The child "clicks" the mouse
over the door and Sally returns to the screen. On the next screen the child is
then asked the test question "Where does Sally think the ball is ?" The child
must then choose to move the mouse and "click" over the blue container (on
the left) or over the red container (on the right). In this case the blue
container is the correct choice and Sally will move to the container and
retrieve the ball, after which the text "YES, WELL DONE" flashes on the
screen. If, however, an incorrect choice was made and the child moved the
mouse over the red container (on the left) and clicked, the screen flashes the
text "No I won't" and "Try again" and the animated sequence returns to
screen 4 and the test question once more.
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The flow diagram of game type B is shown in figure 7.3. A new
character "Anne" is introduced (see figure 6.8). The experimenter first checks
that the child can distinguish between these two characters before the child
proceeds with the game. Game type C is shown in figure 7.4 and game type
D in figure 7.5. The components of these screens are described in table 6. For
these figures the flow diagram continues as far as the test question "Where
does Sally think the ball is?" As with game type A the correct choice for these
games will lead to Sally retrieving the ball with the accompanying music
and the text "YES WELL DONE", where as an incorrect choice prompts the
child to try again and loops back to the test question screen.
Games Type E (see figure 7.6) requires a full understanding of false-
belief in order to answer the final question correctly. In other words, this is
the computer equivalent of the false-belief task carried out with the dolls.
Once again an incorrect choice here prompts the text "No I won't" and "Try
again" and loops back to the test question (not shown in figure 7.6).
However, with this game answering the test question correctly does not lead
Sally to the ball; instead Sally approaches the container and finds no ball
there which is accompanied by the text "The ball is not there anymore", the
character Sally stamps her feet and the text "YES WELL DONE" flashes on
the screen.
The child was allowed to continue playing the games for as long as he
or she wanted and an attempt was made to keep to the order shown above.
The only real constraint was that a game could not be repeated immediately.
In exceptional cases this "freedom of choice" may have led to some gaps in
the data collection, however, this only occurred on a couple of cases, as we
shall see from the data later, and almost all the children completed the
games in the order shown above with no omissions. Data collected under
forced circumstances was considered worthless and disruptive for further
experiments. The computer was the child's personal "toy" and not an
experimental device that he or she had been "plugged" into.
The computer logged which screens had been selected and also the time
spent on each screen. These data could be printed out for analysis.
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RESULTS
Tables 7 to 11 show the results of experiment 1 for all three groups of
subjects. For each group the results of the non-computer presentation are
shown in the table headed "Dolls Data" and the results of the computer
presentation are shown in the table headed "Computer Data".
For the "Dolls Data" tables the column headings refer to the following:-
Subj Subject (code number).
Response to the task Questions 
IQ Test Question-"Where does Julie think the ball is?"
IA2 Reality Question-"Where is the ball really?"
M1 Memory Question 1-"Where did Julie put the ball in the beginning?"
M2 Memory Question 2-"Where did Bruce put the ball?"
M3 Memory Question 3-"Where was Julie when Bruce put it there?"
M4 Memory Question 4-"So did Julie see Bruce put it there?"
Chronological Age and Mental Age. 
CA-Chronological Age in years and months.
VMA-Verbal Mental Age in years and months.
NVMA-Non-Verbal Mental Age in years and months.
For the "Computer Data" tables the column headings refer to the
following:-
Subs Subject (code number)
Computer Games
TO Response to the Test Question- "Where does Sally think the ball is?" for
game type E (requiring understanding of false-belief).
A to D Response to the Test Question- "Where does Sally think the ball is?"
for game type A,B,C or D.
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Training games 
t(s) Total time spent on the training game in seconds.
n.sc. Number of screens visited.
t/d(s)	 Time per decision on the training game in seconds.
Analysis Strategy
The data will be presented and dealt with in the following way:-
I. Presentation of raw data (tables 9 to 13)
2. Summary data (means for each group etc.)
3. Analyses (Chi squared, t-test, Fisher Exact etc.)
For both the "Dolls Data" and the "Computer Data" tables, responses
are represented as follows :-
/ = Correct Response,
0 = Incorrect Response.
In table 7 below, there are three trials with a response to each question
for each trial. So, for example, subject Al made the response 000 for the test
question (Test Q); which means that this subject responded incorrectly to
that question on the first, second and third trial.
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Table 7. Results of Experiment 1. - Autistic Children
Dolls Data
Questions
M2 M3 M4
Age and Mental Age
Subj
Task
elLQ IZQ M1 CA	 VMA NVMA
Al 000 /// /// /// /// /// 13:6 7:2 6:7
A2 000 /// /// /// /// /// 13:8 7:11 6:5
A3 /// /// /// /// /// /// 13:0 8:7 14:6
A4 000 /// 000 000 /1/ 000 14:6 6:5 4:3
A5 000 /// 00/ /// 0// 000 16:0 7:4 6:3
A6 /// /// /// /// /1/ /// 9:8 10:4 7:8
A7 000 /// /// /// /1/ /// 6:3 3:7 5:10
A8 000 /// /// /// /// /1/ 10:4 5:5 8:6
A9 000 /// 01/ /// /// 000 10:0 5:6 7:8
A10 /// /// /// /// /// /// 16:0 15:4 12:10
All /// /// /// /// /// /// 16:2 16:7 16:10
Al2 000 /// 000 000 /// 000 12:5 5:6 5:7
Al3 000 /// /// /// /// /// 13:1 7:9 6:10
Al4 000 /// 000 000 000 000 8:3 5:0 5:3
Al5 0/0 /// 000 /// /// 000 9:6 4:10 5:6
Al6 000 /// /// /// /// /// 16:9 10:1 16:11
Al7 000 /// /// /// /// /// 16:1 7:7 10:9
Al8 000 000 000 000 000 000 16:4 7:0 9:2
Al9 000 000 000 000 000 000 14-.4 €,-.2 7A
A20 000 /// /// /// /// /// 14:1 8:5 10:5
A21 000 /// /// /// /// /// 14:7 7:4 10:6
A22 /// /// /// /// /// /// 14:8 8:6 9:3
A23 000 /// /// /// /// /// 16:1 11:5 9:4
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Table 8. Results of Experiment 1. Autistic Children
Computer data 
Subj IQ A B C D t(m/s) n.sc. ticl(s)
Al 000 / / 0 0 264 10 26.4
A2 00/ / / / 0 273 10 27.3
A3 // / / / / 180 12 15.0
A4 000 0 / / 0 359 10 35.9
A5 /0 0 0 0 0 140 10 14.0
A6 // / / / / 150 12 12.5
A7 00 / / / / 155 10 15.5
A8 000 / / / / 261 10 26.1
A9 00 / / / / 225 10 22.5
A10 / / / / / 190 10 19.0
All / / / / / 196 10 19.6
Al2 0 / 0 / / 237 10 23.7
A13 000 / / / / 160 10 16.0
A14 000 / / / / 451 10 45.1
A15 0/0 / / / / 422 10 42.2
A16 /0 / / / / 228 10 22.8
A17 000 / / / / 291 10 29.1
A18 000 / / / / 257 10 25.7
A19 000 / / / / 185 10 18.5
A20 000 / / / / 226 10 22.6
A21 00 / / / / 789 22 35.9
A22 / / / / / 237 10 23.7
A23 000 / / / / 322 12 26.8
Table 9. Results of Experiment 1. - Down's Syndrome Children
Dolls Data
Questions
M2 M3 M4
Age and Mental Age
Subj.
Task
l'Q IQ M1 CA	 VMA NVMA
Ea	 /// /// /// /// /// /// 16:9 10:3 5:2
1102 /// /// /// /// / // /// 16:5 8:6 6:3
E6 /// /// /// /// /// /// 14:1 7:7 4:11
D4 000 /1/ /// /// /00 /00 14:9 6:6 6:2
El5 /// /// /// /// /// /// 14:10 6:10 4:9
D6 000 /// /// /// 0/0 00/ 18:3 9:6 4:0
D7 /// /// /// /// /// /// 17:2 9:7 4:4
D8 /// /// /// /// /// /// 16:9 7:9 5:0
D9 000 /1/ /// 000 000 000 11:3 5:2 3:3
Eq 0 000 /// /// /// /// /// 15:0 7:6 4:10
EQ1 /// /// /// /// /// /// 11:4 5:11 4:6
Eq2 /// /// /// /// /// /// 11:2 6:0 4:2
EU 000 /// /1/ 000 000 000 10:9 4:4 4:1
DA 000 /// /// /// /// /// 15:2 8:1 5:2
Eq5 /// /// /// /// /// /// 15:8 8:0 5:2
D16 /// /// /// /// /// /// 13:2 6:4 4:6
D17 /// /// /// /// /// /// 9:4 5:6 3:9
Computer Data 
Subj ID AB C D t(m/s) n.sc. t/d(s)
236 10 23.6DI // / / / /
D2 /// / / / / 220 10 22.0
D3 // / / / / 259 10 25.9
D4 000 / / / / 230 10 23.0
D5 // / / / / 279 10 27.9
D6 /0 / / / / 285 10 28.5
D7 // / / / 0 325 10 32.5
D8 // / / / / 165 10 16.5
D9 00 / / / 0 189 10 18.9
Eq 0 00 0 / / / 221 10 22.1
Eq l /1 / / / / 165 10 16.5
Eq2 /1 / / / 0 221 10 22.1
DB 00 0 / / / 316 10 31.6
Eq4 // / / / / 205 10 20.5
Eq5 // / / / / 185 10 18.5
13016 /1 / / / / 296 14 29.6
DU /1 / / / / 239 10 23.9
97
Table 10. Results of Experiment I. - Clinically Normal Children
Dolls Data
Questions
M2 M3 M4
Age and Mental Age
Sub'
Task
IQ RO M1 CA VMA NVMA
NI /// /// /// /// /// /1/ 4:1 5:1 5:1
N2 /// /// /// /// /// /1/ 4:9 6:7 5:10
N3 /// /// /// /// /// /1/ 4:9 5:5 5:5
N4 /// /// /// /// /// /// 4:10 5:10 5:11
N5 /// /// /// /// /// /// 4:7 5:8 5:6
N6 000 /// /// /// /1/ /1/ 4:9 4:7 4:11
N7 /// /// /// /// /// /// 4:10 4:10 4:6
N8 /// /// /// /// /// /1/ 4:9 5:0 5:0
N9 /// /// /// /// /// /1/ 4:7 5:7 5:9
N10 /// /// /// /// /// /// 4:7 5:7 5:8
N11 /// /// /// /// /// /1/ 4:7 5:6 5:1
N12 /// /// /// /// /// /// 4:10 5:3 5:10
N13 /// /// /// /// /// /// 4:10 5:3 5:10
N14 /// /// /// /// /// /// 4:9 6:1 6:1
N15 /// /// /// /// /// /// 4:7 4:9 5:1
N16 00/ /// /// /// /// /// 4:8 5:1 5:1
N17 /// /// /1/ /// /1/ /// 4:10 5:5 6:2
N18 /// /// /// /// /// /1/ 4:3 5:11 5:11
N19 /// /// /// /// /// /1/ 4:10 5:11 5:11
N20 000 /// /// /1/ /// /1/ 4:7 4:4 5:1
N21 /// /// /// /// /// /// 4:7 4:7 5:11
N22 /// /// /// /// /// /1/ 4:8 5:3 5:3
N23 /// /1/ /// /// /// /// 4:7 5:4 4:5
N24 /// /1/ /// /1/ /1/ /// 4:7 5:4 5:9
N25 /// /// /// /// /1/ /1/ 4:8 4:5 4:4
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Table 11. Results of Experiment I. Clinically Normal Children
Computer data 
Subj IQ AB C D t(m/s) n.sc. t/d(s)
N1 / / / / / 265 10 26.5
N2 / / / / / 212 10 21.2
N3 / / 0 / / 174 10 17.4
N4 / / / / / 183 10 18.3
N5 / / / / / 134 10 13.4
N6 / / / / / 206 10 20.6
N7 / / / / / 237 10 23.7
N8 / / / / / 157 10 15.7
N9 / / / / / 180 10 18.0
N10 / 0 / / / 203 10 20.3
N11 / / / / / 257 10 25.7
N12 / / / / / 237 10 23.7
N13 / / / / / 244 10 24.4
N14 / / / / / 193 10 19.3
N15 / / / / / 184 10 18.4
N16 0 / / 0 0 197 10 19.7
N17 / / / / / 219 10 21.9
N18 / / 1 0 / 164 10 16.4
N19 / / / / / 190 10 19.0
N20 0 0 / 0 / 212 10 21.2
N21 / / / / / 181 10 18.1
N22 / / / / / 236 10 23.6
N23 / / 0 220 10 22.0
N24 / / / / / 200 10 20.0
N25 / / / / / 201 10 20.1
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Details of the mean IQ scores and Chronological Ages of the three
groups are shown below in Table 12.
Table 12. IQ scores and Chronological Ages of the three groups
CA
(y:m)
Verbal JO Non-Verbal JO
(BPVS) (Leiter)
A 23 Mean 13:3 60 67.4
SD	 2:11 18.2 21.5
Range 6:3-16:9 43-107 29-112
D 17 Mean 14:3 50.8 33.2
SD	 2:8 5.4 4.9
Range 9:4-18:3 40-61 22-40
N 25 Mean 4:8 113.6 116.3
SD	 0:2 12.0 11.8
Range 4:1-4:10 95-139 93-139
Key for Table 12. (and Table 13. below) 
A - Autistic
D - Down's
N - Normal
Gp - Group
CA - Chronological Age
y:m - years :months
Pairwise comparisons were carried out on these data using analysis of
variance, further analysis was then carried out using Tukey's HSD test.
Chronological Age Comparisons
Pairwise comparison of Chronological Ages for the three groups, using
analysis of variance, revealed a significant effect (F(2,62)=130.15, p<.001).
Further analysis of this effect using Tukey's HSD showed that the autistic
children and the Down's Syndrome children were significantly older than
the normal children, and that the difference in Chronological Age between
the Down's Syndrome children and the autistic children did not reach
significance (HSD=19.6).
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Verbal IQ Comparisons
Pairwise comparisons of the Verbal IQ's for the three groups, using
analysis of variance, showed a significant effect (F(2,62)=144.88, p<.001).
Further analysis of this effect using Tukey's HSD showed that the normal
children had a significantly higher mean Verbal IQ than the autistic children
and the Down's Syndrome children. The Verbal IQ of the autistic children
was slightly higher than that of the Down's Syndrome children, but this
difference was not found to be significant (HSD=9.9).
Non-Verbal IQ Comparison
Pairwise comparisons of the Non-Verbal IQ's for the three groups,
using analysis of variance showed a significant effect
(F(2,62)=163.78,p<.001). Further analysis using Tukey's HSD revealed that
the mean Non-Verbal IQ was significantly higher for the normal children
than for the autistic and Down's Syndrome children, and that the autistic
children had a significantly higher mean Non-Verbal IQ than the Down's
Syndrome children (HSD=11.1).
Details of the mean Verbal Mental Ages and the mean Non-Verbal
Mental Ages of the three groups are shown in Table 13.
Table 13. Mean Mental Ages (MA) 
_GR n Verbal MA Non-Verbal MA
(y:m) (y:m)
A 23 Mean 8:0 8:11
SD 3:2 3:7
Range 3:7-16:8 4:3-16:11
D 17 Mean 7:2 5:6
SD 1:9 1:5
Range 4:4-10:3 3:3-8:1
N 25 Mean 5:4 5:5
SD 0:7 0:6
Range 4:4-6:7 4:4-6:2
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Verbal Mental Age Comparisons
Pairwise comparisons of the Verbal Mental Ages of the three groups,
using analysis of variance, showed a significant effect (F(2,62)=10.38,
p<.001). Further analysis using Tukey's HSD showed that the normal
children had a significantly lower mean Verbal Mental Age than both the
autistic children and the Down's Syndrome children (HSD=18.6).
Non-Verbal Mental Age Comparisons
Pairwise comparisons of the Non-Verbal Mental Ages of the three
groups, using analysis of variance, showed a significant effect (F(2,62)=17.65,
p<.001). Further analysis using Tukey's HSD showed that the autistic
children had a significantly higher mean Non-Verbal Mental Age (NVMA)
than both the Down's Syndrome children and the normal children. There
was no significant in NVMA between the Down's Syndrome and the normal
children (HSD=23.5).
Discussion of TO results. 
The Down's Syndrome group was slightly older than the autistic
group, although this difference did not reach statistical significance. This
matching of Chronological Ages was what we set out to achieve from the
comparison group.
The autistic group had a higher mean Non-Verbal IQ and Non-Verbal
Mental Age, than the Down's Syndrome group. However, this difference
was only statistically significant for the Non-Verbal measures.
The higher IQ and Mental Age means for the Down's comparison
group was not considered to be problematic since in fact it adds to the power
of the comparison group. If the performance of the Down's Syndrome
children is better on the experimental tasks than the autistic children then we
can rule out IQ as an explanation, since performance was superior despite a
lower mean IQ.
Comparing the autistic group with the normal children (comparison
group), it was found that the autistic group had a significantly higher mean
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Verbal Mental Age and Non-Verbal Mental Age. Again, this difference is not
a problem since it is the autistic group with the higher mean Mental Age
scores which increases the power of the comparison group.
Finally, since the individual Mental Ages of each of the subjects has
been obtained, this will enable us to make within-group comparisons
between Mental Age and performance on the tasks.
A number of comparisons can be made from the results concerning the
training program and the understanding of false-belief as measured by
conventional procedure and by computer games. The remainder of this
section then will be divided into a number of parts addressing these issues.
0. Computer Training Program
Table 14 shows the total time spent on the training program and the
time per decision (ie average time spent on each screen), for the three groups
of subjects.
Table 14. Time spent on the Training program
Group n Total time Time per dec.
(seconds) (seconds)
Autistic 23 Mean 265 24.6
SD 141 8.6
Range 140-789 14.0-45.1
Down's 17 Mean 237 23.7
SD 50 5.0
Range 185-325 16.5-32.5
Normal 25 Mean 203 20.3
SD 32 3.1
Range 134-265 13.4-26.5
Pairwise comparisons were carried out using analysis of variance,
comparing the total training times for each of the three groups and also
comparing the time per decision on the training program for each group.
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Total training time comparisons
Pairwise comparisons using analysis of variance revealed no
significant differences between the three groups in total time spent on the
training program (F(2,62)=2.84, p<.05)
Time per decision
There was also no significant difference between the three groups in
the time per decision (time spent on each screen) on the training program
(F(2,62)=3.28, p<.05)
Discussion
The Autistic and the Down's groups tended to spend longer on the
training program and make slower decisions than the normal controls.
However, analysis of variance revealed that this difference was not
significant.
Although the autistic children as a group were calculated to have a
much greater mean total training time than the other two groups, this could
be explained by one particular subject (A21) who had spent considerably
more time on the training program than any of the other subjects. Without
this subject, the mean total time for the autistic group is 245 seconds.
We can conclude from these results then, that the autistic children,
although they may have been slightly slower on the training program than
the normals, did not have any special difficulty handling the computer
interface. Any differences between the autistic group and the other two
groups in their performance on the computer tasks could not be attributed to
an inability to use the computer.
It is sufficient at this point, to be satisfied that none of the children
failed to be able to use the mouse and, as a preliminary observation, the
mechanics of the computer environment seem to present no problems for
any of the subjects.
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ii) Performance on the False-Belief Tasks
Doll Presentation
Table 15 below shows the number of children from each group who
either passed or failed the test question of the false belief task given that they
had passed all the control questions.
Those children who failed any one of the control questions are not
considered in this analysis; therefore when we refer to "failing the false-
belief task" we mean that the subject has failed the test question despite
passing all the control questions.
Table 15. Performance on the False-Belief task (using Dolls)
Group	 Number who passed Number who failed 
Autistic	 5	 10
Down's	 11	 2
Normal	 21	 3
Chi squared or Fisher Exact analyses were carried out on these data,
making comparisons between the groups in terms of the numbers of children
who passed or failed on the false-belief task.
a) Autistic vs Down's Syndrome group
Significantly more autistic children failed the false-belief task than Down's
Syndrome children (Chi squared=5.53, p<0.01)
b) Autistic vs Normal group
Significantly more autistic children failed the false-belief task than normal
children (Chi squared=9.87, p<0.01)
c) Down's Syndrome vs Normal group
There was no significant difference in the proportions of children who
passed or failed the false-belief task when comparing the Down's Syndrome
group with the Normal group (Fisher Exact, p=0.78)
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Computer Presentation
Table 16. shows the number of children from each group who either
passed or failed on game type E of the false-belief program (False-belief
scenario test question), given that they passed the test questions on all the
other "control" games (A to D).
Those children who failed any one of the "control" games are not
considered in this analysis. Two interesting cases (A15 and A16) showed a
combination of passing and failing the test game E whilst passing all the
control games. These subject were not included in the analysis but we will
consider them later.
Table 16. Performance on False-Belief task (using computer) 
Group	 Number who passed
	
Number who failed
Autistic
	 5	 11
Down's	 9	 1
Normal	 17	 0
Chi squared or Fisher Exact analyses were carried out on these data
making comparisons in terms of the numbers who passed from each group.
a) Autistic vs Down's Syndrome group
Significantly more autistic children failed the false belief game E than
Down's Syndrome children (Fisher Exact, p=0.005)
b) Autistic vs Normal group
Significantly more autistic children failed the false-belief game E than
Normal children (Chi squared=14.57, p<0.001)
c) Down's Syndrome vs Normal group
There was no significant difference in the proportion of children who passed
or failed on the false-belief game E between the Down's Syndrome group
and the Normal group (Fisher Exact, p=0.37)
106
Discussion
Dolls data 
Analyses were carried out using only those children who passed all
the control questions. Of these children, a greater proportion of the autistic
group failed the false-belief task than passed, whereas for the Down's
Syndrome group and the group of young normal children a greater
proportion passed the task than failed. In other words the performance of
the autistic group was significantly different from the performance of either
of the other two groups in that the autistic group failed the test question
"Where does Sally think the ball is?"
Despite the added control questions of the revised false-belief task,
then, the pattern of these results were similar to those found by Baron-Cohen
et al (1985).
It is interesting that five of the autistic children did pass the false-belief
task. Later we will consider what it might be about these subjects which
enabled them the pass the test question.
It is also worth noting that 18 out of the 23 autistic children failed the
test question, although of course 8 of these subjects also failed the control
questions. It may be the case that these children do not understand false-
belief but we cannot deduce this from our task since their failure on the test
question may be explained by their failure on a control question.
We need further analysis before we can be satisfied that failure on the
task was purely due to a deficit in understanding of false-belief. Failure may
be due to some abstract feature of the task rather than the conceptual nature
of the task. Therefore we need to consider whether a completely different
mode of presentation makes any difference.
Computer data 
The computer data revealed similar patterns of results to the dolls
data. Using only those children who passed all the control games it was
found that a greater proportion of the autistic children failed on game E
(false-belief scenario) than passed, whilst the Down's syndrome children and
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the normal children tended to pass on this game. This result testifies to the
consistency of the results found with the dolls experiment and suggests that
the computer has been used effectively as a tool for investigating false-belief
in the children.
Although the overall pattern of results from the two forms of
presentation are similar, we need to look in more detail for any differences
in performance on the computer presentation compared to the dolls
presentation.
iii) Comparison of results - Dolls vs Computer presentation
The five autistic children who passed the false-belief task with dolls
(A3,A6,A10,A11,A22) were also the only five to pass the computer
presentation.
There are however, four interesting cases of autistic children who
showed a combination of passing and failing on different trials of the test
question or test game. Although this is too few subjects to be of any major
significance, as individual cases they are still worth reporting.
Subjects A2 and A5 both passed game E on one trial but failed on other
trials. Unfortunately neither of these subjects passed all the control games
successfully. A2 failed game D and A5 failed all the control games. One
explanation for the inconsistency of their performance then, is that they are
simply making random selections. It is interesting though that using the
dolls presentation subject A2 failed the test question consistently whilst
making no errors on the control questions. Subject A5 also failed the test
question consistently using the dolls presentation. It will be interesting to
follow these subjects up by retesting them later.
It is also worth observing the performances of subject A15 and A16.
Using the dolls presentation subject A15 passed the test question on one
occasion but failed control questions and subject A16 failed the test question
on all three trials but passed all the control questions. For the computer
presentation though, both of these subjects showed a combination of passing
and failing game E whilst passing all the control questions. If the explanation
for their success on the computer presentation was that they were simply
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making random selections then why were they so consistently correct in
their performance on the control games?
Obviously all four of these subjects have difficulty with their
understanding of the false-belief question, but they are interesting cases
since their performance is inconsistent. It may be that they are on the verge
of understanding false-belief, or that they are somehow learning how to
answer this question correctly. It is particularly interesting to observe that in
all four cases performance was improved on the computer presentation and
that the order of presentation was dolls first followed by computer. Retesting
these subjects will be particularly valuable.
It is also worth observing some discrepancies in the performances of
the Down's Syndrome children. Subjects D6 and D14 are of particular
interest. D6 consistently failed the test question and also failed control
questions on the doll presentation. However, on the computer presentation
this subject showed a combination of pass and fail on game E (the test game)
whilst passing all the control games. Also D14 failed on the test question on
the doll presentation but passed all the control questions, whilst on the
computer presentation this subject passed the test question on both trials and
passed all the control games.
The raw data show no pattern of particular control questions or games
being failed. However, it may be that the computer control games are easier
to pass than the doll control questions, perhaps because they require less
memorised information. We will speculate as to the differences between
computer and doll presentation later in the general discussion.
It is interesting then, that whenever there is a discrepancy in
performance it always occurs in the same "direction", failing on the dolls
presentation and passing on the computer presentation. This result was also
found for the normal subjects as N6 failed on the dolls task but passed on the
computer task.
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iv). The relation of performance to Chronological Age and Mental Age
In tables 17 to 22 below the autistic subjects are divided into two
groups, those who passed the test question (Pass group) and those who
failed the test question (Fail group), given that they passed all the control
questions. We can then compare the Chronological Age (CA), Verbal Mental
Age (VMA) and Non-Verbal Mental Age (NVMA) of the two groups, to see
if passing or failing on the test question is related to any of these factors.
Mann-Whitney U tests were carried out to compare the two groups
since the numbers in each group were small.
a) Doll Presentation
Table 17. Performance vs Chronological Age (Dolls Presentation) 
n	 median mean
	 Std.Dev	 Mean Rank
(y:m)	 (y:m)	 (y:m)
Pass Group 5 14:8 13:11 2:8 8.2
Fail Group	 10 13:11 13:5 3:2 7.9
Table 17 shows the median, mean and standard deviation (Std.Dev)
Chronological Age in years and months (y:m) for the Pass group and the Fail
group for the dolls presentation. The median CA of the Pass group is higher
than that of the Fail group. CA's were transformed into ranks in order to
perform the Mann-Whitney U test. The mean ranks differed in the same
direction as the median CA's. However, although the Pass group was found
to be older the effect was not significant at the .05 level (p---0.9511).
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Table 18. Performance vs Verbal Mental Age (Dolls Presentation) 
n	 median mean	 Std.Dev	 Mean Rank
(y:m)	 (y:m)	 (y:m)
Pass Group 5 10:4 11:10 3:10 12
Fail Group 10 7:6 7:8 2:2 6
The median Verbal Mental Age of the Pass group is higher than that of
the Fail group and the mean ranks differ in the same direction as the
medians. A Mann-Whitney U test shows the difference in Verbal Mental Age
to be significant at the .05 level (p=0.0169).
Table 19. Performance vs Non-Verbal Mental Age (Dolls Presentation) 
n	 median mean	 Std.Dev	 Mean Rank
(y:m)	 (y:m)	 (y:m)
Pass Group 5 12:10 12:3 3:9 10.2
Fail Group	 10 8:11 9:3 3:3 6.9
The median NVMA of the Pass group is higher than that of the Fail
group and the mean ranks differ in the same direction as the medians.
However the Mann-Whitney U test shows that this difference is not
significant at the .05 level (p=0.1984)
b) Computer Presentation 
The same analyses were carried out for the Pass and Fail group of the
computer presentation, comparing performance with CA, VMA and NVMA.
111
Table 20. Performance vs CA (Computer Presentation) 
n	 median mean	 Std.Dev	 Mean Rank
(y:m)	 (y:m)	 (y:m)
Pass Group 5 14:8 13:11 2:8 9.4
Fail Group	 11 14:1 12:8 3:5 8.1
The median CA of the Pass group is higher than that of the Fail group
and the mean ranks also differ in the same direction. However the Mann-
Whitney U test shows that this difference is not significant at the .05 level
(p=0.6504).
Table 21. Performance vs VMA (Computer Presentation) 
n
	
median mean	 Std.Dev	 Mean Rank
(y:m)	 (y:m)	 (y:m)
Pass Group 5 10:4 11:10 3:9 13.4
Fail Group	 11 8:6 8:4 1:11 6.3
The median VMA of the Pass group was higher than that of the Fail
group and the mean ranks differed in the same direction. The Mann-
Whitney U test revealed this difference to be significant at the .05 level
(p=0.0065)
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Table 22. Performance vs NVMA (Computer Presentation)
n	 median mean
	 Std.Dev Mean Rank
(y:m) (y:m) (y:m)
Pass 5 12:10 12:3 3:9	 11.9
Fail	 11 7:0 6:10 2:1	 7
The median NVMA of the Pass group was higher than that of the Fail
group and the mean ranks differed in the same direction. However, the
Mann-Whitney U test revealed that this difference was not significant at the
.05 level (p=0.0616).
Discussion 
The autistic children who passed the false belief task were slightly
older than those who failed (although this difference did not reach
significance). Also, those who passed had significantly higher Verbal Mental
Ages and higher Non-Verbal Mental Ages (although this did not quite reach
significance) than those who failed. Can this explain why most of the
autistic group failed?
If we compare the autistic group with the control groups it is clear that
Chronological Age (CA) and Mental Age (MA) alone cannot account for
failure to pass the false belief questions. The Down's Syndrome control
group had the same CA and a lower MA than the autistic group (see chapter
5) and yet were able to pass the false belief questions. The normal controls
had a lower CA and MA than the autistic group (see chapter 5) and were
also able to pass the test question. In other words, failure to pass the false
belief task is not related to general developmental delay.
So, what is the significance of the CA and MA of the "Pass" group? In
order to find an explanation for the results we need to look at the "specific
developmental delay hypothesis" proposed by Baron-Cohen (1989). This
theory states that there is a specific delay in the development of the
mechanism for meta-representational capacity (thought to underlie theory of
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mind), and that some autistic children may eventually develop a theory of
mind at the lowest level some years after it would develop normally. Baron-
Cohen (1989) found that the four autistic children who passed the Sally-
Anne task in an earlier experiment (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985) and a further
six who passed from another large sample, were amongst the oldest children
(none was younger than 11 years) and also had a higher Verbal Mental Age.
However, these children were unable to attribute beliefs at a more advanced
level (eg. Mary thinks that John thinks the icecream van is in the park),
whereas matched non-autistic controls (normal 7 year olds and Down's
children) could. In other words, those autistic children who passed the false
belief task at the simplest level (used in our study) are specifically delayed in
the acquisition of more complex theory of mind.
The autistic children who passed the false belief task in our experiment
were similar to those who passed the original version of the false belief task
in the experiments of Baron-Cohen et al (1985) and Baron-Cohen (1989).
They had a higher Verbal Mental Age than those who failed and (apart from
one subject who was 9:8 years) were well above 11 years of age. Mental Age
clearly has some role to play in being able to pass the false belief task, but it
must also be noted that there were some children who failed the task who
had similar levels of ability. Therefore we can conclude, as Baron-Cohen
(1989) did, that "High Verbal MA is a necessary but not sufficient condition
for developing a theory of mind."
These data then, are in line with those found in previous studies
(Baron-Cohen et al, 1985, 1986; Leslie and Frith, 1988; Baron-Cohen, 1989).
The autistic children who passed were all in a high age range with high
Mental Ages. However, we would expect these children to fail on higher
levels of belief attribution. Also, it must be noted that this was true of both
media of presentation (Dolls and Computer), suggesting further that there is
something about the conceptual nature of the task (ie. understanding of false
belief) which causes the autistic children to fail.
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v). Informal Observations. 
Finally, Our informal observations suggested that all three groups of
subjects were attracted to and motivated by the experience of working with
the computer. In particular, we were interested in the reactions and
behaviour of the autistic children.
a)Initial Reactions
All of the autistic children reacted positively to the prospect of
working on the computer, despite the fact that the majority of these children
had little or no previous experience of computer work. The exception to this
was subject A3 who was described by his teachers as having an "obsession"
for the computer, which he had worked with at a previous school. The
difficulty with this subject then was in ending the computer sessions without
the child becoming upset. This was achieved fairly easily by promising the
child that he would be able to indulge another obsession (setting out the
plates at lunch time) if he behaved well at the end of the computer session.
b). Behaviour
The initial signs are that the autistic children were able to concentrate
extremely well when working with the computer, compared to the more
conventional forms of work. Certainly for a number of children specific
behavioural problems were vastly reduced during the computer session.
Subject A4 who normally pulled the hair of any one near her (a
behavioural problem which was normally solved by holding her hands
while talking to her), was able to work with the computer, using the mouse
with what was effectively a free hand, whilst the experimenter held the other
hand. This was considered to be somewhat of a breakthrough for this
subject.
Subjects A2 and A9 were normally obsessive questioners, a
behavioural problem which made the dolls presentation of the false belief
task very difficult to carry out. However, working with the computer held
their attention more effectively and limited their questioning to a more
acceptable level.
115
c). Motivation
The autistic children appeared to be highly motivated by the rewards
the computer offered. They reacted particularly well to the computer music,
often humming along to the well known tunes. They appeared to appreciate
the opportunity to control and initiate the work they were doing without the
prospect of failing.
Clearly it is dangerous to place too much emphasis on informal
observations such as these, however they do serve the function of giving a
general positive picture of the autistic child's experience with the computer.
GENERAL DISCUSSION
In this first experiment it was found that all three groups of children
were able to handle the computer interface successfully. Given the various
arguments in Chapter 4 as to why autistic children might be particularly
well suited to the computer environment, it is promising to find that this
group of children had no problems using the mouse and navigating the
screens. Furthermore, since the pattern of results found using the computer
presentation was similar to the results found using the doll presentation it
would seem that the computer has been used successfully here as a novel
investigative tool in a cognitive psychology experiment.
The results of the false-belief task, for both presentations, showed that
the autistic children failed to understand false-belief whereas the Down's
Syndrome children, with lower Verbal and Non-Verbal MA's passed and the
normal children, also with lower Mental Ages than the autistic children, also
passed. These results are similar to those found by Baron-Cohen et al (1985),
and was found using a revised version of the Sally-Anne task and using a
novel form of presentation of the task, suggesting further that there is
something about the conceptual nature of the task which causes autistic
children to fail.
This experiment then, lends further support to the hypothesis that
autistic children are specifically impaired in their "theory of mind".
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The few autistic children who pass the test tend to have higher Mental
Ages. However, Down's Syndrome children with lower MA's passed the
test. It is possible that autistic children have a "specific developmental delay"
in the cognitive mechanism employed in attributing beliefs.
A closer comparison between the computer data and the dolls data
revealed that those children who passed consistently on one presentation
always passed on the other presentation. However, the few inconsistent
results that appeared in the data are interesting. Of those children who
showed a combination of passing and failing the test question or game, any
inconsistency between performance on the two presentations showed failure
on the dolls presentation and passing on the computer presentation. Also, in
all these cases the computer came second in the order of presentation.
There were too few children who showed these inconsistent results to
make any major claims about, however we might consider a number of
questions on the basis of this finding. Firstly, are these children somehow on
the borderline between understanding and not understanding false-belief?
Secondly, is the computer functioning as some sort of training device and if
so, in what way? Thirdly, is there something about the computer that
enables the child to pass?
There are a number of differences between the computer presentation
and the dolls presentation which may be relevant. One possibility is that the
external representation of the computer presentation may be easier to deal
with as a primary representation than the dolls presentation. In general, it
would seem likely that the doll presentation involves far more cues,
generated by the interpersonal interaction, than the computer presentation.
Another factor may be the differing linguistic demands of the two versions,
the dolls version involving more spoken language and in particular the
dolls control questions consisting of a long list of questions requiring
reference to memorized information. The computer version, on the other
hand, involves far more recognition than recall. It is also possible that the
presentation by computer has a novelty value which motivates the child
during the task.
If the child is somehow learning to understand false-belief this may be
being done in two different ways. If the autistic child lacks an innate ability
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that cannot be learned, then they may be passing the task by "hacking out" a
solution to a - subset of problematic situations, in other words the child has
learned an algorithm that has enabled him or her to predict what was
happening next without having understood the basic concept. However, as
Morton (1989) points, one explanation is that the necessary structures are
there but have not yet been "hooked up" within the brain. If this is true, then
these children who are learning to pass the false-belief task may be "linking
together" deficient cognitive structures and genuinely learning to
understand false-belief. This latter explanation is the most optimistic of the
two and the most desirable from a therapist's point of view. It would be
useful if the computer proves to be a good training device as well as an
investigative tool.
It will be interesting to retest these children in the next experiment to
examine how stable the results are over time and if there is any
improvement on initial performance. In particular it will be interesting to
follow the performance of those children who showed inconsistent results.
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CHAPTER 8.
EXPERIMENT 2.
INTRODUCTION
In the second experiment we retested a number of autistic children
and Down's Syndrome children approximately six months after the
completion of experiment one. The main objective was to look at how stable
the results would be when the experiment was repeated.
We will be testing the hypothesis that the tasks are reliably testing the
understanding of false belief and, assuming that this cognitive skill will not
change in the six months between experiments, that the results will remain
the same upon retesting.
In particular, we will be interested in retesting those children who
failed the false belief task, or showed inconsistent results in the first
experiment. If the results are stable, then the children who failed originally
will fail again. However, if retesting yields different results and these
children pass, we will have to consider a number of different explanations.
One possibility is that the children may develop an understanding of
false belief over the months between testing and retesting. Leslie and Frith
(1988) and Baron-Cohen (1989) have suggested that the theory of mind at the
lowest level may develop late (beyond the normally expected rneata1 agel ix
older autistic children (this is the "specific developmental delay" hypothesis
referred to in Chapter 7). However, it seems unlikely that developmental
change in just a few months would produce a sharp change in results, but it
will be interesting to observe the borderline subjects who showed
inconsistent results in experiment one.
Another possibility is that the children may learn to answer the false
belief test by using a compensatory strategy and that repeated testing has a
"training" effect. Learning may have taken place as a result of the feedback
given in the computer version of the task; a correct choice leads to Sally
retrieving the ball with accompanying music and the text "YES WELL
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DONE", whereas an incorrect choice prompts the child to "TRY AGAIN" and
loops back to the test question screen. Feedback was also given in the Dolls
version as the child is told "Well done" for the correct choice. Another
possibility is that a combination of developmental change and "training"
may explain a change in results.
Finally, an explanation for different results on retesting may simply
be that the tasks are unreliable, in which case some of the subjects who
passed in experiment 1 might fail in experiment 2.
METHOD
Subjects
Twelve autistic children and seven Down's Syndrome children, who
were all used in experiment 1, were retested in this experiment. Details of
the subjects are presented in Chapter 5, with individual details of IQ score
and Chronological Age given in Chapter 6. It was not possible to retest all
the subjects we would have liked (for example some had left the school and
some were ill).
Procedure
The subjects were retested approximately six months after their
participation in experiment I. For each subject, the two types of task (dolls
and computer) were presented in a different order to experiment 1. Also,
there was no training program preceding the tasks. Otherwise, the
procedure was identical to experiment I.
RESULTS
Tables 23 and 24 show the results of experiment 2, retesting autistic
and Down's Syndrome children (see Chapter 6 for the key to column
headings). In addition, the final two columns show summarised results from
experiment 1:-
Test() - responses to test question from experiment I.
Controls - / refers to passing all the control questions in expt I.
0 refers to failing one or more of the control questions in expt I.
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Dolls Data
Task Questions Expt.l. Results
Subj TQ RO M1
Al 000 /// /// /// ///
A2 0/ /// /// /// ///
A3 /// /// /// /// / //
A6 /// /// /// /// / //
A8 000 /// /// /// ///
A9 000 /1/ /// /// / / /
Al2 000 /1/ 000 000 ///
A13 000 /// /// /// ///
A15 000 /// 11/ /// ///
A16 000 /// /// /1/ ///
A20 000 /// /// /// /1/
A21 000 /1/ /1/ /// /1/
Computer Data 
Task Questions
M2	 M3	 M4	 Test0
/// 000
/ // 000/// ////// ///
// / 000
/ // 000
000 000
/// 000
000 0/0
/// 000
/// 000
/// 000
Expt.l. Results
Controls
//////
0/
o//
/
Table 23. Retesting Autisic Children
Test° Controls
000 0
00/ 0
/// /
/// /
000 /
00 /
0 0
000 /
0/0 /
/0 /
000 /
00 /
Subj l'Q	 AB
000/ /
CD
/Al
A2 // / / / /
A3 // / / / /
A6 /// / / / /
A8 00 / / / /
A9 /// / / / /
Al2 /0 / 0 /
A13 00 / / / /
A15 0/ / / / /
A16 0/ / / / /
A20 00 / / / /
A21 00 / / / /
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Table 24. Retesting Down's Syndrome Children
Dolls Data 
jp.
Task Questions
M2 M.
Expt.1 Results
TO RO M1 Test°	 Controls
D3 /// /// /// /// /// /// ///
D4 000 /// /// /1/ 000 000 000
D6 000 /1/ /// /1/ 000 000 000
D9 000 /// /// /// /1/ 000 000
D10 000 /1/ /// /// /// /// 000
D13 000 /1/ /1/ 000 000 000 000
D14 000 /// /// /// /// /// 000
Computer Data
Task Questions
CD
Expt.l. Results
Subj11QAB Test°	 Controls
D3 /	 /	 / / / 1/
D4 0 / 0 / 000
D6 0 / / / / /0
D9 0 / 0 / / 0 0
D10 00 / 0 / / 00 0
D13 00 / 0 0 / 00 0
D14 0/ / 0 0 / /1
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These tables allow for quick comparisons between retesting results
and the results of the original experiment. However for a more detailed
comparison refer to the full results of the original experiment in tables 9, 10
and 11.
In the tables below we have attempted to summarize performances on the
first and second experiment. What are the possible responses to the control
questions and to the test questions?
For experiment 1 a subject may:-
1. Pass all the controls or fail at least one.
2. Pass all the test questions or fail at least one.
When that subject is retested on experiment 2, the same possible
responses are available:-
1. Pass all the controls or fail at least one.
2. Pass all the test questions or fail at least one.
The summary tables consider each possible combination of responses
over the two experiments (16 altogether) and shows the number of children
who performed that combination. For example, in table 25, two subjects
passed all the control questions and passed the test questions on experiment
1 whilst also passing all the control questions and passing the test questions
on experiment 2. Directly below the number 2 in this table is a zero. This
shows that no children passed all the control questions and passed the test
questions in experiment 1 whilst passing all the control questions and failing
at least one test question in experiment 2.
Given the geometry of these tables then, entries along the diagonal
(top left to bottom right) represent the numbers of children who show the
same result in experiment 1 and experiment 2.
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Table 25. Summary of Test Retest responses. Autistics (Doll Pres'n) 
Expt 1.
Control Qns
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass
	
Fail
Pass
Control
Test Q	 Pass 2 0 0 0
Fail 0 7 0 0
Qns
Fail Test Q	 Pass 0 0 0 0
Fail 0 0 0 3
In tables 25 to 28 "Pass" refers to passing all the questions and "Fail"
refers to failing at least one of the questions.
In table 25 all the numbers fall on the diagonal which means that the
twelve autistic children retested using the dolls presentation showed the
same results in experiment 1 as in experiment 2. Analysis of those children
who passed the control questions in both experiments (the top left four cells)
confirms that the consistency is unlikely to be due to chance (Fisher Exact,
p=0.03).
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Table 26. Summary of Test Retest responses. Autistics (Computer Presin)
Expt 1.
Control Qns
Pass
	
Fail
Test Qn
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass	 Fail
Pass
Control
Test Q	 Pass 2 1 0 1
Fail 0 6 0 0
Qns
Fail Test Q	 Pass 0 0 0 0
Fail 0 0 0 2
Table 26 considers the data from the two computer presentation
experiments. Ten of the subjects showed the same performance on both
experiments (numbers on the diagonal). However one subject (A9), who
passed the controls but failed the test questions on experiment 1, passed both
control and test questions on retesting. Another subject (A2) who failed both
controls and test questions in the original experiment, passed the controls
and test question on retesting. Considering only the children who passed the
control questions in both experiments, analysis shows that these subjects are
more likely to show the same performance (Fisher Exact, p=0.08) on the two
experiments.
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Table 27. Summary of Test Retest responses. Down's (Doll Pres'n)
Expt 1.
Control Qns
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass	 Fail
Pass
Control
Test Q	 Pass 1 0 0 0
Fail 0 2 0 0
Qns
Fail Test Q	 Pass 0 0 0 0
Fail 0 0 0 4
There were seven Down's Syndrome children retested. Table 27 shows
the data for the dolls presentation. All of the numbers fall on the diagonal
which means that these children showed the same performance on retesting
as they did in the first experiment. The frequencies are too small to allow
statistical analysis.
126
Expt
2
R
E
T
E
S
T
Table 28. Summary of Test Retest responses. Down's (Computer Pres'n)
Expt 1.
Control Qns
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass	 Fail
Pass
Control
Test Q	 Pass 1 0 0 0
Fail 0 1 0 0
Qns
Fail Test Q	 Pass 0 0 0 0
Fail 1 1 0 3
For the computer presentation five of the seven Down's Syndrome
children showed the same performance on both experiments. However, two
of the subjects performed differently on the two experiments. D14 passed
controls and test question on the first experiment but failed both controls
and test questions on retesting. D4 passed the control questions and failed
the test questions on experiment 1 but failed both controls and test question
on experiment 2.
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DISCUSSION
In experiment two we retested 12 autistic children and 7 Down's
Syndrome children. In general, it was found that the results from the first
experiment remained the same on retesting. We can conclude from this that
the tasks are reliable and that the results are stable. These results confirm our
earlier finding that autistic children are impaired in their understanding of
false belief, and that the two forms of presentation, dolls and computer,
essentially measure the same aspects of understanding.
There were, however, some exceptions to this result, which we also
need to consider. Two of the autistic children are of particular interest. For
the dolls presentation A2 failed the test question on each trial of experiment
one, but on retesting, passed the test question on the second trial. The
performance of this subject is also interesting on the computer presentation.
On experiment one A2 failed a control game, failed the first two trials of the
test question game and passed the third trial. On retesting however, A2
passed all the control games and both trials of the computer game. It would
appear from these results then, that the performance of A2 is improving and
that that improvement is shown particularly on the computer presentation.
Another interesting case is A9. This subject showed no improvement in
performance on the doll presentation retesting, however he improved on the
computer presentation and was able to pass all the control games and all
three trials of the test question games.
Only one of the Down's Syndrome children showed a different
performance on the test question. D14 who had originally passed control
games and the test question games on computer presentation, failed both test
question and control on retesting.
Finally, it is also worth observing that subjects A15 and A16 who
showed inconsistent results on the computer test question in the first
experiment responded similarly on retesting, both failing on the first trial
and passing on the second.
How can we explain the improvement in performance of the two
autistic children A2 and A9? It seems unlikely that the discrepancy in
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performance is due to the tasks being unreliable since the majority of
subjects perform so consistently. Therefore improvement in performance
may be due to late development of the understanding of false belief (Baron-
Cohen, 1989) or to the child learning to pass the test question by using an
algorithm or compensatory strategy. Although we cannot say for certain
which of these two processes are taking place, there are some indications of
the subjects learning to pass the tasks.
Firstly, it is interesting that improvement was shown on computer
presentation for both subjects, although the order of presentation was
different for each subject and would not therefore seem to be relevant.
Learning may take place more easily on computer. Failing on the first trial
and passing on subsequent trials within a session may be an indication of
learning; this was true of A2, A15 and A16. Finally, passing the Sally-Anne
task on retesting having failed previously, then going on to fail a different
test of false belief (Smarties test of experiment 3) may be an indication that
the subject has learned how to perform correctly on the Sally-Anne task
without really understanding the concept of false belief. Our third
experiment, then, may give us some indication of whether this has taken
place with subjects A2 and A9, A15 and A19.
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CHAPTER 9.
EXPERIMENT 3.
INTRODUCTION 
The third experiment examines understanding of false belief in the
same group of autistic children but using the "Smarties" task, originally
devised by Perner et al (1987). This task will be presented using conventional
materials and also using computer. This will enable us to make comparisons
across different types of tasks and between different modes of presentation.
The aim of this experiment is to replicate the autistic children's
problems in understanding false belief using a different paradigm. If the
Sally-Anne task (experiment 1) and the "Smarties" task are both testing false
belief then we should expect to find a strong correlation between
performance on the two different tasks. In addition, a second computer-
based task will provide us with further information about the extent to
which the conceptual or the abstract nature of the task leads to failure, rather
than the presentation medium.
The "Smarties" task involves testing false belief using a "deceptive-
appearance" paradigm. In this task the child is shown a well-known tube of
chocolates (Smarties) and asked what is in the tube. The child answers
"Smarties". However, when the tube is then opened s/he is surprised to find
a pencil inside. Understanding of false belief is then tested by asking the
child what another child would say about the contents of the box when s/he
sees it for the first time.
The advantage of this paradigm is that the children are first misled by
the deceptive appearance of the box, which allows them to experience false
belief in themselves before having to attribute false belief to somebody else.
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METHOD 
Subjects
Nineteen of the original 23 autistic children used in experiment 1
were tested in experiment 3. Testing began approximately twelve months
after the first experiment. Details of the subjects are presented in Chapter 5,
with individual details of Mental Age and Chronological Age given in
Chapter 7.
General Procedure
Each child was tested in one session which lasted for approximately
10 minutes. In that session the child was tested on the "Smarties" task using
two different forms of presentation:-
1. Using conventional presentation similar to the procedure used by
Perner et al (1987).
2. Using a computer version of the task.
The order of presentation was counterbalanced.
i) Conventional Presentation 
a) Materials
The Smarties tube used in this task is a well known confectionary box
which normally contains chocolate pastilles. It is a tubular container with a
picture of the sweets on the outside and measures 13 cm long and 2.5 cm in
diameter. The only other material used was a red pencil, short enough to fit
inside the box.
b) Procedure
The experimenter produced a packet of smarties from his bag and
asked the subject "What do you think is in the packet?" After the children
had answered "Smarties" or "sweets", the experimenter then opened the
packet and showed the child that in fact, there was just a pencil inside,
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saying to the child "No, it's a pencil." The experimenter then put the pencil
back in the box and closed it again. The subject was then asked a prompt
question, "Now what do you think is in the packet?" The final control
question checks that the child is still aware of his/her first judgement
concerning the contents of the packet by asking, "When I first asked you,
what did you think was in the packet?" After the subject had answered these
questions, the experimenter explained that the next subject to follow had not
seen what was in the packet:-"[name of next subject] has not seen what is in
the packet. When he/she comes in I'll show him/her this packet and ask:
[name] what do you think is in the packet?" The subject was then asked the
test question "What will [name] think is in the packet?".
The subject will then have given responses to four key questions:-
1. First Response control: "What do you think is in the packet?"
2. Reality control: "Now what do you think is in the packet?"
3. Own-Response control: "When I first asked you, what did you think was
in the packet?"
4. False-belief test: "What will [name] think is in the packet?"
ii). Presentation with the computer
a) Materials
The computer assisted learning system with mouse control described
in Chapter 6 was used for this presentation.
b) Procedure
The experimenter sat next to the child and checked that he or she
knew what the four objects on the screen were (see figure 9.1. which shows a
pencil, smarties, a flower and a smarties packet). The child was then asked
the first response control question, "What do you think is in the packet?".
This appears as text in figure 9.1 and if the child does not read it out the
experimenter does. Each screen is accompanied by music (the tune used for
each screen is shown above the figures, and the key to the music can be
found in chapter 6, table 4.)
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The child then has to choose between the pencil, the smarties or the
flower to answer the question. In most cases the child simply says "smarties"
to which the experimenter replies "move the arrow over the smarties" (see
figure 9.2). Whatever the child's response, the next screen will show a pencil
emerging from the smarties packet and then re-entering (figures 9.3 to 9.5).
The child is then asked the reality control question, "Now what do
you think is in the packet?" (see figure 9.6). Once again the child has to
choose between the pencil, smarties and the flower. In this case the correct
choice is the pencil (see figure 9.7). If the child were to choose incorrectly
then the program loops back to figure 9.3 and the sequence repeats.
However, if the child chooses correctly then the screen that follows flashes
up "YES, WELL DONE" in different colours (see figures 9.8 to 9.10). The
final control question, the own-response control, is then asked, "What did
you first think was in the packet?" (see figure 9.11). In this case the correct
choice is the smarties (see fig 9.12). An incorrect choice takes the program
back to figure 9.3. If the correct choice is made the message "YES, WELL
DONE" will appear again (see figures 9.8 to 9.10).
After a time delay of five seconds an animated character moves onto
the screen (see figure 9.13; note that the double image shows the movement
of the character). The following texts then appear explaining who the
character is, which are read out by the child or the experimenter. These are,
"This is Fred" (figure 9.14), "Fred has been outside" (figure 9.15), "Fred has
not seen what is in the packet" (figure 9.16), and finally the test question
"What does Fred think is in the packet?" (figure 9.17).
Once again the child has three choices. The correct choice is, of course,
the smarties (see figure 9.18); if this is chosen then the pencil appears (fig.
9.19) and Fred is disappointed (figures 9.20 and 9.21). If the child chooses
incorrectly the screen merely shows the pencil appearing.
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Because the program is set up to follow a different route of screens
depending on the choices made by the child, the log of screens visited shows
how the child has answered the four questions:-
1. First Response control - "What do you think is in the packet?"
2. Reality control- "Now what do you think is in the packet?"
3. Own-Response control - "What did you first think was in the packet?"
4. False-belief test - "What will Fred think is in the packet?"
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RESULTS
Table 29 shows the results of experiment 3 (smarties task) for the
standard presentation and for the computer presentation. The responses of
each subject to the test question and the three control questions are shown
under the following column headings:-
False belief test question - "What will (name) think
is in the packet?"
Cl	 First Response control question - "What do you think
is in the packet?"
C2	 Reality control question - "Now what do you think is
in the packet?"
C3	 Own-Response control question - "When I first asked
you, what did you think was
in the packet?"
Table 29 also shows the summarised results of the Sally-Anne
experiment (experiment 1) and retesting (experiment 2) alongside the results
of the smarties experiment so that easy comparison of performance of each
subject can be made across the three experiments.
The results showed that only five of nineteen children tested on the
smarties task were able to pass the false belief test question. From the
remaining 14 children who failed the test question, all but one passed the
control questions correctly.
There was no difference between the results of the standard presentation
and those of the computer presentation. Table 30 summarises the
performance for the two different modes of presentation.
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Table 29. Smarties Experiment Data
Standard Presentation
Exptl. Expt 2.Smarties Task
Subj	 T	 Cl C2 C3 Test() Cont Test() Cont
Al	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 / 000 /
A2	 /	 /	 /	 / 000 / 0/ /
A3	 /	 /	 /	 / /// / /// /
A4	 /	 /	 /	 / // /
A6	 /	 /	 /	 / // / /// /
A8	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 / 000 /
A9	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 0 000 0
A10	 /	 /	 /	 / /// /
Al2	 0	 /	 0	 / 000 0 000 0
A13	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 / 000 /
Al4
	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 0
A15	 0	 /	 /	 / 0/0 0 000 0
A16
	 /	 /	 /	 / 000 / 000 /
A17
	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 /
A18	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 0
A19	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 0
A20
	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 / 000 /
A21	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 / 000 /
A23	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 /
Computer Presentation
Exptl. Expt 2.Smarties Task
Subj	 T	 Cl C2 C3 TestO Cont TestO Cont
Al	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 0 000 0
A2	 /	 /	 /	 / 00/ 0 /// /
A3	 /	 /	 /	 / /// / // /
A4	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 0
A6	 /	 /	 /	 / /// / /// /
A8	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 / 00 /
A9	 0	 /	 /	 / 00 / /// /
A10	 /	 /	 /	 / / /
Al2	 0	 /	 0	 / 0 0 /0 0
A13	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 / 00 /
A14
	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 /
A15	 0	 /	 /	 / 0/0 / 0/ /
A16	 /	 /	 /	 / /0 / 0/ /
A17	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 /
A18	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 /
A19	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 /
A20	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 / 00 /
A21	 0	 /	 /	 / 00 / 00 /
A23	 0	 /	 /	 / 000 /
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Table 30. Smarties Task. Comparison of performance on different modes of
presentation 
Standard Presentation
C
0
M
P
U
T
E
R
Control Qns
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass
	
Fail
Test Qn
Pass	 Fail
Pass
Control
Test Q
	 Pass 5 0 0 0
Fail 0 12 0 0
Qns
Fail Test Q	 Pass 0 0 0 0
Fail 0 0 0 2
The format for Table 30 is the same as for similar tables shown in
Chapter 8 (eg. Table 25). The number in each cell refers to the number of
children who performed that combination of responses for the Computer
and Standard presentations.
Summarised comparisons of the results of the Smarties task with the
results of the Sally-Anne task (experiment 1) are shown in tables 31 and 32.
Since performance on the Smarties task was the same for both modes of
presentation (see Table 30), the results from the Smarties task shown in
tables 31 and 32 refer to both Standard and Computer presentation.
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Table 31. Summarised comparison of performance on the Smarties task
with performance on the Standard presentation of the Sally-Anne task 
Sally-Anne Task
(Standard Presentation)
Control Qns
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass
	
Fail
Pass
Control
Test Q	 Pass 3 2 0 0
Fail 0 7 0 5
Qns
Fail Test Q	 Pass 0 0 0 0
Fail 0 0 0 2
The numbers on the diagonal represent those subjects who performed
the same on the Smarties task as they did on the Sally-Anne task. Twelve of
the nineteen subjects showed the same performance. There were two subjects
who passed the test question and the control questions on the Smarties task
but who had failed the test question and passed the controls on the Sally-
Anne task. These 2 subjects were A2 and A16. Their overall performance will
be mentioned in more detail in the discussion. Five subjects who had failed
the test question and the controls on the Sally-Anne task, again failed the test
question on the Smarties task but passed the Smarties task controls. This
suggests that the control questions in the Smarties task were conceptually
easier than those in the Sally-Anne task.
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Table 32. Summarised comparison of performance on the Smarties task
with performance on the Computer presentation of the Sally-Anne task
Sally-Anne Task
(Computer Presentation)
Control Qns
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass	 Fail
Test Qn
Pass	 Fail
Pass
Control
Test Q	 Pass 3 1 0 1
Fail 0 11 0 1
Qns
Fail Test Q	 Pass 0 0 0 0
Fail 0 0 0 2
Table 32 shows the comparison of performance on the Smarties task
and the computer presentation of the Sally-Anne task. Most of the numbers
fall on the diagonal (16 out of 19), showing that performance on the two
tasks was almost the same. There were only 3 subjects who did not perform
in the same way on the two tasks. One subject (A2) who had failed both test
question and control question on the original Sally-Anne task passed both
test question and control on the Smarties task. Two subjects (Al and A4) had
failed test question and control question on the Sally-Anne task but on the
Smarties task failed the test question and passed the control questions.
Finally, subject A16 passed all the Smarties task but failed the test question
of the Sally-Anne task, whilst passing the control questions.
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DISCUSSION
In experiment 3, nineteen autistic children, from our original sample of
twenty-three, were tested using the "Smarties" task. This task tested false
belief but differed from the Sally-Anne task of experiments 1 and 2 as it
involved using a deceptive appearance paradigm.
The results from the "Smarties" task provided further evidence that
autistic children have difficulty understanding false belief. Most of the
autistic children (68%) failed the false belief test question whilst passing the
control questions, whilst only 26% passed the test question and controls.
Only 1 autistic child (6%) failed the control questions and this subject also
failed the test question.
The "Smarties" task was presented both in standard form and on the
computer. Both of these forms of presentation yielded the same results. This
would suggest that the standard and computer presentations are both
measuring the same aspects of understanding and that it is the conceptual
nature of the task (understanding of false belief) that causes the autistic
children to fail.
We also compared the results of the "Smarties" task with the results of
the Sally-Anne task (using the data from the first presentation of the Sally-
Anne task which included all the subjects used in experiment 3). In other
words we compared performance across two different types of tasks, both of
which tested understanding of false belief. It was found that the
performance of the autistic children was remarkably similar on the two
different types of tasks, and this was true for both standard and computer
presentations (see tables 31 and 32). This comparison demonstrates the
consistency of the results and the robust nature of the finding that autistic
children have difficulty understanding false belief.
Despite the concordance between the results from the Sally-Anne task
and the Smarties task, there were some minor differences in performance
that are worth mentioning. The main difference in the results was that more
children passed the control questions on the Smarties task (although still
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failing the test question). This is not surprising however, given that the
Smarties task involved fewer control questions and far less memory recall.
Two subjects passed the Smarties task having previously failed on the
Sally-Anne task. A2 had failed the Sally-Anne task on the first experiment,
but passed the Sally-Anne task on retesting with the computer version. A16
had shown a combination of passing and failing the computer version of the
Sally-Anne task. For these subjects we might speculate that a gradual
improvement in understanding of false belief was taking place in the first
two experiments, and that this understanding enabled them to pass a
different test of false belief in the form of the Smarties task. The third
experiment took place 12 months after the first experiment. If they had
passed the Sally-Anne experiment simply by learning some algorithm for the
task (without understanding false belief) then it would be unlikely that they
would pass the Smarties task.
Alternatively, subjects A9 and A15 showed a different pattern of
results. A9 had improved on the Sally-Anne experiment to the extent that he
was able to pass the computer version on retesting, having failed all
previous trials. However, this subject failed the Smarties task. A15 showed a
combination of passing and failing the Sally-Anne task but also went on to
fail the Smarties task. It is possible that these subjects had passed the Sally-
Anne task using some sort of algorithm, and since they had not developed
an understanding of false belief, went on to fail the Smarties task.
If these two alternative explanations are correct then it is interesting
that the subjects who we argue have truly developed understanding of false
belief, A2 and A16, are much older (14:8 and 17:9 years) than the two
subjects, A9 and A15, who had developed an alternative method of passing
the Sally-Anne task (11 and 10:6 years). It follows that older autistic children
develop understanding of false belief at this lower level, whereas younger
children have not yet developed understanding but may be able to use a
workable algorithm, within a specific situation.
To summarise the work so far, we have examined autistic children's
understanding of false belief using different mediums of presentation and
using different types of tasks. Despite our efforts to construct a task which
may enable autistic children to display an understanding of false belief we
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still find that most autistic children fail to show this understanding. There
are a few exceptions to this however, including a minority of children who
pass all the tasks consistently and a small number who show a combination
of responses.
We now have a profile of our autistic subjects which includes
performance on two different types of tasks, each presented in different
ways, chronological age, verbal and nonverbal mental age. In the next
experiment, we intend to explore how these profiles are related to measures
of cognitive and social behaviour in everyday life. If failure to form adequate
metarepresentatiolis is indeed the central cognitive deficit of autism, then its
extent and nature should relate to everyday observed behaviours.
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CHAPTER 10. 
EXPERIMENT 4.
INTRODUCTION
The experimental work so far offers strong support for the hypothesis
that autistic children have a specific deficit in their theory of mind. Such a
deficit was found despite relevant changes to the text of the "Sally-Anne"
task and despite changing the medium of presentation to one of computer
graphics, which it was argued might be more accessible to autistic children.
The deficit was also found on retesting and when using a different and new
form of false belief task. These data support the recent findings of other
researchers, that autistic children are unable to attribute mental states to
others (Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith, 1985, 1986; Dawson and Fernald,
1987; Baron-Cohen, 1989a; Leslie and Frith, 1988; Perner, Frith, Leslie and
Leekam, 1989; Harris and Muncer, 1988).
The next experiment considers the "ecological validity" of the theory of
mind hypothesis,(ie the extent to which ability to use a theory of mind
predicts a range of social and communicative behaviours, as measured by
existing assessment instruments). This is done by examining whether
performance on two theory of mind tasks (the revised Sally-Anne task and
the Smarties task) is related to measures of adaptive behaviour. 
Adaptive behaviour refers to the individual's "effectiveness in areas
such as social skills, communication, and daily living skills, and how well
the person meets the standards of personal independence and social
responsibility expected of his or her age by his or her cultural group"
(American Psychiatric Association, 1987). Although impairments in adaptive
behaviour have long since been included in the definition of mental
retardation, it is only recently that tests of adaptive behaviour have been
adequately standardized with firmly established norms.
In this study a newly revised assessment instrument, the Vineland
Adaptive Behaviour Scale (Sparrow et al, 1984), was used to document
adaptive behaviour in autistic and Down's Syndrome children. This scale has
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been nationally standardized and is intended for use with children and
adults with mental retardation. The scale has also been shown to have high
reliability and validity (Cicchetti and Sparrow,1981; Sparrow et a1,1984).
There are three editions of the scale. In this study we used the Survey form,
as it was the most appropriate for research and diagnosis. The Vineland
Adaptive Behaviour Scale is administered by interviewing either the parent
or caregiver of the subject. In this case the primary caregiver was
interviewed, since many of the children were resident at the schools.
The Vineland is scored in terms of four domains: Communication,
Daily Living Skills, Socialization and Motor Skills. Only the first three
domains are used for ages 6 and over. Also, these domains can be divided
into the following subdomains: (Communication) receptive, expressive, and
written language; (Daily Living Skills) personal, domestic, and community;
(Socialization) interpersonal relationships, play and leisure time, and coping.
These features are summarised in table 33 below.
Table 33. Description of VABS contents used. 
Domain	 Subdomain	 Content
Communication	 Receptive	 Understanding of
communiction
Expressive	 Expressive communication
Written	 Reading and written
communication
Daily living	 Personal	 Eating, dressing, self
skills	 care skills
Domestic	 Household activities
Community	 Use of time, money,
phone, job skills
Socialization Interpersonal	 Social interaction
relationships
Play & leisure	 Use of play and leisure time
Coping skills	 Responsibility,
sensitivity to others.
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A child can be given any one of five possible scores on each item in the
Vineland. Table 34 shows the scoring system.
Table 34. Key to Vineland Scoring System. 
Score	 Scoring criteria for activity
2	 Usually or habitually performed.
1	 Performed only sometimes.
0	 Never performed.
No opportunity for it.
DK	 Respondent does not know whether the
individual can or cannot perform it.
A literature search revealed only a handful of studies which have used
the Revised Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale (VABS) with autistic
populations. These studies were concerned with differences between clinical
groups rather than between subjects with differing cognitive abilities. The
first of these (Sparrow et al, 1986) was a longitudinal study comparing
"autistic-like" children with normals at preschool age and at 7 years of age.
Between-group differences were found on all domains of the VABS at both
ages, the Socialization Domain showing the greatest difference. Volkmar et
al (1987) compared autistic children on the VABS with non-autistic children
matched for age, gender, and Mental Age. Again it was found that autistic
children exhibited significantly greater deficits in the Socialization Domain
than non-autistic children. Loveland and Kelly (1988) measured adaptive
behaviours of young adult autistic and Down's Syndrome subjects. For this
age range, no significant differences in adaptive behaviour were found
between these groups when matched for Verbal Mental Age. However there
was a trend towards greater deficits in socialisation within the autistic
group; furthermore, those with autism were found to be significantly less
advanced in communication and socialization than were Down's Syndrome
subjects with similar Non-Verbal Mental Age. Finally, Freeman et al (1988)
also reported lower scores for autistic children compared to Down's
Syndrome children in the Socialization Domain.
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All of these studies then, have found that the VABS is a useful
instrument for documenting autistic behaviour and that a deficit particularly
in the Socialization Domain is characteristic of autistic children. These
studies have also shown that autistic children are impaired, to a lesser
extent, in the Communication Domain, but remain largely unimpaired,
relative to Mental Age, in the Daily living Skills Domain.
The present study uses a group of autistic subjects and a group of
Down's Syndrome subjects. Our main interest is whether subjects who fail
the false belief task differ from subjects who pass. Each clinical group is
divided into subgroups of those who pass and those who fail the theory of
mind tasks. Any differences in adaptive behaviour between the subgroups of
children who pass and fail the tasks will be of great interest in the light of
the theory of mind hypothesis, since this hypothesis claims to explain real
behaviour in terms of cognition. It will also be possible to find out whether
there are any interaction effects, ie: whether the clinical groups differ in
terms of the effects the cognitive deficit has on behaviour. Finally, we can
also examine whether there is an overall difference between the clinical
groups in their level of adaptive behaviour, after controlling for performance
on the theory of mind tasks.
Comparison of the Pass and Fail subgroups
A number of predictions can be made, consistent with the theory of
mind hypothesis. Firstly, if this cognitive deficit does produce deficits in
social behaviour, then we would expect that the subgroup who fail the false
belief task would show greater deficits than those who pass, in the
Socialization Domain, especially on those items that employ a theory of
mind. We might also expect those who fail to be more impaired in the
Communication Domain, although this would depend on the extent to
which the Communication Domain measures the specific aspects of
communication that require understanding of mental states. In addition, we
would predict that the Daily Living Skills Domain score, which may not
require a theory of mind, would not be related to performance on the false
belief tasks. Finally, if we assume that Passing or Failing means the same for
subjects in any clinical group, then our predictions should be true regardless
of clinical group.
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If differences between the Pass and Fail subgroups are found within
certain subdomains, it will then be of interest to find out exactly which items
are involved using an item analysis. There are three possible outcomes. The
items that differentiate the subgroups might be:-
1. Only items which require a theory of mind.
2. Items which require a theory of mind plus other items.
3. A variety of items (where some items requiring a theory of mind are not
involved).
The first outcome is the strongest prediction of the theory of mind
hypothesis; that failure on the cognitive tasks is associated with failure only
on items requiring a theory of mind. Other items of adaptive behaviour
should not be affected (ie items not requiring the use of
metarepresentations). This outcome would validate the cognitive tasks by
showing that performance on the tasks is related to "real life" behaviours
involving theory of mind.
The second outcome would suggest that failure on the cognitive tasks is
associated with items relevant to theory of mind but also to additional
factors. This could either be because the cognitive deficit causes more
widespread disability, (eg. affecting the learning of other social skills), or
that the cognitive deficit is simply an associated symptom, rather than a
cause. In other words, those with the cognitive deficit may also have some
general social deficits (Goodman, 1990).
The third outcome would be the most unpredictable and surprising
finding. If the items differentiating the pass and fail subgroups bear no
relation to items requiring a theory of mind, then this would refute the
"ecological validity" of the theory of mind hypothesis. There might be a
number of possible explanations for such a result. One would be that the
understanding of false belief (and hence, metarepresentational capacity)
does not relate to behaviour. Another is that the tasks lack validity. A third
explanation might be that the items chosen by independent judges to
"require a theory of mind" were inappropriate in some way.
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Comparison of the Autistic and Down's Groups
It will also be possible to make an overall comparison of the adaptive
behaviour profile of the autistic group with that of the Down's Syndrome
group. However, it should be noted that the subjects in these groups have
been selected according to their performance on the cognitive tasks (ie a
stratified random sample rather than a simple random sample), so that there
are an equal number in each subgroup within the groups. This means that
our groups are not a good representative sample of the clinical groups as a
whole. The autistic group has far more passing subjects than one would
expect from a randomly selected sample, and the Down's Syndrome group
has more failing subjects.
The comparison between the Down's and autistic groups remains an
interesting one, given that the two groups have equal numbers of "pass" and
"fail" subjects. Our null hypothesis, based on the simplest scenario that
"passing" and "failing" means the same in terms of cognitive capacity for
both groups, would be that there will be no overall difference and no
interaction between the clinic groups and the performance subgroups. In
other words, if we contend that the cognitive deficit underlies deficits in
behaviour, and is the only or major cause, then groups matched for cognitive
performance should not differ in their adaptive behaviour profile.
In the event that differences were found between the clinical groups in
certain subdomains, an item analysis was planned in order to find out which
items might be most relevant.
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METHOD
SUBJECTS
Subjects were 20 autistic children and 20 Down's Syndrome children,
individually matched for Chronological Age, Verbal Mental Age and Non-
Verbal Mental Age, (See Tables 35. and 36 for details).
Autistic subjects
Eleven of the autistic subjects had been used in previous experiments in
this thesis. The remaining nine autistic subjects were recruited from either
Radlett School or Brondyffryn School (see Chapter 5 for details). The group
consisted of 15 males and 5 females, which reflects the male:female ratios
found in epidemiological studies (Rutter and Schopler,1987). All these
subjects had a primary diagnosis of autism according to DSM-III criteria.
There were no subjects with a Verbal Mental Age below 4 years, as
measured on the British Picture Vocabulary Scales (BPVS). All of these
subjects were resident at school during week days, returning home at the
weekend.
Down's Syndrome subjects
The Down's syndrome group consisted of 12 males and 8 females. All
had trisomy 21. All the subjects in this group had a Verbal Mental Age above
4 years, on the BPVS. Subjects were recruited from either Dee Bank School or
Foxfield School (see Chapter 5 for details). In contrast to the autistic children,
none of the Down's Syndrome children were resident at the school.
Subjects were required to meet strict criteria of consistent performance
on the two false belief tasks in order to be included in either the pass
subgroup or the fail subgroup. In particular, it was required that all the
subjects passed all the control questions on both cognitive tests. This was
done to ensure that subjects differed only in their understanding of the
crucial belief questions on the tasks. As a result the majority of the subjects
used in this study were "high functioning" for their clinical group.
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Criteria for inclusion in the Pass or Fail subgroup. 
Subjects were placed into one of two subgroups, or left out of the study,
according to their performance on the false belief tasks.
Pass subgroup:
Fail subgroup:
Excluded
subgroup:
MATCHING
Subjects included in the Pass subgroup
had passed both the Sally-Anne and
the Smarties tasks (standard versions).
This included passing the belief and the
control questions.
Subjects included in the Fail subgroup
had failed one or both of
the false belief tasks. In order for
tasks to be counted as a "fail" the subject
had to have passed all the control
questions on that task, whilst failing the crucial
belief test question.
Subjects who failed both the belief
and control questions.
The matching procedure first concentrated on the autistic group, since
these subjects were hardest to find. The subgroups were first matched for
Chronological Age. Verbal Mental Age and Non-Verbal Mental Age were
kept as similar as possible across the subgroups. A similar procedure was
then carried out for the Down's group, matching the Pass and Fail
subgroups. During the Down's group matching an attempt was also made to
keep the clinical groups as similar as possible. The purpose of matching is to
ensure that Chronological Age and Mental Age are not the source of any
differences found between the clinical groups or subgroups in Vineland
Adaptive Behaviour Scale scores, although statistical control of these factors
was also employed.
Subjects received the Leiter International Performance Scale and the
British Picture Vocabulary Scale which measure Non-Verbal and Verbal IQ
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respectively. These are standard IQ tests, appropriate for the clinical groups
in this study (see Chapter 5).
PROCEDURE
The study involved two sessions with each child and a third session
interviewing a teacher or caregiver.
Session 1 
In the first session each child was presented with the two false belief
tasks (non-computer versions) used previously in the thesis.
The Sally-Anne task used was the revised version of the task used by
Perner, Leekam and Wimmer to test false belief understanding in young
normal children (Perner, Leekam and Wimmer, 1987), and includes added
text and a further three control questions. Although this version had not
been used with autistic children before (and so may not be considered
"standard"), it was used in the previous experiments of the thesis. The
second false belief task used was the Smarties task devised by Perner et al
(1987), which was also previously used in the thesis. The order of
presentation of these tasks was counterbalanced.
Session 2. 
In the second session each child was tested using the 2 standard IQ
tests; The Leiter International Performance Scale and The British Picture
Vocabulary Scale.
Session 3. 
The primary caregiver was interviewed using a semistructured
interview format using the Revised Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale
Survey Form (Sparrow et al, 1984). Each interview lasted approximately 40
minutes. Both interviewer and caregiver were aware of the final diagnosis of
the child. Raw scores were obtained for three domains (Communication,
Daily Living Skills and Socialisation). Following the protocol of the Vineland
Adaptive Behaviour Scale, scores were not obtained for the Motor Skills
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domain as subjects were over 6 years of age. Also, no scores were obtained
for the optional maladaptive behaviour domain.
Theory of mind item reliability. 
In order to interpret the item analysis it is necessary to have some
rating to indicate which items might reflect behaviour requiring a theory of
mind and which items reflect behaviour not requiring a theory of mind.
Twenty-four items were selected by the experimenter, twelve of which
were thought to be "theory of mind items." Most of these items were in the
Socialization Domain, although a small number of items were to be found in
the Communication Domain. Four independent judges, all psychologists,
were asked to assess which of these items "requires the use of a theory of
mind" (see appendix for details of items used). "Theory of mind" was
defined in simple terms to the judges as "being able to take into account
one's own or someone else's mental states." In addition, the judges were told
"examples of mental states are -: thinking, pretending, knowing, dreaming
and wanting."
RESULTS
The details of each subject's Chronological Age, Verbal Mental Age and
Non-Verbal Mental Age are shown in Table AA. and Table BB. below. The
tables show the subjects divided into Pass and Fail subgroups within each
Group. The Means and Standard Deviations for each subgroup are also
shown.
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Table 35. Subject Characteristics (Autistic Group) 
Fail	 Pass
CA VMA NVMA
	
CA	 VMA NVMA
Sn Sn
A30 10:11 10:3 8:0 A6 10:5 10:4 7:8
A8 11:1 5:5 8:6 A29 11:0 6:1 6:7
A13 13:10 7:9 6:10 A3 13:9 8:7 14:6
Al 14:3 7:2 6:7 A27 14:1 7:4 7:2
A2 14:5 7:11 6:5 A25 14:9 7:9 6:0
A20 14:10 8:5 10:5 A26 14:6 8:7 10:3
A21 15:4 7:4 10:6 A24 15:0 7:9 8:1
A17 16:10 7:7 10:9 A31 16:11 7:1 10:0
A32 16:9 15:1 13:1 A10 16:7 15:4 12:10
A23 16:10 11:5 9:4 A28 16:10 10:9 8:7
Mean 14:6 9:0 9:1 14:5 9:2 9:2
SD 2:2 2:9 2:2 2:3 2:8 2:9
Table 36. Subject Characteristics (Down's Syndrome Group) 
Fail	 Pass
CA VMA NVMA CA VMA NVMA
Sn Sn
D33 10:4 6:3 6:7 D43 10:6 6:2 7:0
D34 11:1 6:3 9:0 D44 11:0 6:4 8:6
D35 11:10 7:6 7:1 D45 11:10 7:6 7:10
D36 12:6 7:6 7:1 D45 11:10 7:3 9:4
D37 14:3 8:6 8:2 D47 14:5 8:8 8:4
D38 15:2 9:5 9:1 D48 16:1 9:1 9:4
D39 16:9 9:7 8:9 D49 17:2 9:3 8:3
D40 17:8 10:1 7:8 D50 17:8 10:9 8:2
D41 13:2 8:3 7:2 D51 13:6 8:1 7:4
D42 14:8 8:4 7:6 D52 14:4 8:5 7:6
Mean 13:9 8:2 8:1 13:10 9:0 8:2
SD 2:5 1:4 1:0 2:7 3:0 0:9
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Key to Table 35. and Table 36.
CA	 Chronological Age
VMA	 Verbal Mental Age
NVMA Non-Verbal Mental Age
Sn	 Subject number
y:m	 years:months
These data show that the subjects were closely matched on all three
measures. However, since the subjects were not perfectly matched, a
stepwise analysis of covariance was employed with covariates Chronological
Age, Verbal Mental Age and Non-Verbal Mental Age. This procedure was
carried out in order to calculate the contribution of these covariates in
accounting for Group and subgroup differences in Vineland Adaptive
Behaviour Scale scores, and where any of these predict, to control for bias
and to improve the power of subgroup comparisons.
None of these measures yefound to be significant predictorp of
Vineland score on the Communication Domain and its subdomains or on the
Socialization Domain and its subdomains. However, Chronological Age was
found to be a significant predictor of the Daily Living Skills Domain and its
three subdomains. These results are shown in Table 37.
Table 37. Chronological Age as a predictor of Vineland scores. 
Domain/Subdomain Raw Score
	 Age Eq Score
F p E p
Daily Living Sk. 47.6 <0.001 43.0 <0.001
Personal 31.2 <0.001 22.9 <0.001
Domestic 60.7 <0.001 57.6 <0.001
Community 30.0 <0.001 27.2 <0.001
Two sets of analyses were subsequently carried out. Raw scores were
used in the first set of analyses. For the second set of analyses, raw scores
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were converted to age equivalent scores, using the Vineland Norms tables.
Age equivalent scores are useful when comparing subjects ranging in ages
and are appropriate given the developmental nature of the subdomains. Age
equivalent scores were used in preference to standard scores which cannot
be derived below a score of 20.
Due to the large number of items being examined (N= 225 in the
Vineland) a strategy of hypothesis testing was necessary in order to avoid
compromising the a-priori probability levels.
For each of the 3 Domains and 9 subdomains a linear model was used
of the form:
subdomain score = Constant + (1)performance + (2)clinical
group + (3) performance * clinical group+ random error term.
For the Daily Living Skills Domain and its subdomains, Chronological Age
was included in this model as a covariate. Only where there was statistical
evidence of an effect on any of the factors (1)-(3) was this investigated by
analysing in a similar fashion the individual items making up the
subdomain.
A Normal model was assumed when analysing the subdomains,
applying standard maximum likelihood methods for analysis of
variance/covariance. When analysing the individual items a binomial model
was assumed, again using maximum likelihood after a log-linear
transformation.
An analysis of variance was carried out for each Domain and
subdomain using these raw scores. Firstly, the analysis of variance tests for
an interaction, in other words whether a pass/fail effect is found to be
significantly greater for one clinical group compared to another. Where there
was no evidence of an interaction, the scores of those subjects who pass were
compared with those who fail the cognitive task, regardless of clinical group,
and the scores of the autistic group as a whole were compared with the
scores of the Down's syndrome group regardless of performance on the
cognitive tasks. Where there was evidence of an interaction separate analyses
were carried out for each clinical group to assess the effect of performance,
and for each performance group to assess the effect of clinical group.
165
Table 38. shows the mean raw scores for each subgroup on the three
Domains and nine Subdomains.
Table 38 Mean Raw Scores
Domain/Subdomain
Autistic Gp. Down's Gp.
Pass	 Fail Group Pass	 Fail Group
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Communication 80.8 79.7 80.3 90.2 86.7 88.5
Receptive 24.0 23.8 23.9 25.6 25.8 25.7
Expressive 46.2 44.6 45.4 53.8 49.7 51.8
Written 11.6 11.3 11.5 10.8 11.2 11.0
Daily Living Sk. 108.2 107.3 107.8 114.9 115.5 115.2
Personal 67.1 66.3 66.7 68.2 69.0 68.6
Domestic 16.8 16.9 16.9 19.5 19.2 19.4
Community 24.3 24.1 24.2 27.2 27.3 27.3
Socialization 76.9 48.9 62.9 94.0 77.1 85.6
Interpers. 36.6 28.0 32.3 43.9 38.5 41.2
Play & Leis. 21.4 11.8 16.6 24.5 22.5 23.5
Coping 18.6 9.1	 13.9 25.6 16.1 20.9
Daily Living Sk.	 Daily Living Skills
Interpers.	 Interpersonal Relationships
Play & Leis. 	 Play and Leisure Time
nb Subdomains inset.
For the Daily Living Skills Domain and its subdomains the means have
not been adjusted for Chronological Age as the differences in the estimates
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with and without this covariate were negligible, reflecting the adequacy of
matching.
Table 39. shows the results of the analysis of variance calculations,
displaying the F ratio and the p value for each domain and subdomain.
Table 39. Analysis of Variance (Raw Scores) 
Domain/Subdomain Pass vs Fail Aut vs Downs Interaction
E p E p E p
Communication 0.9 0.361 10.9 0.002 0.2 0.635
Receptive 0.0 1.000 18.2 <0.001 0.2 0.642
Expressive 4.3 0.045 21.3 <0.001 0.8 0.371
Written 0.1 0.965 0.2 0.689 0.1 0.759
Daily Living Sk. 0.1 0.944 10.5 0.003 0.2 0.699
Personal 0.1 0.983 8.0 0.007 1.0 0.327
Domestic 0.1 0.901 12.3 <0.001 0.1 0.998
Community 0.1 0.961 6.4 0.016 0.1 0.829
Socialization 48.2 <0.001 49.1 <0.001 3.1 0.086
Interpers. 29.3 <0.001 47.3 <0.001 1.6 0.221
Play & Leis. 14.5 <0.001 20.5 <0.001 7.3 0.011
Coping 63.7 <0.001 34.6 <0.001 0.0 1.000
Interaction effects
Interaction effects reflect a larger pass-fail difference in one clinical
group than another.
There was some evidence of an interaction in the Socialization Domain
overall (F=3.1, p=0.086), this being attributed mainly to the Play and Leisure
Time subdomain (F=7.3, p<0.011). The main effect results of performance
and clinical group for this Domain and subdomain should therefore be
treated with caution and separate t-tests are required since the performance
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effect is not constant across the two clinical groups. However, for the
remaining areas of adaptive behaviour no evidence of an interaction was
found.
Pass vs Fail comparison. 
There was strong evidence of a difference between the Pass and Fail
subjects on the Interpersonal Relationships subdomain (F=29.3,p<0.001) and
on the Coping Skills subdomain (F=63.7,p<0.001). The mean scores shown in
Table 38 show that the Pass subjects scored consistently higher than that for
the Fail subjects in these subdomains. This trend is also true of the
Socialization Domain and Play and Leisure Time subdomain where there is
an interaction effect.
Separate t-tests comparing (a priori) the mean scores for the Pass and
Fail subgroups within each Group were carried out. For the Socialization
Domain the difference between the means was significant for the Down's
Group (t=6.26, p<0.001) and for the autistic Group (t=4.93, p<0.001). For the
Play and Leisure Time subdomain, the Pass and Fail subgroup mean scores
differed for the autistic Group (t=3.88, p<0.001), but there was no evidence of
a difference in these scores for the Down's Syndrome Group (t=1.49,
p=0.155)
Analysis of variance also produced evidence of a difference between
the Pass and Fail subgroups on the Expressive subdomain (F=4.3, p=0.045).
Pass and Fail subjects did not differ on the Communications Domain,
the Daily Living Skills Domain or any of the remaining subdomains.
Autism vs Down's Syndrome comparison. 
Table 39 shows strong evidence that the Groups differ in Vineland
scores in all areas apart from the Written subdomain (F=0.2, p=0.689). Table
38 shows that the Down's Syndrome subject's mean score was consistently
higher than the autistic subject's, in both performance categories.
Separate t-tests were carried out for the Socialization Domain and the
Play and Leisure subdomain since there were interaction effects in the
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analysis of variance. When the subjects who passed the cognitive tests were
analysed separately the Down's Group had a significantly higher mean score
than the autistic Group on the Socialization Domain (t=3.38, p=0.007), but
there was no difference between the Groups on the Play and Leisure Time
subdomain (t=1.32, p=0.210). When the Fail subjects were analysed
separately, autistic and Down's Syndrome subjects both differed on both the
Socialization Domain (t=7.55, p<0.001) and the Play and Leisure Time
subdomain (t=6.81, p<0.001)
Age Equivalent Scores
Analyses were also carried out using Age equivalent scores. Table 40
shows the mean age equivalent scores for each subgroup on the three
Domains and nine subdomains. The basic pattern of results mirrored the
findings for the raw scores.
Table 40. Mean Age Equivalent Scores
Domain/Subdomain
Autistic Gp Down's Gp 
Pass Fail Group Pass Fail Group 
Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean Mean
Communication 57.3 55.7 56.5 68.9 64.5 66.7
Receptive 55.8 53.7 54.8 84.6 89.3 87.0
Expressive 49.1 44.8 47.0 70.3 57.1 63.7
Written 73.6 73.0 73.3 71.8 72.8 72.3
Daily Living Sk. 75.1 73.5 74.3 83.3 84.4 83.9
Personal 77.5 73.2 75.4 82.4 87.4 84.9
Domestic 75.1 76.0 75.6 87.3 85.5 86.4
Community 74.5 73.1 73.8 81.1 81.2 81.2
Socialization 64.9 28.4 46.7 90.9 62.1 76.5
Interpers. 57.4 27.9 42.7 104.6 62.1 83.4
Play & Leis. 58.9 15.6 37.3 69.1 57.6 63.4
Coping 74.9 48.6 61.8 100.4 66.5 83.5
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Analysis of variance tests were computed for each Domain and
subdomain using age equivalent scores. The results are shown in Table 41
which shows the F ratio and p value for each calculation. Adjustment was
made for Chronological Age in the Daily Living Skills Domain.
Table 41. Analysis of Variance (Age Equivalent Scores) 
Domain/Subdomain	 Pass vs Fail Aut vs Downs Interaction
F p F p F p
Communication 1.0 0.334 11.1 0.002 0.2 0.654
Receptive 0.1 0.860 19.2 <0.001 0.2 0.649
Expressive 4.8 0.035 17.5 <0.001 1.2 0.272
Written 0.1 0.924 0.2 0.632 0.1 0.705
Daily Living Sk. 0.1 0.894 10.4 0.003 0.2 0.665
Personal 0.1 0.996 4.2 0.049 1.0 0.320
Domestic 0.1 0.900 12.0 <0.001 0.1 0.918
Community 0.1 0.863 6.2 0.017 0.1 0.764
Socialization 46.0 <0.001 38.4 <0.001 0.6 0.431
Interpers. 43.4 <0.001 55.5 <0.001 1.4 0.239
Play & Leis. 8.7 0.006 7.9 0.008 3.1 0.088
Coping 57.3 <0.001 29.8 <0.041 0.9 0.346
Interaction effects
There was some evidence of an interaction in the Play and Leisure Time
subdomain (F=3.1, p=0.088). It was therefore necessary to carry out separate
t-tests for this subdomain. However, Interaction effects were not found on
any of the other Domains or subdomains.
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Pass vs Fail comparison. 
There was strong evidence of a difference between the Pass and Fail
subjects on the Socialization Domain (F=46.0, p<0.001), the Interpersonal
Relationships subdomain (F=43.4, p<0.001) and the Coping Skills subdomain
(F=57.3, p<0.001). The mean scores shown in Table 40 show the Pass subjects
score consistently higher than the Fail subjects in these subdomains. This
trend is also true of Play and Leisure Time subdomain where there was an
interaction effect.
Separate t-tests comparing the mean scores for the Pass and Fail
subgroups within each Group were carried out on the Play and Leisure Time
subdomain. The Pass and Fail subgroup mean scores differed for the autistic
Group (t=2.70, p=0.024), but there was no evidence of a difference in these
scores for the Down's Syndrome Group (t=1.37, p=0.186)
Analysis of variance also produced evidence of a difference between
the Pass and Fail subgroups on the Expressive subdomain (F=4.8, p=0.035).
Pass and Fail subjects did not differ on the Communications Domain,
the Daily Living Skills Domain or any of the remaining subdomains.
Autism vs Down's Syndrome comparison. 
Table 41 shows strong evidence that the Groups differ in Vineland
scores on all areas apart from the Written subdomain (F=0.2, p=0.689). Table
40 shows that the mean score of the Down's Syndrome subjects was
consistently higher than the autistic subjects.
Separate t-tests were carried out for the Play and Leisure Time
subdomain since there was some evidence of an interaction effect in the
analysis of variance. When the subjects who passed the cognitive tests were
analysed separately there was no evidence of a difference between the
Groups (t=0.60, p=0.560). However when the Fail subjects were analysed
separately, autistic and Down's Syndrome subjects differed on the Play and
Leisure Time subdomain (t=6.69, p<0.001), such that the autistic Fail
subgroup scored particularly low on this subdomain, whereas the Down's
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Fail subgroup had a similar mean score to the Pass subjects of both clinical
group.
Item Analysis.
The item analysis was carried out only where there was any effect in
the subdomain; furthermore, only that effect was considered in the analysis.
In fact, the results of the initial analyses, shown above, made it necessary for
item analyses to be carried out on each subdomain with the exception of the
Written subdomain. The Pass/Fail effect was only considered in the
Socialization subdomains and the Receptive subdomain (of the
Communication Domain), where differences in this effect had been found in
earlier analyses. The overall difference between clinical groups (ie the
autism/Down's effect), however, was considered for each subdomain, apart
from the Written subdomain of the Communications Domain where no effect
was found. First though, it was necessary to consider interaction effects in
order to decide whether separate analyses were required.
Only the scoring possibilities "2", "1" and "0" (see introduction, Table
SS) occurred in the present study.
For the purposes of statistical analysis, these three possible scores were
collapsed into two dichotomized categories. These categories were as
follows:
Not usually performed = Scores 0 and 1
Usually performed = Score 2
A Log Linear item analysis, giving rise to Likelihood Ratio (LR) Chi-
square figures was carried out using the raw score for each item.
No interaction effects were found for the item analyses on any of the
subdomains. This was in spite of there being an interaction effect in the Play
and Leisure subdomain overall. The apparent difference in the two analyses
probably reflects the reduced power of the item analyses as much as the
cumulative nature of the interaction effect across items. This finding allowed
us to look at the relevant effects for each item without further breakdown (ie
looking at the pass/fail effect overall and the autism/Down's effect overall).
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The item analysis for the autism/Down's effect revealed no significant
items in the Daily Living Skills subdomains in spite of there being a
significant effect overall. Certain items in the Communications Domain and
the Socialization Domain showed significant differences in the item analysis.
The results are displayed in four tables below (one table for the
Communication subdomain items and a table for each of the Socialization
subdomains). Table 42. 43. 44. and 45. show those items found to be
significant on the item analysis, with an LR above 3.84 (ie p<0.05). The value
of LRX2
 and the probability level are both given, as well as a "theory of
mind" rating (see key). Table 46. shows the actual frequency of subjects
scoring 2 (ie. usually performed) on the items found to be significant on the
item analysis.
Table 42. Item Analysis Results for the Communication Domain.
Item Item description A/D P/F T.O.M
C27r Follows intructions in **
"if-then" form 8.14	 NS NR
C20e Spontaneously relates
experience in simple terms 4.73	 NS NR
C34e Uses phrases or sentences
containing "but" and "or" 6.21	 NS NR
C46e Expresses ideas in more than ***
one way without assistance NS	 14.12 3
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Table 43. Item Analysis Results for the Interpersonal Subdomain
(Socialization Domain) 
Item	 Item Description	 AID, P/F	 T.O.M
S15i	 Laughs or smiles	 **
appropriately in response 	 7.97 NS
	 NR
to positive statements
S22i	 Shows preference for some
friends over others	 7.16 7.16
	 0
S31i	 Responds verbally and	 **	 **
positively to good fortune
	
7.97 7.97	 3
of others
S53i	 Initiates conversation on 	 ***
topics of particular interest	 NS	 29.67	 4
to others
S56i	 Responds to hints or indirect	 ***
cues in conversation	 NS	 17.81	 3
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Table 44. Item Analysis Results for the Play and Leisure Subdomain
(Socialization Domain) 
Item	 Item Description	 AID P/F_	 T.O.M
S21p	 Engages in elaborate make-	 **
believe activities, alone	 NS	 8.66	 4
or with others
S26p	 Shares toys or possessions 	 **
without being told to do so	 9.95 NS	 NR
S27p	 Names one or more favourite **
TV programmes and tells on	 9.61 NS	 NR
what days and what channels
progs. are being shown
S35p	 Plays one or more board games ***
or card games requiring skill
	 22.69 NS	 NR
and decision making
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Table 45. Item Analysis Results for Coping Skills Subdomain (Socialization
Domain) 
Item	 Item Description	 A/D P/F	 T.O.M
S32c	 Apologizes for unintentional
	 ***
mistakes	 NS 31.74	 4
S38c	 Responds appropriately when **	 *
introduced to strangers	 10.66 5.68
	 0
S40c	 Keeps secrets or confidences	 ***
for more than one day	 NS 31.74	 4
S42c	 Ends conversations	 *	 ***
appropriately	 7.51 11.52	 0
S44c	 Refrains from asking or	 **
making statements that might NS 8.66
	
4
might embarrass or hurt
S45c	 Controls anger or hurt
	 ***
feelings when denied own way 12.20 NS
	
NR
S46c	 Keeps secrets or confidences	 ***
for as long as appropriate 	 NS	 38.80	 4
S51c	 Apologizes for mistakes or	 **
errors in judgement	 NS	 8.66	 3
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Key to Tables 42. 43. 44. and 45.. 
A/D	 Autism vs Down's difference (Likelihood Ratio)
P/F
	 Pass vs Fail difference (Likelihood Ratio)
T.O.M Number of independent judges (out of 4) rating
the item as "requiring a theory of mind"
Item code
C	 Communication Domain
r	 Receptive subdomain
e	 Expressive subdomain
S	 Socialization Domain
i	 Interpersonal relationships subdomain
P	 Play and Leisure subdomain
c	 Coping skills subdomain
Probability level code
*
	 p<0.05
**
	 p<0.005
***
	 p<0.001
The independent judges ratings for "theory of mind" items are shown
in Table A. of the appendix. Each item has a score of 0 to 4 according to the
number of judges rating it as a "theory of mind" item. If an item has a
maximum score of 4, this means that all four judges rated it as "requiring a
theory of mind."
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Table 46. Number of subjects scoring "2" (usually performed). 
Item Autistic Group Down's Syndrome Group
Pass	 Fail Pass
	
Fail
C27r 5 5 9 9
C20e 9 7 10 10
C34e 7 8 10 10
C46e 8 3 10 4
S15i 8 6 10 10
S22i 10 5 10 10
S31i 5 2 10 5
S53i 9 1 9 2
S56i 8 1 5 1
S21p 7 2 8 4
S26p 8 5 10 10
S27p 7 6 10 10
S35p 4 3 10 10
S32c 9 2 9 2
S38c 9 4 10 10
S40c 9 2 9 2
S42c 8 2 10 7
S44c 7 2 8 4
S45c 8 4 10 10
S46c 8 1 10 1
S51c 7 2 8 4
Ten items were rated by at least three of the four independent judges as
requiring a theory of mind (see appendix). All of these items showed a pass-
fail effect. A further three items showed a pass-fail effect which all four
judges rated as not requiring a theory of mind.
Twelve items showed an autism-Down's effect. Seventeen of the twenty
one items showing any significant effect on the item analysis were found in
the Socialization Domain.
The results for the significant items were in the predicted direction for
each of the items showing a pass-fail effect. In other words, there were more
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subjects scoring 2 (usually performed) in the pass subgroup than the fail
subgroup. For each item showing an autism-Down's effect there were more
subjects scoring 2 in the Down's Group than in the autism Group.
Discussion.
This study suggests that there is a relationship between theory of mind
capacity and adaptive behaviour, particularly in the area of socialization
skills. This finding is consistent with the "theory of mind hypothesis" and
offers evidence to support its ecological validity. In addition, a detailed item
analysis pinpoints specific items from the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour
Scale that differentiate those who pass and those who fail on the theory of
mind tasks. Most of these items had been rated by all four independent
judges as "requiring a theory of mind". Knowing which of these items is
affected by the cognitive deficit may have important implications for our
understanding of how a deficit in theory of mind manifests itself in
behaviour, and could be of value for educational and training purposes.
Finally, data from two clinical groups (autistic and Down's Syndrome)
raises some interesting questions concerning how these groups might differ
in terms of adaptive behaviour and theory of mind capacity.
Pass vs Fail comparison
In our first set of analyses we looked at three Domains of adaptive
behaviour. In general, we found that those subjects who passed the false
belief tasks scored significantly higher than those who failed on the
Socialization Domain. This effect was not found for the Daily Living Skills
Domain or the Communication Domain. This finding was as predicted in the
introduction. It is of interest that previous studies using the Vineland have
suggested that the Socialization Domain is most typically impaired in
autism. If a deficit in understanding mental states is linked to a deficit in
their socialization behaviours, then it would not be surprising to find low
Socialization Domain scores in a clinical group such as autism, where the
majority of subjects fail false belief tests.
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Looking more closely at each subdomain separately, we found that
there were in fact four subdomains showing a pass/fail difference in mean
scores:- Interpersonal Relationships, Play and Leisure, Coping Skills (all
from the Socialization Domain) and Expressive (from the Communications
Domain). It was also interesting to find an interaction effect in the Play and
Leisure subdomain, such that a pass/fail difference was found for the
autistic group but not for the Down's Syndrome group. When age equivalent
scores were used instead of raw scores this effect was smaller, however it
remains an interesting finding.
In order to look in still greater detail at this effect, item analyses were
carried out on the relevant subdomains. Thirteen items showed a significant
pass/fail effect, with no interaction effects found. Most of these items were
to be found in the Interpersonal subdomain (four items) and the Coping
skills subdomain (seven items) of the Socialization Domain.
Only one item was found to show a significant pass/fail effect in the
Play and Leisure subdomain. This item, "engages in elaborate make believe
activities alone or with others," was highly significant, and was also rated by
all four independent judges as "requiring a theory of mind." This item is of
particular interest in the light of the theory of mind hypothesis which
suggests that there is a link between understanding of false belief and ability
to engage in pretend play; that link being the ability to form
metarepresentations (Leslie, 1987). These results then, strongly support the
existence of that link. It should also be noted that the effect for this item was
found regardless of clinical group.
One item, "expresses ideas in more than one way without assistance"
from the Expressive subdomain (of the Communication Domain) showed a
pass/fail difference. This item had also been independently rated by three
judges as a "theory of mind" item.
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In the introduction to this study we speculated on three possible
outcomes to this item analysis. The items that differentiate the groups might
be:-
1. Only items which require a theory of mind.
2. Items which require a theory of mind plus other items.
3. A variety of items (where some items requiring a theory of mind are not
affected).
It was interesting then, to find that all of the items rated as "requiring a
theory of mind" did show a difference between the pass and fail group. It
should be stressed that judges were told to rate items that can only be
achieved with a theory of mind. In other words, a strict definition of "theory
of mind" items was employed. This finding rules out the third outcome
which may have cast doubt on the validity of either the theory of mind
hypothesis or the false belief tests. In fact, our findings are in line with the
second outcome, "Items which require a theory of mind plus other items are
affected." Before discussing the implications of this outcome, let us first look
at what the relevant items were.
Of the thirteen items where a pass/fail difference was found, ten were
rated by three or four independent judges as "requiring a theory of mind".
These items were as follows -:
1."Expresses ideas in more than one way without assistance."
2."Responds verbally and positively to good fortune of others."
3."Initiates conversation on topics of particular interest to others."
4."Refrains from asking or making statements that might embarass or hurt
others."
5."Responds to hints or indirect cues in conversation."
6."Apologizes for mistakes or errors in judgement."
7."Apologizes for unintentional mistakes."
8."Keeps secrets or confidences for as long as appropriate."
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9."Keeps secrets or confidences for more than one day."
10."Engages in elaborate make believe activities alone or with others."
Subjects who failed the false belief tasks then, had difficulties with
these specific behaviours, whereas those who passed the tasks did not. It
seems reasonable to argue then, that these behaviours may be directly
affected by a cognitive deficit in theory of mind as measured by the false
belief tasks used in earlier experiments of the thesis.
It may be useful to cluster these items into three general areas. The first
seven items refer to social communication. Taking mental states into account
is clearly important for social communication skills such as knowing when to
apologize (items 6 and 7), knowing when to say the appropriate thing (item
2) and when an utterance is inappropriate (item 4), taking into account the
knowledge and interests of others (items 1 and 3) and perhaps at a more
advanced level, reading subtle hints (item 5). Secondly, understanding the
concept of keeping secrets (items 8 and 9) is an unusual social skill which
requires understanding that knowledge is available to some people but not
to others. Thirdly, Pretend play  (item 10) requires the understanding of the
mental state of pretend and is, according to Leslie (1987), a prerequisite of
being able to use a full theory of mind.
There were also three other items showing a pass/fail difference in our
item analysis which were not considered, by the independent judges, to be
"theory of mind" items. These items were -:
1."Shows preference for some friends over others."
2."Responds appropriately when introduced to strangers."
3."Ends conversations appropriately."
In the introduction to this study we suggested that this outcome may be
evidence that the cognitive deficit causes more widespread deficit in
adaptive behaviour than the theory of mind hypothesis would predict.
Certainly this would seem to be true for item one, for which a direct
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connection with being able to use theory of mind would seem tenuous.
However, the second two items would not seem inappropriately placed
along with the "social communication" items (the first 7 items) of the above
list. For these items at least, the connection with taking mental states into
account is not unreasonable. It is also interesting to note when looking at all
thirteen significant items, that the effect was not large for these three items in
comparison to the other items, suggesting a weaker association with the
cognitive deficit.
It is unclear exactly how the cognitive deficit might affect items not
concerned with theory of mind, particularly items such as, "Shows
preference for some friends over others." However, we might speculate that
the those behavioural deficits which are directly related to the cognitive
deficit might disable or inhibit the learning of other social skills.
An alternative hypothesis might be that the cognitive deficit is simply
an associated symptom typical of subjects showing this a particular pattern
of deficits in socialization behaviour, rather than a cause of that behaviour.
In other words, this correlation between failure on the false belief tasks and
deficits in social adaptive behaviour, does not necessarily mean that a cause
and effect relation exists. Nevertheless, the firiditigs af this study do it
neatly into the theoretical argument that a deficit in theory of mind can
explain typically autistic behaviour and adds weight to the plausibility of
such a theory. In addition to this, we have been able to pinpoint specific
behaviours which those who fail theory of mind tasks tend to have difficulty
with. Knowledge of these behaviours may be useful for future research, as
well as for the education of autistic children.
Autism vs Down's Syndrome comparison. 
The design of the study also allowed us to look at the adaptive
behaviour profiles of two different clinical groups, matched for performance
on the false belief tasks. We found that while both clinical groups showed a
difference between pass and fail subgroups in some areas, there was also an
overall difference between the clinical groups. This was contrary to our
prediction that the clinical groups would not differ. This prediction was
made on the basis of two main assumptions. Firstly, that the ability to use a
theory of mind is the lone predictor of adaptive behaviour and secondly, that
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passing and failing the false belief tasks means the same in terms of this
cognitive ability for both clinical groups. These two assumptions were
derived by considering the simplest possible scenario in order to form our
null hypothesis. If these assumptions were correct and the two groups were
matched for passing and failing the false belief tasks, then the groups should
not have differed in adaptive behaviour.
How, then, can we account for the overall difference between the
groups which existed on all the subdomains apart from the Written
subdomain?
One explanation is that ability to use a theory of mind is not the only
factor important in the development of adaptive behaviour. In fact, the
assumption that it is the lone predictor of behaviour does seem
oversimplified. Whatever the other factors are, they affect the clinical groups
differently such that the adaptive behaviour score for the Down's subjects is
higher than for the autistic subjects. We can only speculate as to what these
factors might be.
One possible influence is understanding of emotions and emotion
recognition (Hobson 1989) being deficient in autistic children. If this were a
factor this would be consistent with the idea that a more complete theory of
the autistic disorder should incorporate not only the cognitive deficit theory
but also Hobson's theory (1989) taking into account autistic children's
understanding of emotions.
Another possible factor which may affect the groups differently is the
environment the children grow up in. It may be that autistic and Down's
children have different opportunities presented to them as a result of their
handicap, both at school and at home, and may also be treated and
perceived differently by others.
A third possible explanation for the difference in overall scores for the
clinical groups is that although the groups were matched for passing and
failing the false belief tasks, this may not mean that they are matched in
terms of their ability to use a theory of mind. This argument becomes clearer
if we consider the idea that understanding of false belief may be just one
stage along a developmental continuum (Baron-Cohen, 1991).
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This developmental continuum may begin with joint attention (Baron-
Cohen, 1989a), progressing to pretend play, followed by understanding of
false belief and through to the more complex abilities to form second order
and third order metarepresentations.
One possibility then, is that the autistic children who pass the tasks are
not as far along the developmental continuum as the Down's Syndrome
children who pass. Baron-Cohen (1989b) found that autistic children who
were capable of passing the Sally-Anne task were unable to attribute beliefs
at a more advanced level (eg. Mary thinks that John thinks the icecream van
is in the park), whereas matched Down's Syndrome children could. This
would suggest that autistic and Down's syndrome passing subjects may still
be at different levels on the developmental continuum, autistic children
being specifically delayed in the acquisition of a more complex theory of
mind.
Likewise, it could be argued that the autistic children in the fail
subgroup may be more delayed along the continuum than the Down's
children in the fail subgroup. For example, the autistic children may have
still been impaired in their of joint attention skills. This of course would
depends on whether joint attention does relate to theory of mind.
Recently, it has been argued that joint attention behaviours do require
metarepresentation (Baron-Cohen, 1989a; Leslie and Happe, 1989), since in
order to understand joint attention behaviours in another person the child
must understand that the person is either interested or not interested in a
particular object. As Baron-Cohen (1989) points out, this may involve
representing "another person's representation of an object as being tagged
with a positive or negative valence (ie interesting or uninteresting)." If this is
the case, then joint attention would indeed be the earliest manifestation of
the ability to form metarepresentations. There have also been a number of
recent studies which suggest that a range of joint attention behaviours are
impoverished in autistic children compared with non-autistic children,
matched for Mental Age (Mundy et al, 1986; Sigman et al, 1986).
It is possible then that the autistic children in the fail subgroup are
impoverished not only in understanding belief but also in their
185
understanding of joint attention behaviours, and so are more delayed than
the Down's Syndrome children in the fail subgroup in terms of their theory
of mind capacity.
It is particularly interesting to note that in a number of subdomains the
autistic pass subgroup mean score is actually lower than the Down's
Syndrome fail subgroup. One interesting possibility is that autistic children
who pass the false belief tasks are actually passing via use of an algorithm
for the task, and in fact we are overestimating their ability to use a theory of
mind. This idea is of course highly speculative, and it should be noted that
the difference in mean scores was not significant. Furthermore, the
interpretation that an algorithm was being used was reserved for evidence of
an Interaction. However, this possibility will be explored in the next
experiment when we attempt to train autistic and Down's Syndrome
children on false belief tasks they normally fail on. This will allow us to
examine whether it is possible for autistic children to learn to pass the false
belief task, and we will also be able to look for clues that subjects are using
an algorithm for the task.
The item analysis revealed twelve items showing a significant
Autism/Down's effect, with no interaction found (see Table 41). It is
interesting to note that nine of these items were to be found in the
Socialization Domain. In other words, as with the pass/fail effect, the items
differentiating the clinical groups were mainly found in the Socialization
Domain (most typically impaired in autism). This further suggests that the
Socialization Domain is the crucial area of adaptive behaviour specifically
impaired in autism. Again, identifying these particular behaviours may be
important for future research and for education.
We have presented two alternative theories as to why there should be a
difference between the clinical groups. Our first suggestion was that other
factors, apart from the cognitive deficit, may be involved in contributing to
the difference. If this were so, then these items may be important in
identifying such factors. One idea is that understanding of emotions may
differentiate the groups (Hobson, 1989). We can only speculate as to which
of the items involve such understanding, but perhaps the following are
relevant:-
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"Controls anger or hurt feelings when denied own way."
"Responds appropriately when introduced to strangers."
"Responds verbally or positively to good fortune of others."
"Laughs or smiles appropriately when introduced to strangers."
The second suggestion was that the subjects were not necessarily
matched for metarepresentational capacity, and this was reflected in the
difference between the clinical groups. Items which may be important for
this hypothesis were those also showing a difference between the pass and
fail subgroups. These were as follows:-
"Shows preference for some friends over others."
"Responds verbally and positively to good fortune of others."
"Responds appropriately when introduced to strangers."
"Ends conversations appropriately."
It should be noted of course, that all but the second item in this list
were rated as not "requiring a theory of mind."
We can only conclude that it is not clear why these items should show a
difference between the clinical groups. Further research is necessary in order
to clarify this issue.
Summary
We have found evidence to suggest that a cognitive deficit in
understanding of false belief is indeed related to adaptive behaviour, in both
autistic and Down's Syndrome children. Furthermore we have found that
despite being matched for performance on two false belief tasks the clinical
groups still differ in terms of their overall adaptive behaviour scores. Two
possible explanations for this have been put forward; one involving the
cognitive deficit hypothesis (which may have implications for our
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knowledge of the relative metarepresentational capacities of the two clinical
groups), and the other, perhaps more likely, speculating that there are
additional factors affecting autism, one of which may involve understanding
of emotions. It is, of course, important not to rule out the possibility that both
of these explanations are important to our understanding of autistic-like
adaptive behaviour.
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CHAPTER 11. 
EXPERIMENT 5
INTRODUCTION
A natural progression from the previous work in this thesis is to
investigate theory of mind further with a training study. The previous work
in this thesis suggests that the computer offers a rich new environment
which children find motivating and rewarding. This pilot study then,
attempts to use the computer as a training tool.
When we retested the autistic subjects on the Sally-Anne task in
experiment three, we found that four of the subjects showed some
improvement in their performance on the computer task. Two of these
subjects went on to pass a different test of false belief, suggesting that they
had learned or developed the concept. These subjects may have developed
this concept naturally between the time of testing and retesting. However, it
is also possible that repeated trials on the computer may have been effective
in teaching these subjects to pass the false belief task.
In this experiment a modified computer version of the Sally-Anne
task will be used as a basis for attempting to train subjects, who usually fail
on false belief tasks, to pass the Sally-Anne task and ultimately to
understand the concept of false belief.
We will first be interested in whether subjects can learn to pass the
computer task consistently during training and the speed with which any
improvement takes place. If subjects do learn to pass the computer task
however, we will still be uncertain as to whether they have learned the 
concept of false belief or whether they have simply learned an algorithm 
which allows them to pass the task without any genuine understanding of
the concept. For this reason, performance on pre-test false belief tasks and
post-test transfer tasks will be used to evaluate the effects of training.
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Learning the concept
If a child learns the concept of false-belief in training then s/he may
be able to generalize this understanding so that s/he can pass other sorts of
false belief tasks involving different scenarios. The implication of this would
be that prior to training, the cognitive mechanisms required for such a
concept are available but not "linked up" or functioning. This outcome
would be the most promising finding in terms of the child's cognitive
makeup, since it suggests that the child has the potential for understanding
the concept.
Learning an algorithm
The child may learn to pass the false belief task by learning some
compensatory strategy or algorithm which has nothing to do with
understanding mental states. For example, one simple algorithm for passing
the Sally-Anne task might be "choose the container where the ball is not found."
Another rule might be "choose the container where Sally first put the ball." If a
subject fails the post-test transfer tasks after passing the training tasks then
we must assume the simplest explanation that some sort of algorithm has
been used to pass the training task, rather than concluding that the child
understands the concept.
It will also be possible to look for evidence of the sort of algorithm
that has been used by looking at changes in performance on the control
games of the Sally-Anne computer task, given before and after training, since
these games involve true belief (ie the character looking for the ball where it
really is). For example, a subject who passes the control games prior to
training, may learn to pass the test games using an algorithm that "Sally
always goes to the container where the ball is not found." If the subject
continues to use this same algorithm when subsequently tested on the
control games (despite the subtle differences in the scenarios) then s/he will
fail the control games. It should be noted though that this will only occur if
such a simple algorithm is used and the subject was unable to distinguish
between the test games and the control games.
Three diagnostic groups will be used in the experiment: autistic,
Down's syndrome and young normal children. The autistic and Down's
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Syndrome children will be matched for Chronological Age. All three groups
will be matched for Mental Age. All subjects will have failed the pre-test
transfer tasks whilst passing all the control questions on those tasks. We will
be interested in whether any differences in the effects of training are found
according to diagnostic group, Chronological Age, Verbal Mental Age, Non-
Verbal Mental Age and speed of acquisition on the training task. What
specific prediction can we make regarding these factors?
Diagnostic Group
We will be interested in looking for differences between the groups in
outcome on the post-test transfer tasks. If we were to find that one of the
diagnostic groups learned the training task by algorithm, whilst the other
two groups learned the concept, then this would suggest that the cognitive
mechanisms for understanding false belief in that group are impaired in a
qualitatively different way to the other two groups.
Chronological Age and Mental Age
Another hypothesis might be that ability to learn this concept is
related to developmental level. This would be consistent with the specific
developmental delay hypothesis (Baron-Cohen, 1989b). We might therefore
predict that subjects with high Mental Ages (particularly Verbal Mental Age)
would be more likely to learn the concept than subjects with low Mental
Ages. Also we may find that Chronological Age predicts ability to learn the
concept, since the older children have more experience of social interaction.
From our own experiments (see expts 2 and 3), of the four subjects
who showed some improvement on the Sally-Anne task, the younger
children, with lower Verbal Mental Ages, failed to generalise whilst the
older children, with higher Verbal Mental Ages, did generalise and
appeared to have learned the concept rather than a compensatory strategy.
Speed of acquisition
The diagnostic groups may differ in speed of acquisition on the
training task. Also Chronological Age and Mental Age may predict speed of
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acquisition. However, it is difficult to predict whether speed of acquisition
will be related to the learning of an algorithm or the learning of the concept.
Contents of the Training task
The training task is based around the Sally-Anne computer task. The
main difference is that the training task is designed to include text which
gives information  and explanation concerning the conceptual nature of the
task. This gives the best possible chance and encouragement for the subject
to learn the concept.
Another important feature of the training task is that this explanation
is not given directly by the experimenter. Instead, the impression is given
that the information comes from the characters. The computer is being used
as the main channel of communication. If the child is able to read the text
aloud then s/he is encouraged to do so; however, if the child is unable to
read, the experimenter reads the text out by reporting what a character or the
computer has said.
The two versions of the test condition game on the Sally-Anne
computer program will be used for training. The versions differ in the
original location of the ball at the start of the game (and consequently in the
correct location of the final answer). Each version will be presented three
times, in random order with the other version, during a training session.
If the subject completes the game correctly, s/he will be rewarded
with music and a flashing, colour changing message "YES, WELL DONE"
which will also be read out by the experimenter, saying "The computer says
well done."
If the subject gives an incorrect response the characters will not move.
A message next to Sally will appear saying "I think it's in the red box because
that's where I left it." The experimenter will tell the child that "Sally says that
she thinks the ball is still in the red/blue box because that's where she left it."
After a short delay the message "try again" will be displayed. The
experimenter will tell the child that "the computer says try again." The
program will remain at the same point (ie. the whole scenario will be re-
enacted). If the child chooses the wrong container again then the same
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message will appear. However, if a third attempt is made to click over the
wrong container, a message reading "try the red/blue box" will appear. The
experimenter will then tell the child that "the computer says try the red/blue
box." At this point the only active area on the screen will be the correct box,
so that the child can only proceed if the correct box is chosen. The first
response on each trial will be recorded.
Further prompts will also be given on the computer in the training
task. The first three prompts take place, one after the other, just after Sally
has hidden the ball:-
Prompt 1.	 "I put the ball in the red/blue box"
Prompt 2.	 "Now I think the ball is in the red/blue box"
Prompt 3.	 "I must remember to look in the red/blue box if I want my ball"
Anne makes the next two prompts just after moving the ball:-
Prompt 4.	 "Sally hasn't seen me move her ball"
Prompt 5.	 "Sally will think that the ball is still in the red/blue box"
Using a set number of trials
It was decided to train subjects using a set number of trials rather than
training to an artificially set criterion. This ensured that subjects had
received equal exposure to training before being compared on their post-test
transfer task performance.
Transfer tasks
There will be five transfer tasks, all designed to test the child's
understanding of false belief. Each of these tasks will be presented before
training (Pre-test) and after training (Post-test transfer tasks). These tasks can
be divided into two categories; close transfer tasks and distant transfer tasks.
i. Close transfer tasks
The first two transfer tasks will be the Sally-Anne computer task
(complete with control games) and the revised version of the Sally-Anne task
with dolls. Each of these tasks will be presented three times. Both these tasks
are described in detail in Experiment 1.
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Subjects are considered to have passed a task only if they succeed in
passing all three trials of that task. The control questions (or in the case of the
computer presentation, the control games), must also be completed correctly.
These tasks are described as close transfer tasks because they use the
same scenario as the training task. This means that an algorithm or
compensatory strategy for passing the training task could be used effectively
in passing these transfer tasks.
However, some transfer will have taken place since these tasks do
differ slightly from the training task. The computer transfer task does not
involve the prompts and explanation of the training task and the dolls
presentation differs in that it uses a different medium of presentation (dolls
instead of computer images) and also different text. Subjects passing these
transfer tasks might only have generalized to the extent of this difference.
ii Distant transfer tasks
There will be three distant transfer tasks; the Smarties task (described
in Experiment 3), and two new tasks called the Cornflakes task and the Tom
task. All of these tasks require an understanding of false belief in order to
pass and involve different scenarios to the training task.
These tasks are described as distant transfer tasks because both the
scenario and the surface form of each task differs from the training task. This
means that an algorithm used to pass the training task could not be used to
pass these transfer tasks. If a subject can pass these transfer tasks after
training then this suggests that the concept of false belief has been learned
and generalised. Once again subjects must pass all trials of a task in order to
be counted as passing the task as a whole.
a) The Cornflakes task
The Cornflakes task uses the same "deceptive appearance" paradigm
as the Smarties task. However, instead of a smarties packet containing a
pencil, this task used a cornflakes packet containing an orange and a milk
carton containing water.
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The child was presented with a packet of cornflakes, a milk carton, a
bowl and a spoon. The child was reminded that this was "just like breakfast."
The child was first asked what s/he thought was in the cornflakes packet.
After the child answers cornflakes the experimenter opens the packet to
reveal an orange, which is then tipped into the bowl. Then the child is asked
what s/he thinks is in the carton. The child replies that the carton contains
milk. However, the carton is found to contain water, which is also poured
into the bowl.
The water and the orange are returned to the containers and the
experimenter then checks that the child knows what s/he first thought was
contained in the packet and the carton and what s/he now knows is inside
these containers. As with the Smarties test, the child is then asked what
another person, who hasn't seen inside these packets, will think they contain.
In order to answer this test question correctly, the child must understand
that the person who has not seen inside the packets will have a false belief
about the contents.
The text used for this task is shown in Table 47 below.
Table 47. Cornflakes task text.
1. What do you think is in the packet?
2. Now what do you think is in the packet?
3. But when I first asked you, what did you think was in
the packet?
4. [name] hasn't seen what's in the packet. What will
[name] think is in the packet?
These four questions are asked about both the cornflakes packet and
the milk carton. Where [name] is written in the text, the experimenter
substitutes the name of a child known to the subject, who has not already
done the task with the experimenter.
The Cornflakes task then, uses the same principles as the Smarties
task but with different materials. It was considered worthwhile to use
different examples of this paradigm for an number of reasons. Firstly, using
only the Smarties task runs the risk that some surface artifact of this task is
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responsible for subjects failing. Also, if the subject is able to narrow the
answer down to two possibilities (smarties or pencil) on the basis of what
has already been discussed, then s/he has a 0.5 probability of guessing the
correct answer. Using two more examples decreases the probability of
guessing the correct response. Secondly, we were concerned that the
smarties task had been used before by other researchers so that subjects may
have simply learned to respond automatically with the same answer each
time.
c) The Tom task
The Tom task was a new task devised for the experiment. This task
uses nine line drawings on white card (see appendix). The experimenter uses
these cards to illustrate the text concerning a character, Tom, who has a false
belief about either the weather (raining or sunny) or the time (day or night).
The text and picture numbers are shown in Table 48 below. Subjects are
required to predict Tom's behaviour on the basis of his false belief (line 6)
and also, as a control question (line 7), to indicate what time it really is, or
what the weather is really like by pointing to the appropriate cards. In
addition, two prompt questions (lines 4 and 5) are asked prior to the test
question in order to check that the subject has followed the story.
The experimenter reads the text out to the subjects, presenting the
pictures appropriate for each line of text in sequence. The pictures are
covered over after being used. For lines four to seven of each scenario two
pictures are presented side by side. The child answers the question given in
the text for that line by pointing to one of the two pictures.
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Table 48. Text for TOM task and picture sequence used
A
1. This is Tom
2. Tom thinks it's sunny outside
3. But really it's raining outside
Picture
1
2
3
4. What does Tom think the weather is like? 2 & 3
5. What is the weather like really? 2 & 3
6. Will Tom wear his T-shirt or will Tom
wear his raincoat to go outside?
4 & 5
7. What is the weather like really? 2 & 3
B
1. This is Tom 1
2. Tom thinks that it's daytime 6
3. But really it's night time 7
4. What time is it really? 6 & 7
5. What does Tom think the time is? 6 & 7
6. Will Tom go to bed or will
Tom play football? 8 & 9
7. What time is it really? 6 & 7
C
1. This is Tom
2. It's really sunny outside
3. But Tom thinks it's raining outside
1
2
3
4. What is the weather like really? 2 & 3
5. What does Tom think the weather is like? 2 & 3
6. Will Tom wear his T-shirt or will Tom
wear his raincoat to go outside?
4 & 5
7. What is the weather like really? 2 & 3
D
I. This is Tom 1
2. It's really daytime 6
3. But Tom thinks it's night time 7
4. What time does Tom think it is? 6 & 7
5. And what time is it really? 6 & 7
6. Will Tom go to bed or will
Tom play football? 8 & 9
7. What time is it really? 6 & 7
The order of presentation for the four scenarios, A to D above, is
counterbalanced.
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This task also differs in scenario and surface form from the training
task and requires an understanding of false belief and how it predicts
behaviour in order to pass. This task also differs from the other transfer tasks
in that the text makes it clear that the character has a belief which is
alternative to reality, whereas in the other false belief tasks the subject has to
work out that a false belief will be present.
This experiment was first piloted at Mill View Primary School,
Chester, with 15 normal children between the ages of four years six months
and five years, at which point normal children are able to understand false
belief (Astington and Gopnik, 1991). All of these children passed the task,
suggesting that subjects who could understand false belief were capable of
understanding the task.
Finally, a three month follow up will also be carried out with each
child. This will involve testing each child on close and distant transfer tasks.
These results will provide an indication of how well a newly learned concept
or algorithm is held over time. Of course, it may be that some natural
development has taken place over time to account for subjects passing the
tasks; such development would certainly be predicted in the young normal
subjects. However, for the Down's Syndrome and autistic children we would
not expect natural development to be a factor over such a short period of
time, so that if these subjects can still pass the transfer tasks, we can
reasonably assume that they have maintained what they have learned in
training, whether that is a learned algorithm or understanding of false belief.
This will be a small scale study using eight subjects in each group and
looking specifically at the understanding of false belief, as an example of a
concept requiring the use of a theory of mind. The study is intended to
provide a useful pointer for future work.
METHOD 
SUBJECTS
Subjects were eight autistic children, eight Down's Syndrome and
eight normal children, individually matched for Verbal Mental Age (BPVS)
and Non-Verbal Mental Age (Leiter). The autistic and Down's Syndrome
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groups were also matched for Chronological Age. Subjects' Chronological
Ages range from five years six months to fifteen years ten months. Details of
subject characteristics are given in tables 49 to 51 below.
Autistic subjects
Six of the autistic subjects were recruited from Radlett School and two
from Brondyffryn School (see Chapter 5 for details). All subjects were male.
This reflects the high male:female ratios found in epidemiological studies
(Rutter and Schopler, 1987). All of these subjects had a primary diagnosis of
autism according to DSM-III criteria. The subjects were all resident at the
school during week days only. Subjects' Chronological Ages ranged from
five years six months to fifteen years ten months.
Down's Syndrome subjects
There were eight Down's Syndrome subjects, all with trisomy 21. The
group consisted of seven males and one female. Subjects were all attending
Dee Banks School (see Chapter 5). Subjects' Chronological Ages ranged from
five years nine months to fifteen years six months.
Normal subjects
All eight young normal children attended Boughton Nursery (see
Chapter 5). This group consisted of three female and five male subjects.
Subjects' Chronological Ages ranged from three years and three months to
three years and eight months. All of the children in this group, then, were
below the age at which understanding of false belief normally develops.
Criteria for inclusion
i Matching
A single-subject design was employed in this study. Using this design
individuals were first matched for Verbal Mental Age, since this was
considered to be most important for understanding these tasks. Non-Verbal
performance was kept as similar as possible across the three groups, and
199
Chronological Age was also kept as similar as possible for the Autistic and
Down's Syndrome groups.
ii Pre-training performance
Only subjects who fail all the test questions of all the pre-test transfer
tasks whilst passing all the control questions were included in the study.
Subjects were therefore matched in their understanding of aspects of the
tasks which did not require a theory of mind (although they all failed to
understand false belief).
In addition, all the subjects were required to complete the computer
mouse training program successfully.
PROCEDURE
The entire procedure involved an initial assessment (involving pre-
test transfer tasks, computer mouse training and IQ testing), false belief
training, post-test transfer tasks and three month follow-up.
INITIAL ASSESSMENT
i). Pre-test Transfer Tasks and Computer mouse training. 
The three pre-test sessions took place during the week prior to
training.
Session 1 
a). Computer mouse training. 
Subjects were also required to complete two runs of the mouse
training program (described in detail in Experiment 1). The second run was
completed without assistance from the experimenter. Successful completion
of the second presentation was a prerequisite for inclusion in the study.
b). Computer transfer task
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Subjects were given the Sally-Anne computer task (described in detail
in Experiment 1). They were given three presentations of the Test condition
games and a single presentation of each of the control games.
Session 2
c). Non-Computer transfer tasks
Each subject was presented with the four non-computer pre-test
transfer tasks. The standard presentations of the Sally-Anne task and the
Smarties task, followed by the two new false belief tasks, the Cornflakes task
and the Tom task.
The order of presentation of these transfer tasks was counterbalanced
within each group, with the same order of presentation in the post-test
sessions.
Session3
ii). 10 Testing
Verbal IQ was measured for each subject using the British Picture
Vocabulary Scale. Non-Verbal IQ was measured using the Leiter
International Performance Scale.
FALSE BELIEF TRAINING
Training took place over four days (Monday to Thursday). Subjects
completed two sessions per day on the training program on each of these
days, making eight sessions altogether. The two daily sessions were no less
than two hours and no more than five hours apart. Each session consisted of
six trials of the training task (three trials of each version).
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Training Timetable
DAY	 TRAINING SESSION
1	 am	 1
pm	 2
2	 am	 3
pm	 4
3	 am	 5
pm	 6
4	 am	 7
pm	 8
POST-TEST TRANSFER TASKS
The post-test transfer tasks were run on day five of the training week.
The tasks used were identical to the pre-test transfer tasks.
THREE MONTH FOLLOW-UP
The same transfer tasks (with the exception of the computer close
transfer task) were also used to test all the subjects in a follow-up, three
months after the end of the training sessions.
RESULTS
The details of each subject's Chronological Age, Verbal Mental Age
and Non-Verbal Mental Age are shown below in Table 49. Table 50. and
Table 51. below. The Means and Standard Deviations for each Group are
also shown.
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Table 49. Subject Characteristics (Autistic Group) 
Sn CA VMA NVMA
A33 10:10 3:8 4:3
A34 15:10 3:8 4:9
A35 6:5 3:7 4:2
A36 5:6 3:1 3:9
A37 10:8 4:0 4:6
A38 9:0 4:1 4:3
A39 14:1 4:2 4:6
A40 13:6 2:9 3:8
Mean 10:9 3:8 4:3
SD 3:8 0:6 0:4
Table 50. Subject Characteristics (Down's Syndrome Group) 
Sn CA VMA NVMA
D53 11:1 3:7 4:4
D54 15:6 4:1 4:6
D55 6:8 3:5 3:9
D56 5:9 3:2 3:4
D57 11:1 4:2 4:4
D58 9:5 4:4 4:0
D59 14:1 4:1 4:3
D60 13:0 3:4 3:7
Mean 11:9 3:9 4:0
SD 4:0 0:5 0:5
Table 51. Subject Characteristics (Normal Group) 
Sn CA VMA NVMA
N43 3:8 4:1 4:4
N44 3:6 3:8 4:4
N45 3:4 3:6 3:8
N46 3:3 3:3 3:6
N47 3:4 3:8 3:9
N48 3:3 3:5 4:3
N49 3:8 4:0 4:0
N50 3:5 3:5 4:4
Mean 3:5 3:7 4:1
SD 0:2 0:3 0:3
Key to Table 49. Table 50. and Table 51. 
CA	 Chronological Age
VMA	 Verbal Mental Age
NVMA	 Non-Verbal Mental Age
Sn	 Subjects Number
y:m	 years:months
These data show that subjects were all closely matched for Verbal
Mental Age (VMA) and Non-Verbal Mental Age (NVMA). The Autistic and
Down's Syndrome subjects were also closely matched for Chronological Age.
However, since subjects were not perfectly matched analysis of covariance
was employed with covariates CA, VMA and NVMA. This was done in
order to calculate the contribution of these covariates in accounting for group
differences in Training Scores, Post-test Training Score, and Follow-up Score.
None of these covariates were found to be predictors of performance
at the 5% level of significance.
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Three sets of results were analysed: The Training session results, the
Post-test transfer task results and the Follow-up results. In addition, the
relationship between these sets of results was also examined.
TRAINING SESSION RESULTS
Table 52. (parts A,B and C) shows the results for the eight training
sessions. The number of correct trials on each of the training sessions is
shown in the columns headed sl to s8. Two summary scores were computed
for each subject. The Overall Training Score is the number of correct trials for
the eight sessions. Although this overall score is a useful indication of
success during training an additional score, the Session Acquired Score was
also derived to estimate the session in training when a subject reached a
criterion, set post-hoc to represent the acquisition of consistent success on the
task. This criterion was set at five out of six correct trials in a session.
Two subjects failed to reach criterion of acquisition. For these subjects
a score for session number when criterion was reached was unknown.
However in order to include these subjects in the analysis, they were
arbitrarily given a score of 9 (ie assuming that the subjects would have
scored five correct on session 9). This is obviously a conservative estimate,
since although subjects could not have done better than 9 they could have
done worse. However, it should be noted that these subjects did achieve two
correct and three correct trials in a session. In fact, the most frequent number
of correct trials for other subjects in this group, in the session prior to
reaching the criterion of five correct trials, was three. It is therefore not
unreasonable that these subjects could have achieved five correct trials on
their next session.
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Table 52. Training Session Results.
A. (Autistic Subjects). 
Sn	 sl s2 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 Ov Acq
A33	 1 2 3 3 6 6 6 6 33	 5
A34	 0 1 3 5 5 6 6 6 32	 4
A35	 1 1 4 5 5 6 6 6 34	 4
A36	 0 2 1 5 6 6 6 6 32	 4
A37	 0 1 1 4 6 5 5 6 28	 5
A38	 1 3 3 5 6 6 6 6 36	 4
A39	 1 2 5 4 6 6 6 5 35	 3
A40	 0 1 4 4 5 6 5 6 31	 5
Mean 0.5 1.6 3.0 4.4 5.6 5.9 5.8 5.9
B. (Down's Syndrome Subjects)
Sn	 sl	 s2	 s3 s4 s5 s6 s7 s8 Ov Acq
D53	 0 1 3 5 5 5 5 5 29	 4
D54	 0 1 2 3 3 3 5 4 21	 7
D55	 1 1 1 2 2 3 2 3 15	 9*
D56	 0 1 2 3 2 3 3 5 19	 8
D57	 0 1 3 3 3 4 6 5 25	 7
D58	 0 1 2 3 2 2 5 6 21	 7
D59	 0 0 0 1 1 2 2 2 8	 9*
D60	 0 2 2 1 2 4 5 4 20	 7
Mean 0.1 1.0 1.9 2.6 2.5 3.3 4.1 4.3
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C. (Normal Subjects). 
N43 2 4 3 3 2 4 3 6 27 8
N44 1 1 3 3 6 5 5 6 30 5
N45 1 1 5 5 6 6 5 6 35 3
N46 3 3 3 4 6 5 6 6 36 5
N47 3 2 3 3 6 6 6 6 35 5
N48 2 2 3 4 4 6 4 5 30 6
N49 2 3 4 5 5 6 6 6 37 4
N50 3 3 4 2 5 6 6 6 35 5
Mean 2.1 2.4 3.5 3.6 5.0 5.5 5.1 5.9
Key to Table 52. (A,B and C) 
Sn	 Subject Number
sl to s8	 Session 1 to Session 8
Over	 Overall Training Score
Acq	 Session Acquired Score
9*	9 scored for subjects not reaching a score
of 5 trials correct on a training session
The results show a general pattern of increase in the number of correct
trials over the course of the 8 sessions. Figure 11.1. summarizes the results
for the three diagnostic groups
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Figure 11.1. Performance During Training. 
1	 2	 3	 4	 5	 6	 7	 8
Session Number
— 0 — Autistic-0 — Downs --•-• Normal
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It can be seen from Figure 11.1. that the normal group scores higher
than the other two groups on session one. Between session one and five the
normal group and the Down's Syndrome group show a similar rate of
increase in the number of trials correct. However, the autistic group appears
to learn quicker (showing a steeper gradient), so that the curve for the
autistic group crosses that for the normal group. The autistic group and the
normal group curves meet at the session 8, both groups having a mean score
of 6 correct trials. The Down's group remains at a lower mean score
throughout training.
A summary of the Overall Training Score (OV) and Session Acquired
Score (ACQ) results and analyses are shown in Table 53. below.
Table 53. Training Session results and analysis.
Group Means	 Overall Between	 Scheffe
Groups Anova	 Pairwise Comp's
A	 D	 N	 F	 R	 AvD AvN DvN
OV	 32.6	 19.8	 33.1	 23.4	 <0.001	 **, NS ***
	
'
ACO 4.25	 7.25	 5.12	 11.1	 0.001	 *** NS **
Key to Table 53. 
A	 Autistic Group
D	 Down's Syndrome Group
N	 Normal Group
AvD Autistic versus Down's Group comparison
AvN Autistic versus Normal Group comparison
DyN Down's versus Normal Group comparison
OV Overall Training Score
ACQ Session Acquired Score
Anova Analysis of Variance
Comp's Comparisons
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p<0.10
p<0.05
p<0.01
Analysis of the Overall Training Scores for each group revealed that
whilst the normal group and the autistic group obtained similar scores, the
Down's Syndrome group scored significantly less than the other two groups.
The analysis of the Session Acquired Score also revealed significant
differences between the groups. Again the Down's Syndrome group differed
significantly from the other two groups.
POST-TEST TRANSFER TASK RESULTS
Table 54. (parts A,B and C) below shows the results of the five Post-
test transfer tasks. A score of 1 is assigned if the subject passes the task and a
score of 0 is given if the subject fails. Two sets of scores are derived from the
transfer task results. The Close Transfer Score (CTr) is the sum of the scores
for the computer task and the Sally-Anne task. The Distant Transfer score 
(DTr) is the sum of scores for the Smarties task (Sm), the Cornflakes task (CO
and the Tom task (Tom). The Overall Training Scores and Session Acquired
Scores from the training task results are also shown again in Table 54. for
comparison.
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Table 54. Post-test transfer task results.
A. Autistic Subjects. 
Sn Corn S-A Sm Cf Torn CTr DTr Ov Acq
A33 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 33	 5
A34 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 32 4
A35 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 34 4
A36 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 32 4
A37 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 28 5
A38 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 36 4
A39 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 35 3
A40 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 31 5
B. Down's Syndrome Subjects. 
Sn Corn S-A Sm Cf Torn CTr DTr OV Acq
D53 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 29 4
D54 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 21 7
D55 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 15 9*
D56 1 1 I 1 0 2 2 19 8
D57 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 25 7
D58 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 21 7
D59 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 8 9*
D60 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 20 7
211
C. Normal Subjects.
Sn Corn S-A Sm Cf Tom CTr DTr Ov Acq
N43 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 27 8
N44 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 30 5
N45 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 35 3
N46 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 36 5
N47 1 1 1 1 1 2 3 35 5
N48 1 1 0 0 0 2 0 30 6
N49 1 1 1 1 0 2 2 37 4
N50 1 1 1 0 0 2 1 35 5
Key to Table 54.
Sn	 Subject number
Corn Computer task
S-A Sally-Anne dolls task
Sm Smarties task
Cf	 Cornflakes task
Tom Tom task
CTr Close Transfer Task Score
DTr Distant Transfer Task Score
Ov	 Overall Training Score
Acq Session Acquired Training Score
Close Transfer Score
All but two subjects were successful on both Close transfer tasks. Both
these subjects were in the Down's Syndrome group. These two subjects
obtained the lowest Overall Training Scores throughout the three groups,
and were also the only subjects who failed to reach the acquisition criterion.
The mean Close Transfer Score for each of the groups is shown in Table 55.
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Distant Transfer Score
The results and analysis of the Distant Transfer Score for each group
are shown in Table 55 below. Non-parametric tests were appropriate for this
data.
Table 55. Post-test training results and analysis. 
Group Means	 Overall Between Mann-Whitney
Subjects K-W Pairwise
Anova	 Comparisons 
A	 D	 N	 Chi2 p	 AvD AvN DvN
CTr 2.0	 1.5	 2.0	 7.6	 0.124	 NS NS NS
DTr 0.0	 1.5	 1.5	 7.6	 0.022	 **	 **	 NS
Key to Table 55. 
A	 Autistic Group
D	 Down's Syndrome Group
N	 Normal Group
AvD Autistic versus Down's Group comparison
AvN Autistic versus Normal Group comparison
DvN Down's versus Normal Group comparison
CTr Close Transfer Score
DTr Distant Transfer Score
K-W Anova Kruskal-Wallis oneway analysis of variance
NS	 Not significant
**	 p<0.05 nb Z values were z=2.56 in both cases.
No differences were found between the groups for the Close transfer
tasks. However, the analysis of the Distant Transfer Score showed that the
autistic group scored significantly less than both the normal and the Down's
Syndrome groups at 5% level of significance.
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Post-test performance on control questions games. 
All of the subjects passed the computer control games given after
training.
Relationship Between Training Session Scores and Post-Test Transfer Task
Scores 
The correlation between Overall Training Score and Distant Transfer
Score and also between Session Acquired Training Score and Distant
Transfer Score, was calculated using Kendall's tau b statistic pooled over the
diagnostic groups. This non-parametric test was used as the number of
subjects used was small. Since all the autistic subjects failed on the distant
transfer tasks they provided no correlational data and were omitted from
this analysis.
Overall Training Score was correlated with performance on the
distant transfer tasks (tau=0.33, p<0.10). Session acquired, ie. speed of
acquisition, was more highly correlated with performance on the distant
transfer tasks (tau=0.60, p<0.001).
Follow-Up Results
Performance on the dolls presentation of the Sally-Anne task (close
transfer) and on the three distant transfer tasks for the three month follow-
up are shown in Table 56. (parts A, B and C) below. This table also shows
the Close Transfer Score (calculated without the score from the computer
task as this was not used in follow-up), and the Distant Transfer Score, at
post-test and at three month follow-up.
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Table 56. Transfer Task Performance At Three Month Follow-Up.
A. Autistic Subjects. 
Sn	 S-A Sm Cf Tom FCTr FDTr Pctr	 Pdtr
A331 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
A34- - - - 1 0
A350 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
A360 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
A371 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
A380 0 0 0 0 0 1 0
A391 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
A401 0 0 0 1 0 1 0
B. Down's Syndrome Subjects.
Sn	 S-A	 Sm Cf Tom FCTr FDTr Pctr	 Pdtr
D531 1 1 1 1 3 1 3
D54- - - - - 1 0
D550 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D561 1 1 0 1 2 1 2
D571 1 1 1 1 3 1 3
D581 1 1 0 1 2 1 1
D590 0 0 0 0 0 0 0
D601 1 1 1 1 3 1 3
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C. Normal Subjects.
Sn	 S-A Sm Cf Tom FCTr FDTr Pctr	 Pdtr
N431 1 1 0 1 2 1 0
N441 1 1 1 1 3 1 3
N451 1 1 1 1 3 1 3
N461 1 1 0 1 2 1 0
N471 1 1 1 1 3 1 3
N481 1 1 0 1 2 1 0
N491 1 1 1 1 3 1 2
N501 1 1 1 1 3 1 1
Sn	 Subject number
S-A Sally-Anne dolls task
Sm Smarties task
Cf	 Cornflakes task
Tom Tom task
FCTr Follow up Close Transfer Task Score
FDTr Follow up Distant Transfer Task Score
Pctr Post-test Close Transfer Score (dolls task only)
Pdtr Post-test Distant Transfer Score
Two subjects were unavailable for retesting at follow-up, one autistic
subject (A34) and one Down's Syndrome subject (D54).
For the normal and the Down's Syndrome subjects the results for the
Close transfer task were the same at follow-up as they were at post-test.
However, three of the autistic children who had previously passed the close
transfer task failed when retested at follow-up. This change was not
significant using McNemar's test.
All the autistic children once again failed all the distant transfer tasks.
For this reason the autistic subjects were not included in the analysis
comparing distant transfer task performance at post-test and follow-up.
Table 57. below shows mean Distant Transfer Scores for the Down's
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DyN change
M-W Test
z	 p
2.05 <0.05
Wilcoxon
z	 p
1.0	 NS
2.02	 <0.05
Syndrome and normal groups at post-test and follow-up. A Mann-Whitney
U test was used in order test whether the change in performance for the two
groups was different. Since this analysis was found to be significant, the
changes were analysed separately for the two diagnostic groups using the
Wilcoxon test.
Table 57. Post-test and Follow-up Distant Transfer Mean Scores. 
G_p	 p.ct	 foll	 change
D	 1.71	 1.86	 0.14
N	 1.5	 2.63	 1.13
Key for Table 57. 
Gp Group
post Post-test Distant Transfer Task Score mean
foll Follow-up Distant Transfer Task Score mean
change Change in Distant Transfer Task Score
DyN Down's versus Normal Group
M-W Mann-Whitney U Test
There was no significant change in the performance of the Down's
Syndrome subjects between post-test and three month follow-up. The
normal subjects improved in their performance on the distant transfer tasks
at the follow-up retesting.
DISCUSSION
The training study has produced an interesting pattern of results with
respect to the three diagnostic groups (autistic, Down's Syndrome and
normal subjects), and may have implications for our understanding of the
cognitive structures available to these children.
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Performance on the training task. 
During the 8 training sessions the autistic and normal groups both
showed a steady and impressive rate of learning, achieving 5 out of 6 correct
trials in a session (criterion for acquisition) by approximately session number
5. The Down's Syndrome group however, were not as successful on the
training task, in terms of both their overall performance and how quickly
they reached the criterion for acquisition. Despite their inferior performance
compared to the other two groups, most of the Down's Syndrome group did
show a steady rate of learning, with 6 of the 8 subjects reaching criterion by
the end of training.
We also examined the contribution of Chronological Age, Verbal
Mental Age and Non-Verbal Mental Age and found that none of these
covariates were significant predictors of training performance.
Although the subjects were successful on the training task, we needed
to look at the results of the distant transfer tasks given after training in order
to assess whether subjects had learned the concept of false belief during
training or whether they had learned to use an algorithm in order to pass the
training task.
Post-Test Transfer Tasks
On the Close Transfer tasks, no significant difference was found
between the three groups, although the two Down's Syndrome subjects who
did not reach acquisition during training failed on both the computer and
standard presentations of the Sally-Anne task.
This suggests that autistic, Down's Syndrome and normal children
were able to generalize what they had learned from presentation using
computer images to presentation using dolls. However, since the close
transfer tasks involved the same scenario as was used for training, we cannot
tell whether subjects generalised by using the concept of false belief or a
strategy learned during training.
The diagnostic groups did differ in terms of their performance on the
distant transfer tasks. Despite their success during training, all the autistic
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subjects failed all the distant transfer tasks. In other words, the autistic
subjects failed to generalize what they had learned during training. This
suggests that the autistic subjects may be using an algorithm to pass the
training task and close transfer tasks. Performance on the computer control
games gave no indication of the nature of such an algorithm, as all the
subjects were successful on these tasks after training. This may have been
because a more complicated algorithm than "look in the container where the
ball is not present", was used or because the subjects were able to distinguish
between the test game and the control games.
In contrast, five of the Down's Syndrome subjects and five of the
normal subjects passed at least one of the distant transfer tasks, suggesting
that these subjects had learned the concept of false belief and were able to
use it in different situations. Performance on the distant transfer tasks was
not related to either Chronological Age, Verbal Mental Age or Non-Verbal
Mental Age.
The implication of this finding is that the cognitive mechanisms for
understanding false belief in autistic children who fail the false belief task
are impaired in a qualitatively different way to the Down's Syndrome
children and the young normal children who also fail the false belief task.
The autistic children may have learned an algorithm for the task, whilst
normal and Down's Syndrome children had the cognitive mechanisms
available to enable them to learn the concept during training. This is not to
say that autistic children are incapable of acquiring this concept and using a
theory of mind at this "lower level" (examples of such children are found in
experiment 4), but it does appear from this pilot study that such acquisition
is more difficult for autistic children than it is for young Down's Syndrome
or young normal children, and the cognitive structures used for a theory of
mind may be uniquely impaired in autism.
Another explanation could be that the autistic children find it easier to
learn an algorithm than the other two groups. They learn this algorithm
quickly, and are content to continue passing the task in this way. This would
imply that autistic children are not motivated to learn the concept, perhaps
because they are not attending to the mental state components of the training
task.
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This finding supports the hypothesis expressed in the previous
experiment in this thesis that autistic children are more likely than other
groups to be impaired at an earlier stage on a developmental "continuum" of
theory of mind. These results suggest that although all three groups in the
training study failed the false belief task, they were not at equal stages on
this continuum.
The finding that some of the Down's Syndrome and normal subjects
were able to pass the distant transfer tasks after training is also of great
interest. Such results testify to the effectiveness of the training, but also
indicate that the cognitive structures required for understanding false belief
are available to these subjects. The young normal children were all below the
Chronological Age when understanding of false belief has been reported to
have developed (Astington and Gopnik, 1991). This therefore suggests that
in normal development the structures for understanding false belief and
hence using a theory of mind are available earlier than three years and nine
months. It would also appear that such structures are also available to
Down's Syndrome subjects, despite their low Mental Age.
The relationship between training and distant transfer
We also examined how training performance was related to ability to
learn the concept (ie performance on the distant transfer tasks). Since all of
the autistic subjects failed distant transfer, these subjects were excluded from
the analyses. The results showed that both speed of acquisition and overall
training performance were related to performance on the distant transfer
tasks, for the Down's Syndrome subjects and for the young normal subjects.
For these two groups the subjects who failed the distant transfer tasks
performed worse than those who passed on the training program. This
distinguishes them from the autistic subjects who failed distant transfer, all
of whom performed well during training. One explanation for this difference
may be that the autistic children tend to learn an algorithm more quickly and
with more ease than the subjects in the other groups because they are not
analysing the task in terms of a social situation that requires explanation.
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Follow-up Results
The subjects were retested three months after training in order to find
out whether the effects of training had been maintained.
The autistic subjects also failed all the distant transfer tasks at follow-
up. There was also a suggestion from the data that this group had got worse
at the follow-up on the close transfer task, although the difference between
post-test and follow-up was not found to be significant. Four autistic subjects
did maintain their original performance on the close transfer task.
The Down's Syndrome subjects maintained their performance on all
the Transfer tasks suggesting that the concept they had learned was stable.
The normal subjects improved in their performance. This was
probably because these subjects had developed understanding of false belief
in the course of their natural development.
Subjects who learned the concept of false belief during training were
still able to use the concept at three month follow-up, suggesting that this
was not a short term phenomenon. It is possible that some subjects may have
acquired this concept during the course of their natural development over
the three months; this seems likely in the case of the normal subjects who
actually improved in their performance on the distant transfer tasks. The
algorithm also appeared to be reasonably well remembered over the three
months amongst the autistic children.
Informal Observations. 
The autistic subjects who passed at follow-up seemed to remember
the Sally-Anne task remarkably well. They were able to quote much of the
text used in the training program eg. "Sally thinks her ball is in the red box
where she left it." These quotes were volunteered by the subjects rather than
being prompted. This suggested further that rote learning of the two test
games had taken place. Such rote learning might support an algorithmic
method for passing the task. This memory for text was not displayed
voluntarily by either the Down's Syndrome group or the normal group at
follow-up, although these subjects were also able to pass the tasks.
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It is also worth noting that all three groups greeted the computer
training tasks with enthusiasm, which appeared to be maintained
throughout the training period. This was encouraging given that the subjects
were required to complete the Sally-Anne task a total of 48 times over the
four days.
This pilot study then suggests that it is possible to teach normal and
Down's Syndrome children to understand the concept of false belief and
generalize this understanding to other tasks. However, it would appear that
autistic children differ from these two groups in their ability to learn about
false belief and suggests that autistic children have an innate neurologically
based deficit in their theory of mind.
A more large scale training study would be useful in order to confirm
these results. This might include a variety of different training approaches
alongside computer presentations and a more comprehensive examination of
ability to use a theory of mind. A control group of subjects being trained on
something other than theory of mind tasks would also be necessary. Such a
study may tell us more about the origins and development of the ability to
use a theory of mind and the prospects for autistic children being able to
learn a genuine concept which might ultimately alleviate some of their
communication and socialization difficulties.
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CHAPTER 12.
SUMMARY AND CONCLUSIONS
This final chapter is divided into a number of sections. Firstly, we give
a brief summary of the hypotheses and the experimental findings of the
thesis. Secondly, we discuss the implications our findings have for the
"theory of mind" hypothesis and for the use of computers with autistic
children. Finally, we discuss the implications of the thesis for future
research.
SUMMARY
i Hypotheses
In the first two chapters of the thesis we reviewed the current
knowledge concerning autism. In Chapter 1 we looked at diagnosis and
identification, epidemiology and aetiology, and in Chapter 2 we discussed
more recent research on the diagnostic criteria and cognitive deficits found
in autism.
A number of important points emerged from this literature. Firstly,
there is a consensus that autism has a biological basis. Secondly, some higher
order cognitive deficit, presumably resulting from a deficit in brain
functioning, might form an important part of the innate basis of autism.
Three classic symptoms emerged, which always co-occur in autism (Wing,
1988):-
1. Characteristic social incompetence.
2. Impairment of verbal and non-verbal communication.
3. Lack of pretend play.
In the light of this literature it was argued that it would be useful to try
and identify an underlying cognitive deficit which leads to the specific
abnormalities of development characteristic of autism.
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We then focussed on a cognitive theory proposed originally by Baron-
Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985,1986) which attempts to explain the triad of
impairments. According to this theory, autistic children have a specific
deficit in their ability to form and use metarepresentations. According to
Leslie (1987) the cognitive component used to form metarepresentations is
necessary for the ability to pretend and to understand pretence in others; this
component also underlies the child's development of a "theory of mind"
(Wimmer and Perner, 1983).
Having a theory of mind enables the child to think and reason about
the content of his/her own and other peoples' mental states. We then
outlined the importance of a theory and mind for explaining and predicting
behaviour, in other words making sense of the social world; and for
communication, for example in recognizing the speaker's belief and
intentions about the message (Grice, 1975; Sperber and Wilson, 1986).
A deficit in the autistic child's ability to form and use
metarepresentations, then, would explain the lack of pretend play, it would
also account for a deficit in the development of a theory of mind resulting in
characteristic social impairment and communicative impairment.
One aspect of theory of mind, which develops in young normal
children at four years of age, is the ability to understand false belief in other
people (Wimmer and Perner, 1983). Baron-Cohen, Leslie and Frith (1985,
1986) examined understanding of false belief in autistic children, Down's
syndrome children and young normal children. The results showed that
autistic children were specifically impaired in their understanding of false
belief. These findings met with some controversy and criticisms but were
convincing enough to warrant further investigation.
In addition to the theory of mind hypothesis (and considering our
literature review), we then focussed on another interesting area of research;
computer use and autistic children. We found that the few existing studies
suggested that this was a promising area of research. We argued that for
autistic children, the computer was a novel form of presentation and that as
a new channel of communication it might be used effectively as an
investigative tool for research or as a training device.
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By considering the attributes that a computer can offer and what those
attributes might capitalize on in terms of autistic cognition (such as stimulus
overselectivity, ritualistic and compulsive phenomena, impoverished
communication and difficulty with the social world), we argued that the
computer environment might be particularly well suited to autistic children.
In designing our experimental studies, then, we were able to draw
together these two areas of research by examining a cognitive deficit
(understanding of false belief) in autistic children using tasks presented on
computer. We could then gather information about understanding of false
belief and about the efficacy of using the computer for these tasks.
We used our knowledge of autistic cognition in order to design
computer programs best suited to the autistic children. In particular these
programs had a minimalist design with as little reliance as possible on
verbal and social abilities. We designed a mouse training program and two
programs testing understanding of false belief. Logged information about
performance on the training task and observational reports would provide
additional information about how well autistic children work with
computers.
We also presented revised versions of the false belief tasks in standard
form. This enabled us to compare two versions of the false belief task with
very different surface forms. If the performance was the same for both forms
of presentation (as we would predict from the "theory of mind" hypothesis)
then we could conclude that the autistic children's failure on these tasks
must be due to the conceptual nature of the tasks rather than its surface
form. If the performance differs substantially on the two versions, then we
must conclude that the surface form plays a role. In addition, if those
children who fail the false belief task pass the computer version, then we
need to be wary of the fact that these versions are not identical in content, so
that we could not then claim that passing was entirely due to the attributes
of the computer.
It would also be interesting to follow the performances of these
children through trials and over time as we may observe some improvement
or differences in results. However distinguishing between developmental
change and change due to training is a difficult task.
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We then administered the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale using
autistic and Down's Syndrome children in order to assess whether a
cognitive deficit in using a theory of mind is related to real behaviour.
Finally, we attempted to train subjects who fail on false belief tasks to
understand the concept of false belief. We used a specially designed
computer program for training.
ii Findings
Experiment 1. 
In the first experiment we used autistic children, Down's syndrome
children of around the same Chronological Age but with significantly lower
Verbal and NonVerbal Mental Ages, and young normal children also with
lower Mental Ages. The higher Mental Age of the autistic group allowed us
to evaluate conservatively any relative disadvantages in their performance.
The first part of experiment one was an introduction to the computer
and mouse using the training program. Analyses of the time spent on this
program indicated that the autistic children had no special difficulties
handling the computer interface. We also gave an anecdotal account of the
performances of the children. These informal observations pointed to
computer testing relieving many of the problems involved in working with
the autistic children, and suggested that the computer work was greeted
with more enthusiasm, and in many cases more concentrated effort, by the
autistic children, than were other forms of work.
The second part of experiment one tested the three groups on two
versions of the "Sally-Anne" false belief task (Baron-Cohen et al, 1985); a
revised version of the Sally-Anne task using extra control questions and
added texts (based on Perner et al, 1987) and a computer version involving a
number of different games.
The pattern of results found with the computer presentation was
similar to that found for the dolls presentation. For both presentations
autistic children failed to understand false belief, whereas the Down's
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syndrome children and the young normal children passed on these tasks.
This difference between the groups was found to be significant.
This experiment lends further support for the hypothesis that autistic
children are specifically impaired in their theory of mind. Also, the fact that
we found these results using both forms of presentation suggests that the
autistic children's failure is due to something in the conceptual nature of the
task rather than its surface form.
We did find a minority of autistic children who passed the false belief
task. These children tended to be of higher Mental Age. However, Down's
Syndrome children of lower Mental Age still passed the task, so that failure
of the majority of the autistic children could not be due to Mental Age alone.
Baron-Cohen et al (1985) also found a minority group of autistic
children who did pass the false belief task. However, in another experiment
(Baron-Cohen, 1989) these children were found to fail on higher order levels
of belief attribution, whereas mental age matched controls passed. It was
proposed that autistic children have a "specific developmental delay" in the
cognitive mechanisms employed in attributing false beliefs. Our findings,
then, are in line with the theory of mind hypothesis, and it is not unusual for
a minority of the autistic children to pass these tests of false belief.
We also found that those autistic children who passed consistently on
all three trials of one presentation always passed on the other form of
presentation. This suggested further that computer and doll presentations
were testing the same aspects of understanding.
Only four autistic children performed inconsistently on the test
questions. It was interesting to note that any inconsistency between
performance on the two presentations showed failure on the dolls
presentation and passing on the computer presentation. We speculated as to
the possible explanations for this (see Implications section). However, there
were too few children performing in this way for us to draw any strong
conclusions.
Given the results of this first experiment then, we felt it would be
worthwhile to retest these children. We wanted to examine how stable the
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results would be over time and if there was any improvement in initial
performance (particularly in those children who showed inconsistent
results).
Experiment 2
In the second experiment we retested 12 of the autistic children and
seven of the Down's Syndrome children six months after experiment 1. The
general finding was that the results from experiment 1 remained the same on
retesting. We concluded that the tasks were reliable and that the results were
stable. This experiment further confirmed our finding that autistic children
are impaired in their understanding of false belief. In addition, it confirms
that the two forms of presentation, dolls and computer, essentially measure
the same cognitive skill (understanding of false belief), and with equivalent
reliability.
It was interesting to note that those subjects who showed inconsistent
results in the first experiment continued to do so in the second. The
exceptions to the consistency of retesting were two subjects who showed
improvement in their performance on the computer task, passing the test
games. This improvement could be due to a development of understanding
of false belief or, alternatively, it could be due to the subjects learning a
compensatory strategy, in which case the computer may be functioning as a
training device. Although we were only dealing with a few subjects here we
felt that this "subplot" would be interesting to follow up.
We decided it would be interesting to consider how autistic children
performed on a different test of false belief. If the autistic children again
failed, this would provide further evidence for a deficit in understanding of
false belief. In addition, we could look at the performance of those subjects
who had shown inconsistent results on the first two experiments. This might
give us some indication of whether they were passing the test question
because they understood the concept of false belief (in which case they
would pass other different tests of that concept), or whether they passed by
using a compensatory strategy or algorithm for the Sally-Anne task.
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Experiment 3. 
In the third experiment we tested understanding of false belief in 19
autistic children (from our original sample of 23) using a different paradigm
(deceptive-appearance) in the form of the "Smarties task" (Perner et al, 1987)
using a computer version and a standard version of the task. This enabled us
to compare performance across different types of tasks as well as between
different mediums of presentation. At the time of testing this task had not
been tried with autistic children.
The results provided further evidence that autistic children had difficulty
understanding false belief. Again, most of the autistic children failed the
false belief task.
Both standard and computer presentation yielded the same results.
This suggests that both presentations are measuring the same aspect of
understanding (false belief) that causes the child to fail the task.
We also compared performance across two different types of tasks and
found that the results were remarkably similar for the "Sally-Anne" task and
the "Smarties" task. This was true for both standard and computer
presentations.
This experiment then, demonstrated the consistency and robust nature
of our earlier findings from the first two experiments.
There were, however, some minor differences between the "Smarties
task" results and the "Sally-Anne task" results. The most notable difference
was that all the subjects, apart from one, passed the control questions,
although the vast majority still failed the test question. The control questions
are not so rigourous for the "Smarties task", requiring less verbal ability and
memory recall, particularly for the computer task.
We were also able to make some interesting observations concerning
the four subjects who had shown unpredictable results in the first two
experiments. Two of these subjects passed the "Smarties task" consistently,
having previously shown a combination or improvement in results in
experiments one and two. This suggested that they had developed a genuine
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understanding of false belief during the course of the first two experiments
(whether through training or through natural development over this time)
which enabled them to pass the different test of false belief in experiment
three. In contrast, the other two subjects, who had performed in a similar
way in the first two experiments, went on to fail the "Smarties task". Possibly
these subjects had passed the "Sally-Anne task" using a compensatory
strategy (ie without understanding the concept of false belief) which would
not generalise to a different test of false belief and would therefore not
enable them to pass the "Smarties task". We also observed that subjects the
first pair were considerably older than second, making them stronger
candidates for true development of false belief understanding at this level.
We now had a profile of the autistic children, in terms of their
performances on false belief tasks reflecting the extent of their cognitive
impairment. The majority of the autistic children failed to understand false
belief, regardless of the type of task or the form of presentation. In the next
study we set out to examine how performance on the false belief tasks relates
to everyday observed behaviours. In particular, we hypothesized that those
children who failed false belief tests would be more impaired in the
Socialisation Domain, since a deficit in this domain best reflects the autistic
behaviour.
Experiment 4
In the fourth experiment we found evidence of a relationship between
theory of mind capacity and adaptive behaviour in both autistic and Down's
Syndrome children. Those who failed on two false belief tasks were
significantly more impaired on the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale
(VABS) than those who passed the false belief tasks, particularly on the
Socialization Domain.
We also identified specific behaviours which differentiate those who
pass and those who fail on the theory of mind tasks. The majority of these
behaviours had been rated by four independent judges as "requiring a
theory of mind."
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These findings suggest that a deficit in understanding mental states is
linked to a deficit in everyday behaviours particularly in the Socialization
Domain.
We also found that despite being matched for performance on the two
false belief tasks, the clinical groups still differed in terms of adaptive
behaviour score. The specific behaviours differentiating the clinical groups
however, were not theory of mind items. The adaptive behaviour score for
the Down's Syndrome subjects was higher than that for the autistics on all
three Domains.
This suggests that although understanding of mental states is
important, it is not the only factor determining behaviour. This leaves space
to accommodate other theories of the underlying cause of autism, such as a
deficit in perception of affective states (Hobson, 1989).
Another explanation was that children may be at different stages on a
developmental continuum of ability to use a theory of mind. The autistic
children in the fail subgroup may be improverished not only in
understanding belief but also in joint attention and so are more delayed than
Down's Syndrome children in the fail subgroup, in terms of their theory of
mind capacity.
Experiment 5. 
In the fifth experiment autistic, Down's Syndrome and young normal
children were trained on a computerized false belief training program.
Speed of learning and overall training performance was the same for
the autistic and normal children. The Down's Syndrome children were not as
successful during training, but most eventually learned to pass the task.
When testing took place after training, only two children (both Down's
Syndrome) failed the Sally-Anne task presented on computer and with the
dolls. However, the diagnostic groups did differ in terms their performance
on the other false belief tasks involving different scenarios (ie requiring
generalization of the false belief task learned during training).
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Most of the Down's Syndrome and normal children were able to
generalize and hence appeared to have learned the concept of false belief. In
contrast none of the autistic children were able to pass other false belief
tasks, suggesting that the autistic children had learned an algorithm for the
Sally-Anne task during training.
This difference between the groups in tendency to learn the concept,
suggests that autistic children are uniquely impaired in terms of the
cognitive structures available to them for using a theory of mind.
We speculated that this may be further evidence that the autistic
children are more delayed along a development continuum.
It was also interesting that young normal children below the age of 3
years and 9 months were able to pass the false belief tasks after training,
suggesting that these children are capable of understanding false belief at
this early age.
At the three month follow-up we found that subjects who learned the
concept of false belief during training were still able to use it to pass the
distant transfer tasks. Some of the subjects may have acquired this concept
during the course of natural development; this seemed to be the case for the
young normal children who improved in their performance at follow-up.
The autistic children also appeared to remember what they had learned
during training. In fact, those who still passed the Sally-Anne task were also
volunteering text from the original computerized training program which
they appeared to have learned word for word.
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iii). Implications
Using a variety of tasks and forms of presentation we have found that
autistic children are impaired in their understanding of false belief. The
results suggest that it is something in the conceptual nature of these tasks,
rather than their surface form, that contributes to the autistic children's
failure. The impairment cannot be explained simply in terms of the Mental
Age of the autistic children, as other matched clinical groups perform well
on these tasks.
Furthermore, there was a strong relation between performance on these
cognitive tasks and deficits in areas of behaviour most typically impaired in
autism (in the Socialization Domain).
Finally, we have found that autistic children differ from young normal
children and Down's Syndrome children in their ability to learn the concept
of false belief and generalize this knowledge to other false belief tasks.
This thesis then provides strong evidence that autistic children are
impaired in their understanding of false belief. This relates both theoretically
(Metarepresentational Deficit Theory) and practically (Vineland Adaptive
Behaviour profiles) to the behavioural impairments observed in autism. This
underlying cognitive deficit draws together what seemed to be unrelated
core features of autism (Wing's triad of impairments).
These findings add to the general picture that autistic children are
specifically delayed in their theory of mind understanding, when added to
an array of other supporting evidence (Baron-Cohen 1989, 1990, Baron-
Cohen et al, 1985, 1986; Harris and Muncer, 1988; Leslie and Frith, 1988;
Perner, Frith, Leslie and Leekam, 1989).
A deficit of this nature has far reaching implications for autistic
children. Frith (1989) points out the importance of having a "theory" or
coherent system of thought for predicting and explaining the social
behaviour and communicative behaviour of others. As Frith puts it "We need
to know what it means to have a mind and to think, know and believe, and
feel differently to others.. ..one needs the ability to read between the lines,
and yes, to read other people's minds." Looking at the wider implications of
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this mentalizing ability could be conceptualised as a vital cohesive
interpretive device, one which is not functioning in autistic children.
The results of the training study suggested that autistic children may
have learned differently from the other two groups. This raises two
important questions; why did they learn differently? and if they were
learning an algorithm, can that be at all useful in terms of bringing them
closer to having a genuine theory of mind? In order to address these
questions we need to consider how theory of mind develops normally.
Our argument throughout the thesis is that children's understanding of
the mind is innate, in other words there is some kind of theory of mind
module (Leslie, 1987,1988) which is deficient in autistic children. An extreme
view would be that the development of a theory of mind depends wholly on
the maturation of this mechanism. A less extreme view would be that there
are a number of innate precursors for later genuine conceptual development
(Bartsch and Wellman, 1989; Freeman, Lewis and Doherty, 1991) such as
joint attention (Baron-Cohen, 1990), language development (Bretherton and
Beeghly, 1982) and judgement of emotion (Wellman and Wooley,1990).
These precursors provide the infant with a certain view of the mind which is
then revised as the infant learns more about experience and behaviour. The
theory of mind normal children end up with is influenced by what they start
with. Using this model of development it may be that autistic children start
without the normal infant apparatus and so might never fully develop a
theory of mind. In other words in the training task they may be able to learn
the surface form of a false belief task without being able to incorporate it into
a theory of mind.
Another view is that this ability develops as a result of theory
formation (Carey, 1985, 1988; Gopnik, 1988, Karmloff-Smith,1988). The child
develops a theory as a result of internal structural factors (for example the
drive for simplicity) and external factors (such as confirming and
disconfirming evidence). The theory itself influences what evidence will be
collected and how it will be interpreted and the new evidence modifies the
theory (Churchland, 1984, Stich, 1983). If we consider the internal structures
in this model to be the theory of mind module (or innate structure), then this
is similar to the model above. With such a model, providing salient evidence
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and counterevidence as we have done in the training program should
accelerate the development of the theory of mind.
We might argue then that the normal and Down's Syndrome subjects in
the training study had the necessary precursors or internal structures
available to them to enable them to use the evidence during training to
further formulate a theory of mind. The information was not used in the
same way by the autistic children as they were unable to incorporate the
evidence into an existing theory.
Is it possible then for autistic children to "bridge the gap" between
knowing an algorithm and being able to use a theory of mind? Certainly
since autism is a developmental disorder (Harris, 1989; Sigman, 1989) it
seems likely that at least to some extent the mechanisms or innate structures
for theory of mind may develop at a later stage. Perhaps a more extensive
program of training with confirming and disconfirming evidence may serve
to accelerate that development.
It may also be possible that understanding of mental states could
develop in a different way. The intropectivist's view holds that knowledge of
mental states is closely related to the child's immediate psychological
experience. For example Nelson (1981) argues that psychological knowledge
might organise itself into scripts. The child acquires expectations about the
structure of common events and the scripts map these into a more general
plan. Then, to interpret action the child searches for a general plan to fit a
situation. For example the child might know that a person will do x given
the psychological circumstance y without having a theory of mind. One
possibility is that autistic children could form an elaborate set of plans or
algorithms which they can use to predict and explain behaviour in a way
that approximates to using a theory of mind but does not require the use of
the innate mechanisms necessary for a genuine theory of mind.
In terms of treatment and therapy for autism, it is an important step to
have gained a clearer picture of the underlying nature of the disorder. For
example, this has important implications for more effective communication
with autistic children. We need to be aware that what seems self-evident or
redundant in our own utterences needs to be literally "spelt out" to the
autistic child. Similarly, we need to be aware of how easily the autistic child
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may omit important features of his/her own messages. Also, we cannot
make the normal assumptions in terms of interpreting the behaviour of an
autistic person.
One therapeutic approach might be to present the child with a variety
of social situations where s/he may need to use a theory of mind. In
particular, it may be worth concentrating on those behaviours identified
using the Vineland Adaptive Behaviour Scale as being affected by the
cognitive deficit. It may be possible to teach autistic children to use
compensatory strategies for coping with such behaviours and the situations
where such behaviours are important. Alternatively, it may be possible that
some genuine understanding of theory of mind can be taught. The evidence
from our training study suggests that teaching autistic children to
understand the concept of false belief and ultimately use a theory of mind
may be extremely difficult.
The findings of the thesis also emphasised the enormous potential of
the computer both as an investigative tool for cognitive psychology
experiments, and as a possible teaching device for use with autistic children.
The results of the false belief tasks for the computer presentation closely
matched those found for the standard presentation. This suggests that the
computer can be used effectively for this purpose.
There are a number of advantages of computer presentation. Firstly it
creates a very controlled environment for an experiment, cutting out many of
the irrelevant features which might intefere with standard human
presentation. Secondly, it is clearly enjoyed by the autistic children, as our
anecdotal account suggests, which is to the advantage of a researcher trying
to motivate the child in an experimental situation, and thirdly, it has
potential as a novel teaching device.
Another advantage of using the computer is that programs can be
designed to meet the needs of individual children and to adapt
appropriately as their needs change, capitalising on their skills and taking
account of special difficulties. Factors such as individual learning history,
ability to cope with change and communication skills can be considered in
the design.
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These preliminary findings concerning computer use with autistic
children are promising. Future research is now required to analyze the
advantages and also the possible dangers of computer programs for therapy
and instruction. We need to consider what sorts of programs are most
effective and most preferred by autistic children. For example, do they prefer
certain sorts of music or sounds? How much control should the children
have over the program? How can these programs be best structured? We
also need to consider whether computer packages are useful in teaching a
concept which can be generalized, or will an algorithm always be learned. If
the computer can be used effectively in communicating and interacting with
autistic children in may prove to be an indispensable aid to research and
teaching with autistic children.
The research findings of this thesis have raised a number of questions
for future research. It will be interesting to investigate further the nature of
the cognitive deficit in autism. In particular,we need to look at other aspects
of understanding related to theory of mind such a wishes, desires, intention,
affect etc as well as possible precursors to a theory of mind such as joint
attention and imitation. We also need to look more closely at the autistic
child's ability to make different sorts of inferences and to build knowledge
on that basis.
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APPENDIX A. Vineland items rated by independent judges as requiring or
not requiring a theory of mind. 
Which of the following items requires the use of a "theory of mind"?
Being able to use a "theory of mind" means :
- being able to take into account one's own or someone else's mental states
Examples of mental states are :
Pretending
Knowing
Believing
Dreaming
Wanting
Number of judges
rating item as 
requiring a theory
of mind 
1. Reaches for familiar person. 0
2. Shows interest in activities of others. 0
3. Laughs or smiles appropriately in response to 0
positive statements.
4. Engages in elaborate make-believe activities, alone or 4
with others.
5. Shows preference for some friends over others. 0
6. Labels happiness, sadness, fear and anger in self. 0
7. Follows rules in simple games without being reminded. 0
8. Apologizes for unintetional mistakes. 4
9. Responds appropriately when introduced to strangers. 0
10. Keeps secrets or confidences for more than one day. 4
11. Returns borrowed toys, possessions, or money to 0
peers, or returns borrowed books to library.
12. Ends conversations appropriately. 0
238
13. Refrains from asking questions or making statements	 4
that might embarrass or hurt others.
14. Keeps secrets or confidences for as long as	 4
appropriate.
15. Uses appropriate table manners without being told.	 0
16. Independently weighs consequences of actions before 	 0
making decisions.
17. Apologizes for mistakes or errors in judgment.	 3
18. Initiates conversation on topics of particular	 4
interest to others.
19. Responds to hints or indirect cues in conversation.	 3
20. Makes and keeps appointments.	 0
21. Expresses ideas in more than one way without assistance. 	 3
22. Relates experience in detail when asked.	 0
23. Responds verbally and positively to good fortune of others. 	 3
24. Controls anger or hurt feelings when denied own way.
	 0
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APPENDIX B. Tom Task Pictures (Experiment 5.) 
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